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The dialogue between philosophy and life sciences has increasing-ly intensified over the last decades, developing a prolific exchange 
network that leads the former to face the question of life in the light of 
the rich patrimony of knowledge offered by the latter, while encourag-
ing the latter to reflect upon the structures and categories of being as an 
ontological texture of the living world.
An overview of this fertile research field is presented in the current 
issue of Thaumàzein, which aims in particular to elucidate the concep-
tual constellation of morphology, organism, and evolution that is one 
of the central topics of the debate, involving, along with philosophers 
from various disciplines and life scientists, also scholars of the so-called 
theoretical biology (or metabiology). Actually, by questioning life and 
the complexity of its expressions from the biological level to the seman-
tic-symbolic one, philosophy is not new to such exchanges with science. 
A first example of this interaction is provided by the so-called pre-So-
cratic thinkers and subsequently by Aristotle, whose investigations keep 
attracting the attention of scholars for a series of valuable intuitions in 
the biological field. Nonetheless, the contemporary research, to which 
the present issue aims at offering a contribution, detects in Goethe’s age 
its fundamental reference in the philosophical and scientific tradition.
Goethe observes the living beings from a kind of eidetic perspec-
tive that in many ways seems to anticipate the phenomenological in-
quiry, from Husserl and Scheler onward. He is interested in beings as 
forms and he expressly calls this project Morphologie, which he under-
stands to be an inquiry into form. His aim is to explore the entire reality, 
from its inorganic manifestations to the human being and its spiritual 
expressions. According to Goethe, every being has a phenomenal na-
ture that can be perceived, seen and observed, even though each form 
is not ontologically determined and fixed (Gestalt, Bild), but mobile and 
in constant becoming, being involved in a process of “formation” (Bil-
dung) by means of “transformation” (Umbildung). Before Goethe, Bil-
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dung was generally identified with the capacity of receiving an external 
form in a passive way, like clay or soft wax can receive the imprinting 
of a seal. According to Goethe, instead, a living being is the subject of 
Bildung that is not a passive condition in which a predetermined form 
is impressed; rather, Bildung means the possibility of constant creation 
of new forms in a process of transformation that cannot be reduced 
to mere adaptation. The most immediate philosophical consequence of 
this perspective is represented by Schelling’s philosophy of nature. He 
conceives of the organism as being the expression of a circular and ret-
roactive causality inasmuch as, for him, the temporal cause-effect rela-
tion is no longer to be assumed in the sense of succession, but rather in 
that of simultaneity. In this relation, the effect exceeds the cause. In this 
respect, Schelling seems to anticipate Jonas by establishing an essential 
connection between organism and freedom, and defining the organism 
as a physical schema of freedom.
The relevance of Goethe’s theoretical project lies in its eidetic char-
acter, which derives from its ambition to grasp the Urform, that is to 
say, the original prototype of every kind. However, his conception of 
form also bears many similarities with the contemporary notion of form 
as the result of an ontological dialectic between invariance and trans-
formation at the core of reality. This thesis recurs in various essays pub-
lished in this issue. It represents a Leitmotiv around which the various 
scholars investigate the question of the living being in a sort of interme-
diate space between nature and art, natural and artistic forms.
Without entering into details here about the history of morphology, 
it is important to observe that Goethe’s project does not immediately 
receive the attention it deserves at least from philosophy, at the time 
dominated by Hegel’s perspective. A year before his death in 1832, on 
the occasion of the third edition of Metamorphosis of Plants, the elderly 
Goethe expresses his profound regret for being known as a poet, but not 
seriously considered as a scientist or a philosopher of nature despite his 
scrupulous commitment to the study of the natural organic and physical 
phenomena, due to his understanding of morphology as being a science 
ancillary to physiology.
However, the foundations of morphology have already been laid; 




term to designate a doctrine of form concerned with studying the laws 
of development of organisms. From this point forward, a long tradition 
of morphological studies has developed that has not always been ex-
empt from aporias and crises. Today morphology is conceived more as 
a methodological tool than as a proper discipline. It can also be seen as a 
methodological approach for a multidisciplinary research field that, also 
drawing on the Goethean matrix, focuses on those levels of structural 
designs called building plans (Baupläne). The Baupläne show how form 
and function essentially constitute an ontological relationship through 
which a living form comes into being, develops, and articulates as an 
emerging reality. This perspective gives rise to many questions: wheth-
er, for instance, an organism may be assumed as an autopoietic system 
or as a heteropoietic process; or how the individual’s ontogenesis can be 
considered to be an open epigenetic development by posing the relation 
between every individual and its species.
However, in the field of knowledge, we are witnessing today a sig-
nificant relaunch of the morphological perspective after several disputes 
about its validity, including the one involving Uexküll, or after the par-
adigm of modern synthesis reduced its heuristic calibre. Nevertheless, 
Uexküll’s critical point of view must not mislead us since he is the pro-
ponent of a conception of the living organism whose constitution, being, 
and behaviour cannot be reduced to physicalist explanations on a math-
ematical basis. This aspect is another common point emerging from the 
different essays in this issue. Various scholars propose an “alternative 
logic” to understand life and its processuality, expressly underlining 
the limits of mechanistic models of explanation. This common position 
has doubtless much to do with a metamorphic conception of the living 
organism, which is already at the core of Goethe’s theory.
Indeed, from the Goethean doctrine, the contemporary research re-
trieves, under the title of plasticity, the concept of metamorphosis as the 
structural constitution of living beings, hence definitively abandoning 
a vision of living beings as hypostatized substances rigid and steady in 
their essence. It views and analyses living beings as forms constantly 
subject to ongoing changes and continuous reconfigurations. After all, 
this position is also a central topic in today’s Evo-Devo perspective, 
which is less “genocentric” in the awareness that there is no one-to-one 
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relationship between genes and phenotypes. Once again, emphasis is 
placed on the impossibility to read the living world only according to a 
reductionist model or a hard naturalism while we need – as Habermas 
would suggest – a softer naturalism able to bypass the gnoseological 
limits of radical physicalism. Such a view can already be traced back 
to Goethe and Bergson. They can be regarded as inaugurators of a phi-
losophy of the living being endowed with its own categories that cannot 
be reduced to those of physics. However, such a theoretical approach 
was subsequently sidelined by a reductive interpretation of biological 
sciences aiming to understand life by eliminating all categories not di-
rectly attributable to physical or chemical laws. As known, such a para-
digm tried to generate families of forms through generative algorithms, 
which were often mathematically elegant (for example, fractals) but 
very far from biological reality. In other cases, adaptation was used as a 
kind of mechanistic model of ontological explanation for living beings.
From today’s perspective, instead, natural selection can only act on 
the products of developmental mechanisms actually operating in na-
ture. There are perfectly functional biological forms that, had they ap-
peared, would have been very successful, yet never saw the light. At the 
same time, “monstrous” individuals are born even though their survival 
chances are so scarce that they do not even reach adulthood. Therefore, 
a morphological consideration of form leads to rethinking the concept 
itself of evolution beyond that of mere adaptation. For a time, in bio-
logical research, interest in form was the prerogative of developmental 
biology while it practically remained neglected by evolutionary biology. 
Nevertheless, research in recent decades has led to a reinterpretation 
of the concepts of evolution and evolutionism, focusing more on the 
problems of form and morphology. It is acknowledged that, in order to 
understand living forms as they exist in nature, one cannot be satisfied 
either with the functionalist logic of evolutionary biology or with the 
explanations provided by developmental biology in terms of ontogenet-
ic processes: neither research line alone is sufficient to analyse living 
forms. Therefore, Evo-Devo teaches us that knowing the sequence of 
all the “building blocks” of life is not enough, since a biological indi-
viduality has also to be studied as a self-organization whose complex-




with the environment. Today, biology refocuses not only on the form but 
also on subjectivity and biological individuality, which were marginal-
ized during the 19th century, without falling back into vitalism.
We would also like to emphasize the role played by the particular 
connection between aesthetics and theoretical biology, which some of 
the essays of this issue tackle within the framework of a dialogue be-
tween philosophy and life sciences. This aspect appears to be especial-
ly relevant in the light of the turn of aesthetics towards aesthesiology, 
which today provides a broader understanding of living forms that by-
passes the traditional Aristotelian distinction between physei onta and 
techne onta. Again, insofar as Goethe’s morphology reworks this dis-
tinction by looking at reality as such, both natural and artistic, it may be 
seen as providing the matrix for overcoming it. We should not forget, en 
passant, the role of German physiologist and painter Carl Gustav Carus, 
who was also a friend of Goethe and who adopts a morphological per-
spective in art, making the close relation of science and art explicit.
The present issue is divided into three main sections: the first one 
includes the essays of Minelli, Maggiore, Tenti, and Tahar, and analyses 
the nexus between morphology and evolution; the second one, includ-
ing the essays of Porceddu Cilione, Ophälders, Lupo, Tedesco, Zhok, 
and Di Bernardo, focuses on the relationship between morphology, 
plasticity, contingency, and freedom; the third one collects the essays 
of Cusinato, Brentari, and Koutroufinis, and explores the debate stirred 
around the concept of organism proposed by Uexküll.
In the first section, Alessandro Minelli analyses the relation be-
tween form and development and the reasons for the impossibility to 
refer to a single explanatory paradigm of the living forms, starting from 
Burdach’s question about the principles of form and according to the 
contemporary position which denies the possibility for considering the 
form as a response to a function. One cannot investigate living forms by 
following only the logic of biological development, nor can one explain 
the ontogenetic processes only through the criterion of evolution. Rath-
er, Minelli argues for integrating both points of view as in Evo-Devo, 
discussing the three cardinal elements of this perspective, namely the 
presence of systemic changes, the modularity, and the evolvability in 
the living world. By stressing the role of structural constraints work-
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ing as conditions of possibility for changes and transformations, Minel-
li points to how phenotypic plasticity, as a proper character of living 
organisms, shows itself even in the absence of genotypic differences. 
In this sense, Minelli explores the main key topic of the present issue, 
namely the metamorphic form of the living being, on which Valeria 
Maggiore’s contribution also insists.
She raises the question of biological difference between imaginary 
creatures and only apparently fantastic existing animals that fill us with 
astonishment. Hence, Maggiore examines the disparity of existing an-
imals and its reasons as well as the conditions of possibility of the for-
mal organization regulating the emergence of morphological novelties 
in nature. She also discusses how the extended evolutionary synthesis 
relaunches the morphological perspective, focusing both on the role of 
the “architect genes” or “morphogenes” responsible for the ontologi-
cal syntax of animal organisms and on the power of the “architectural 
constraints” affecting (genetic and ontogenetic, physical and historical) 
development of the living forms.
Gregorio Tenti’s philosophical starting point concerning the role of 
difference, conceived to be structurally lying in Being and, hence, life, 
is the access key for a transcendental morphogenetic understanding of 
the living form beyond its biological definition and constitution. In his 
attempt, Tenti refers primarily to two positions, namely Bergson’s meta-
physics of life beyond Darwinism and Canguilhem’s philosophy of the 
living directly influenced by the morphological tradition, thus, recom-
posing the complex mosaic of the tradition of biomorphological studies 
both in Germany and France. At the same time, he deals with two main 
questions in morphology, namely 1) the epistemological problem of a 
knowledge of the living individuals and 2) the ontological problem of 
the consistency of becoming. The first problem, already well-known to 
Goethe and Kant, stems from the dilemma: on the one hand, the individ-
uals are non-objectual beings; on the other, morphology aims at grasp-
ing the essence of the living beings as such, or rather the «impersonal, 
morphogenetical a priori act» in which each living being consists. The 
second problem implies a reflection on notions such as temporality, spa-





Mathilde Tahar also investigates Bergson’s philosophy, which she 
resorts to in order to ponder the limits of strictly evolutionary expla-
nations. She argues that evolution cannot be conceived as a process 
towards an optimum and, therefore, she critically discusses Darwin’s 
solution of natural selection as a mechanistic explanation for adaptation 
that would imply finalism. Tahar’s essay draws the reader’s attention 
to the dynamic structure of evolution, which proceeds through mal-
adjustments, dissonances, conflicts, absurdities, inappropriateness, and 
regressions. In evolution, contingency plays an essential role which re-
veals its historical character insofar as evolution is “duration” and not 
mere succession. Hence, a mechanistic conception of evolution turns 
evolutionary explanations into vicious circles. And, most importantly, 
by not taking the organisms’ internal constraints into account, evo-
lutionary explanations prove to be insufficient in order to understand 
living organisms. Following Bergson, Tahar draws attention to the or-
ganism’s essence as something unpredictable by its own nature that ex-
presses the complexity and the contingent intersection of different and 
heterogeneous levels that can be distinguished only artificially. In this 
sense, biodiversity depends on the process of becoming understood as 
«a creative spiral of novelties».
The essays of the second section of the issue focus on the crea-
tive aspect in the world of forms that depend on contingency. Several 
authors rework Goethe’s overcoming of the Aristotelian difference be-
tween nature and art. Pier Alberto Porceddu Cilione especially devotes 
his essay to rethinking the concept of nature, examining how some cen-
tral concepts of aesthetics can contribute to the understanding of bio-
logical life. Porceddu Cilione not only points out that the natural world 
and the art world are related by a unitary play of forces, but also that 
there is an art of nature as well as a nature of art, therefore, the rigid 
distinction between art and nature must be bypassed. Thus, he calls 
the Goethean morphology into play since Goethe looks at the totality 
of Being as the true object of morphology. This totality is a creating 
processuality, even though this raises the questions of the relationship 
between the form of an entity and the eternal morphological matrix 
of Being. Being not only mimetic but also creative, art offers a study 
model of form. The morphological gaze is able to cross art and nature 
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transversally. Therefore, morphology can provide a common ground of 
reflection for both art and biology, by investigating the form-of-life and 
the form-of-art as Bildung. The concept of form as Bildung entails an 
antideterministic-mechanistic understanding of form, emphasizing its 
“free” character, its “gift” character.
Through a morphological investigation which eliminates the ulti-
mate distinction between nature and art, nature and culture, nature and 
history, Markus Ophälders’ text resorts both to Benjamin’s conceptual 
translation of the main concepts of Goethe’s morphology into those of 
his philosophy of history and his aesthetics (for instance, the reseman-
tization of the concept of Urphänomen as “origin”) and to Spengler’s 
thought. Inspired by Goethe’s philosophy of nature, Spengler assumes 
the cultural eras as living forms and living formation processes, such 
as plants subject to continuous metamorphosis. Both in Benjamin and 
Spengler, history is thematized as a natural phenomenon. Despite the 
role of human actions, history is “transformed” back into nature. Fur-
thermore, Ophälders is specifically concerned with Goethe’s way of 
conceiving the phenomenal essence of reality, hence the manifestative 
trait of the Urphänomene, namely of those phenomena that are sensibly 
perceived as Erscheinungen. This approach allows a kind of eidetic vi-
sion of form as the original form from which the other existing forms 
arise, despite Goethe’s terminological revision after Schiller’s criticism, 
which leads him to replace the concept of Urpflanze with the motto 
“Alles ist Blatt”. Even though Goethe abandons the idea that the es-
sence can be experienced through a sensible perception, the leaf is a 
self-showing phenomenon that allows the knowledge of all other botan-
ical appearances since through the leaf a form is given to the respective 
phenomena, a form different each time, but also consistently similar to 
a hypothetical original leaf. For Goethe, this kind of phenomenality is 
also at work in art, and, in this sense, Ophälders analyses the extension 
of Goethe’s morphological project, which lies on a conception of form 
as a free givenness and manifestation.
Such a conception of form is deeply phenomenological and can also 
be found in Rosa Maria Lupo’s essay, which investigates the question 
of the plasticity of form and its epistemological significance by putting 




Lupo analyses Blumenberg’s revision of the eidetic approach, which 
also lies at the core of Goethe’s morphological project. In its attempt to 
understand the problem of eidetic variation by looking at some theses 
of biology, this approach is exposed to the risk of losing the sense of 
the continuous plastic morphogenesis of living beings. The problem of 
eidetic variation is both an ontological and an epistemological ques-
tion. Indeed, the emphasis on the intelligible character of form, which 
is derived from the possibility of subsuming the individuals under the 
universal generalities of kinds and species to which they belong, im-
plies a reduction of the role of contingency, which actually is one of the 
essential elements that determine ontogenetic acts and epigenetic de-
velopment of the individual being at all levels of the living being, from 
the biological to the symbolic one. Nevertheless, renouncing the eidetic 
intelligibility of form draws the morphological project into question. In 
its constant dialogue with Goethe’s morphology, Blumenberg’s revisit-
ed phenomenology of the living world aims at respecting the delicate 
balance of chance and necessity which life consists in. It also draws 
on the Goethean conception of metamorphosis as a tension between a 
“subversive” force that tends to destroy the form and a “conservative” 
one, maintaining it instead.
In Salvatore Tedesco’s essay, Sebald’s morphological writing is a 
powerful sign of this dialectic tension within life between its loss and 
the possibility of overcoming its defeat. In this sense, Tedesco analy-
ses Sebald’s reference to Bilz and his investigation of identity, homi-
nisation, and metamorphosis. For Bilz, human identity formation is a 
conflictual process concerning the very relationship between the living 
being – in its body and its dynamic and plastic essence – and its vi-
tal environment. In this much troubled formation process, a dialogical, 
metamorphic, relational sense of identity emerges. Furthermore, Bilz’s 
psychopathological research focuses not only on the plastic dimension 
of the human affective world, it also examines the «reciprocal and mo-
tivated replacement of formal configurations», posing the existence of 
two main levels in the identity constitution of the human beings, namely 
the so-called biologische Radikale and identische Exekutive – which 
are marked by the ability both to repeat their ancestral foundation and 
to transform and shape a proper and autonomous inner world. Bilz’s 
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biological-relational interpretation of the human being offers a plural 
and dynamic conception of organic forms and their functional systems 
which reveals the radical human openness to the contingency of experi-
ence and to the unrepeatable uniqueness of life and reality.
This uniqueness is also at the core of Andrea Zhok’s essay, which 
discusses the changing character of the living being whose actions 
are driven by a «transformational logic» lying in a historical process. 
Actions are diachronic units whose meaning is fulfilled to the extent 
that they are embedded in a comprehensive horizon, i.e., in a story that 
includes three dimensions: biological, cultural, and personal. This ho-
rizon cannot be explained as a simple mechanical course. Instead, it 
is characterized by being «oriented towards», which determines that 
something has a value, a meaning for somebody. Therefore, the logic 
of the living beings cannot be described through an erroneous adap-
tationist paradigm that explains the essence of biological properties as 
the phenotypic traits, referring to the adaptation mechanism and hence 
to natural selection. On the contrary, natural selection «works on life 
and does not constitute life», meaning that natural selection operates 
through possibilities and not necessities. Zhok then discusses the mean-
ing of the biological properties as emergent properties. These emerge in 
the sense that they depend on the configuration of the parts of the living 
being. They are relational properties in the sense that they are a meet-
ing point between a certain given configuration of the living being and 
its given surrounding world. Hence, Zhok argues for a way of under-
standing that focuses on what a property can currently do, refusing to 
acknowledge that a new property’s emergence is strictly determined by 
the old one. In this sense, it is possible to consider natural evolutionary 
history as «a process of progressive possibilizations». This kind of de-
scription can also be adopted both for the cultural evolutionary history 
and the individual life, which can be seen as a «space» of possibilization 
where each action has «a possibilizing character» and is «creative of 
new possibilities, primarily for the course of life of the agent itself». In 
all three dimensions, there is no deterministic order, as Mirko Di Ber-
nardo also points out.
In his essay, Di Bernardo analyses the process of continuous auto-




of biological complexity, which considers highly organized living forms 
as plastic compromises between variability and specificity. Di Bernardo 
dwells extensively on the core of this theory, namely the autonomous 
agent defined as a physical system capable of acting for its own advan-
tage in a given environment. According to Kauffman, an autonomous 
agent has a relational character, and in particular it is a relational con-
vergence of matter, energy, and information, where information means 
a «quality [that is] able to generate and regulate the entire system». This 
feature transforms an autonomous agent into a living, cognitive, inten-
tional system which also needs to be analysed semantically, insofar as 
such a system makes use of symbols and signs. Moreover, a living sys-
tem is an expression of a “know-how” capacity that opens the system to 
the ethical sphere given that autonomous agents can act for their advan-
tage and self-preservation according to their representations connected 
to meanings and values they give and behaviours and purposes they 
have. Di Bernardo points out the difference between simple agents and 
complex autonomous ones like human beings capable of good and evil, 
the latter entailing forms of self-awareness capable of responsibility and 
being able to create new meanings and make symbols in continuous 
processes of «production of forms» by proceeding through synthesis, 
cancellations, and integrations. Ultimately, life implies semantics, in-
tentionality, and value.
As said above, despite his criticism of the morphological project, 
Estonian biologist Uexküll plays an important role in elucidating the 
relationship between the living organism and its environment. The es-
says in the third section of the issue are devoted in a more specific way 
to his position.
The project of biosemiotics emerges in Guido Cusinato’s essay, 
which turns to Scheler’s “enactive” phenomenology of the living being 
in his reworking of the most important concepts elaborated by Uexküll, 
especially that of Bauplan. Indeed, Scheler tries to solve Uexküll’s apo-
ria, which is also the starting point of Cusinato’s inquiry, namely how 
the different living species can reciprocally communicate in spite of 
their existence in different environments. Scheler’s answer is that the 
organism selects its Umwelt by «carving out» an ecological niche from 
the world. A «grammar of elementary expression» proper to each living 
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organism discloses the possibility of biosemiotic interaction between 
environments and living forms capable of active orientation within their 
own environment. The relationship between the living organism and 
its environment is made possible through the organism’s drive struc-
ture and perceptive nature, which focuses on what is relevant to its life 
within the environment. The organism, on its part, determines what is 
relevant according to a valueception that takes place on the pre-rep-
resentational level. The idea of plural environments (one for each spe-
cies) and of an interaction between the species and their environments 
are Uexküll’s legacy in Scheler’s thought. Furthermore, according to 
the distinction between Leib and Körper, Scheler recognizes the lived 
body as capable of perception, i.e., of selection through inner and outer 
sense. Indebted to the Uexküllian notion of Bauplan, this perspective 
is the key to Scheler’s «schematism of Leib», which he reworks enac-
tively by stressing its «creative» as well as selective role. According to 
Uexküll, a living organism can create a construction plan and thereby 
a «magic environment», namely its significant and vitally relevant In-
newelt, which can be thought of as a «world of semiotic markings» in 
which the organism acts in accordance with the biological markings it 
perceives as meaningful for its life. In this sense, such a world is also 
an operative one.
Uexküll’s biological concept of Umwelt, his conception of a living 
organism as a perceptive and operative organism that can «shape and 
share their experienced reality», and his Kantian heritage regarding 
the topic of transcendental subjectivity also play a central role in Carlo 
Brentari’s essay. Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt is a multi-semantic one, 
insofar as it designates a subjective, species-specific, intersubjective, 
and inter-specific world. This world results from the organism’s per-
ception and action according to an anti-mechanistic paradigm of nature 
characterized by a teleological force (Naturfaktor) that allows a kind of 
harmony among the various needs and actions of the diverse species. In 
physiological, morphological, anatomical terms, the Naturfaktor is the 
construction plan, while it is subjectivity as concerns the behavioural 
sphere. Another central question in Brentari’s essay is Uexküll’s risk of 
solipsism due to the fact that, in his theory, the subject has the nature 




trait, a Platonic influence can be detected in the possibility of know-
ing the Naturfaktor. Similar to Plato’s conception of ideas as media-
tors, four key functional circles play an intermediary role between the 
Naturfaktor and each living being, while the notion of Bauplan seems 
to present an Aristotelian teleological character. As a matter of fact, this 
Platonic aspect in Uexküll’s theory emphasizes its anti-determinism 
and anti-mechanism, insofar as he assumes the animal’s freedom to be 
a transcendental and semiotic way of being which discloses the possi-
bility of action. This represents an overcoming of the Platonic paradigm 
«of the repetition of fundamental ideas».
The analysis of the «logic of organism» as opposed to a «logic of 
biological mechanism» is precisely that which lies at the core of Spyri-
don A. Koutroufinis’ essay, which draws on the existence of causal 
factors like variables, parameters, and essential equations in order to 
determine the dynamic of a biological system. Causal factors can be 
intrinsic or extrinsic, but the peculiar trait of life is that there are no 
rigid borders between these factors insofar as the living organisms are 
dynamic ways of being constantly subject to change, thus, they are not 
mechanisms. Therefore, an organism is in a permanent processuality 
stemming from always new relations between these intrinsic and ex-
trinsic factors. Moreover, there is also a difference between first-order 
and second-order intrinsic factors, the latter expressing the plasticity 
of the living beings and of their “fundamental organizing principle” 
according to which a living organism aims at the maintenance and per-
petuation of its form of organization. The second-order intrinsic factor 
is conceived by Koutroufinis to be a process that fortifies the synergistic 
relationship between its elements. Individuality emerges from the «in-
extricable causal interweavement of its permanently occurring first-or-
der processes». Despite the presence of constraints limiting the freedom 
of the living organism, Koutroufinis puts their role into perspective in 
order to propose a different understanding of selfhood for overcoming 
scientific materialism. In order to do that, he looks at Uexküll’s concept 
of Umwelt in that it includes relevant aspects for the organism’s life. 
Insofar as an organism produces a representation of its Umwelt thanks 
to its apperception process, its existence cannot be mathematically ex-
plained and, therefore, biology cannot be reduced to physics.
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In publishing this issue of Thaumàzein, we hope that the dialogue 
between scholars from different disciplines will enhance an investiga-
tion of life that respects the complexity of its expressions and forms.
Guido Cusinato, Rosa Maria Lupo, Alessandro Minelli, Salvatore Tedesco
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LIVING FORMS IN BECOMING  
BETWEEN OLD CONSTRAINTS AND 
UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITIES OF CHANGE
Table of Contents: 1. Understanding forms; 2. Living forms between 
development and evolution; 3. Systemic vs. modular changes; 4. Geno-
type and phenotype.
1. Understanding forms
«We really understand a form when we know how it emerges from its 
principles». So Burdach,1 in the pages of the first book where the word 
“morphology” (Morphologie) appears in the title. But what can be the 
principles of a form?
Decades of biology dominated by an evolutionary reading of the 
living world could lead us to focus on adaptation: form responds to a 
function and the forms of living beings change due to selection, i.e. de-
pending on their fitness – the measure in which the different variants of 
a trait differently meet the demands of the environment.
This is certainly not the nature of the principles that Burdach called 
into question, but these are not unlike those that inspired Goethe, for 
example in his interpretation of the bodily organization of the plant and 
its parts, where everything is leaf (Alles ist Blatt) [Goethe 1790].
In the two centuries that separate us from the birth of morphology, 
the search for possible universals of form has sometimes turned towards 
the abstract aspects suggested by geometry (in particular, by topology), 
more often towards adventurous generalizations of the functional value 
of individual classes of shapes, an aspect we will not deal with in these 
pages.
1  «wir streben, den Sinn und Ursprung der Gestalt aus höhern Begriffen zu entwi-
ckeln» [Burdach 1817, 43].
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In the instances where the universals of form are sought in terms 
of geometry, the connection between the different forms does not nec-
essarily have an explicit biological basis. Such a foundation is lacking 
even in the famous geometric transformations of D’Arcy Wentworth 
Thompson [1917], based on a purely visual equivalence between the 
body shapes of different animals. A modern version of this comparative 
approach to organic forms based on geometric relationships is geomet-
ric morphometrics.2
Some approaches to the geometry of organic forms have taken a 
different, generative path, through the formulation of algorithms that 
reproduce families of regular organic forms, e.g. inflorescences [Pru-
sinkiewicz et al. 2007] or mollusc shells [Meinhardt 1998], up to the 
‘superformula’ of Gielis [2003], which intends to unify a great variety 
of forms, biological (e.g. leaves) and not as different solutions of a single 
equation of the maximum generality.
A separate chapter is represented by models that use fractal geome-
try to describe complex shapes in which the same unit form is repeated 
several times on different scale, such as on the surface of a cauliflower 
or in the repeated branches of many fern fronds [Minelli 2018]. It should 
be noted, however, that a close resemblance between natural forms and 
those generated by these models is not necessarily a proof that the for-
mer are produced in the same simple, mathematically ‘elegant’ way as 
the latter.
2. Living forms between development and evolution
In recent times, the never-abated dissatisfaction with a reading of living 
forms in purely functional terms has taken on new vigor, fueled by the 
spectacular progress that developmental biology has experienced over 
the last half century through an increasingly substantial contribution 
of molecular genetics. Natural selection can only act on those forms 
that have been actually built, that is to say on those that fall within the 
possible products of the developmental mechanisms actually operating 




in nature. Before comparatively evaluating the fitness of the various 
phenotypes in a given environmental context, it is therefore reasonable 
to deepen our knowledge of their actual possibility (and probability) of 
realization. A couple of examples will help explaining this statement.
In earthworms, the number of segments into which the body is di-
vided varies, even considerably, within each species and each individu-
al population. For example, if the most frequent value is 105 segments, 
there will also be individuals with 104, 103 etc. and with 106, 107 etc. 
segments. A similar continuity in the numerical variation is not found, 
however, in the chilopods or centipedes, that is in the scolopenders and 
in their closest relatives. In adult condition, these animals always have 
an odd number of leg pairs. This number is fixed in some groups, but 
can instead be variable, even considerably, although always avoiding 
even values. In geophilomorph centipedes the variation is quite evident: 
in a single population there can be for example individuals with 53, 55, 
57, 59 or 61 pairs of legs, none however with 54, 56, 58 or 60. What are 
the reasons for the total absence of chilopods with an even number of 
pairs of legs? An explanation in functional terms is unthinkable: what 
disadvantage could derive, in fact, from having only one pair of legs in 
excess or in defect of 57 pairs? Moreover, it seems difficult to hypoth-
esize a hereditary mechanism that completely excludes the production 
of individuals with an even number of pairs of legs by parents with any 
possible combination of odd numbers. It is far more reasonable to think 
that the absence of chilopods with an even number of leg pairs is due to 
the fact that these cannot be produced: in other words, there would be 
a constructive constraint, an intrinsic limit to the mechanism by which 
these animals produce the modular units (the segments, with a pair of 
legs each) of which their long trunk is formed.
Another instructive story of numbers is told by the giraffe’s neck. 
Lamarck was the first author to use this animal to illustrate his evolu-
tionary vision, according to which the morphological changes resulting 
from the repeated use of a body part end up being transmitted to the 
following generations. We can thus imagine that in ancient times gi-
raffes had a neck much shorter than today but, being faced with the 
dry season, when in the savannah the only green leaves are found on 
the branches of the acacias at considerable height above the ground, 
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they used to stretch it in the attempt to reach the food. The repeated ef-
fort would have produced a progressive lengthening of the neck, which 
would have been regularly transmitted to the offspring. Through a long 
series of generations, the giraffe’s neck would thus have reached the 
proportions it has today.
Acacias and summer drought also play an important role in the 
Darwinian-style scenario in which a population of giraffes appears, 
somewhat different from one another in terms of neck length. We ex-
pect that, as a rule, those with the longest neck are those that most easily 
manage to survive and reproduce. To the extent that the length of the 
neck depends on hereditary factors, there will thus be, from generation 
to generation, a slow but progressive increase in the average length of 
the neck, until the current proportions are eventually obtained. This is 
a functional, adaptive explanation of the peculiar shape of the neck of 
this mammal. But it is a partial explanation at best: it does not tell us, 
in fact, how to make a giraffe’s neck or at least its skeletal scaffolding.
We can imagine indeed that this is constituted by a high number of 
cervical vertebrae (more than the seven elements that support a human’s 
head), or by a few, very elongated cervical vertebrae (perhaps just sev-
en, as in our species). From a functional point of view, there might be 
some small difference between one vertebral composition and another, 
but the solution to our doubt must be sought in another direction. We 
realize this when we discover that the cervical vertebrae of the giraffe 
are just seven, a number virtually fixed in all mammals [Minelli 2009]. 
We have reason to think that there has never been giraffes with cervical 
vertebrae in number other than seven, although it is easy to imagine 
that, had nature been able to produce a more numerous set, this could 
have been advantageous over a lesser number of cervical vertebrae with 
similar average length.
Centipedes and giraffes therefore invite thinking of biological 
forms that, had they appeared, would have been successful, in terms of 
functional adaptation, but ‘simply’ never saw the light. There are also 
reciprocal examples: ‘monstrous’ individuals whose chances of survival 
are uncertain, while it is certain that they will not be able to repro-
duce and therefore to transmit their characters, and yet they often reach 
adulthood, demonstrating that existing developmental mechanisms are 
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capable of constructing forms other than normal ones.
Developmental biology has long learned to use these abnormal in-
dividuals to improve our knowledge of morphogenetic processes; in 
addition to the ‘monsters’ occasionally found in nature, there are also 
those intentionally produced in suitable experimental conditions. Ex-
emplary, from many points of view, are some Drosophila mutants, for 
example the so-called Antennapedia, in which a pair of legs replace the 
antennas. This anomaly can only be seen in the adult (in the previous 
stages, from embryo to larva to pupa, there are not antennae), so it is 
clear that the mutation does not hinder development, metamorphosis in-
cluded. But an adult fly without antennas lacks chemical receptors that 
are indispensable for locating food and searching for partners: in other 
words, it is a total failure, from an adaptive point of view.
What can we learn from this perhaps unexpected counterpoint 
between flies without a future that can be produced nevertheless, and 
giraffes with twenty cervical vertebrates or scolopenders with twenty 
pairs of legs that cannot be built, although we can be sure that they 
would survive and reproduce? The lesson learned from these examples 
is that to understand living forms as these exist in nature we cannot 
be satisfied either with the functionalist logic of evolutionary biology, 
or with the explanations provided by developmental biology in terms 
of ontogenetic processes: separately taken, neither is sufficient to ex-
plain the biological forms we actually find in nature. However, we can 
attempt to integrate between the two approaches, following the recent 
program of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo).3
Evolutionary developmental biology began to take shape as an au-
tonomous discipline only towards the end of the last century and is 
still searching for a precise identity [Arthur 2002; Müller 2008; Minel-
li 2015a]. It is often seen as a trading zone [Winther 2015] in which 
problems and methods of evolutionary biology confront those of de-
velopmental biology. Today, however, we are not only witnessing the 
overcoming (in itself a very important achievement) of the decades-long 
divergence between these two major branches of the life sciences 
[Amundson 2005], because in the context of evolutionary developmen-
3  See Hall 1992; Arthur 2002; Minelli 2003, 2009, 2018; Carroll et al. 2005.
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tal biology an original program has now taken shape, mainly focusing 
on three points: the origin of evolutionary novelties, modularity and, 
most important, evolvability. It will be useful to start from the latter, be-
fore briefly reviewing a series of aspects of the evolution of living forms 
that variously express the modularity of these and of the developmental 
processes that generate them.
The understanding of the relationships between genotype and phe-
notype has undergone a radical change with the lucid analysis of Pere 
Alberch [1991], which focused on the fundamental role of development 
and the constraints it poses to the opportunities for phenotype change. 
A problem therefore arose: what are the most likely, less likely and per-
haps also impossible scenarios of change? In other words, the central 
question became one of evolvability [Hendrikse et al. 2007; Minelli 
2017], that is the evolutionary path of living beings in what we can call 
the labyrinth of forms: phenotypic distances that are apparently easy to 
bridge may actually require difficult or unlikely changes at the genetic 
level while, on the contrary, seemingly large distances between two dif-
ferent phenotypes are sometimes bridged at the price of minor genetic 
changes.
Important news, for example, can be the consequence of a ‘simple’ 
iteration of a developmental process already at work in the same organ-
ism, with results depending on the number of iterations and the polarity 
of the axes along which these are realized. There is evidence, for exam-
ple, of evolutionary leaps in the number of segments of the body as a 
consequence of a probable overall duplication of the entire series of seg-
ments of which the trunk of the animal is composed. This may be the 
origin of Scolopendropsis duplicata, a centipede that has approximately 
twice the number of leg pairs compared to all the other scolopenders 
[Chagas et al. 2008; Minelli et al. 2009], and of the millipedes of the 
genus Dobrodesmus, similarly ‘duplicated’ with respect to their closest 
relatives [Shear et al. 2016]. Of major consequence can however be a du-
plication that gives rise to a new body axis, according to the principle of 
paramorphism that expresses the correlations between construction and 
regionalization of the main body axis and the corresponding processes 
in the axes of the appendages of the same animal [Minelli 2000].
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3. Systemic changes and modular changes
Provided that we retain a critical attitude with regard to a somewhat 
simplified taxonomy, it is useful to distinguish, in the context of the 
changes of living forms in development and evolution, between modu-
lar changes that concern exclusively (or almost exclusively) individual 
parts of the body, and systemic changes in which the entire body organ-
ization is deeply modified [Minelli 2015b]. Let’s start with the latter.
1) Systemic changes
A striking example of living forms resulting from a systemic change 
on an evolutionary scale is offered by the duckweeds, a small tribe of 
plants floating on the surface of freshwater ponds and ditches. In the 
most known and common representatives of this group, those belonging 
to the genus Lemna, there are neither branches nor leaves: the whole 
plant is just a small floating disk a few millimeters in diameter; its al-
most invisible flowers are reduced to a tiny ovary (female flowers) or a 
rudimentary stamen (male flowers). But there are also more simplified 
forms, overwhelmed by a systemic simplification that in the case of 
Wolffia arrhiza reduces the plant to a grain of green matter of just one 
mm in diameter, or even less. These simplified forms appear even more 
extreme when compared to the calla lilies, an example of the typical 
(not simplified) morphology of the plants of the arum family, to which 
the duckweeds also belong.
2) Modular changes
The independence enjoyed by the different parts of the body, from the 
point of view of the developmental processes from which they are gen-
erated, is clearly visible in the regeneration of lost parts, as in the case of 
the lizard’s tail. However, to a greater or lesser extent, this also occurs 
during the normal development of the organism, which can therefore 
be described as a system of local modules dominated by distinct and 
specific developmental dynamics: «Modules are assemblages of parts 
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that are tightly integrated internally by relatively many and strong in-
teractions but relatively independent of one another because there are 
only relatively few or weak interactions between modules» [Klingen-
berg 2005, 6].
Developmental modularity is the condition that allows a whole series 
of important evolutionary changes (developmental reprogramming [Ar-
thur 2000, 2002]), for which variations of ontogenetic processes, even of 
modest size, may be sufficient. Three main types are recognized – heter-
ometry, heterotopy, heterochrony – which involve, in the order, changes 
in quantitative (metric or meristic, positional and temporal) aspects of the 
production of individual parts of the body during development.
Heterometry is a significant variation of the size relationship be-
tween two parts of the body. An extreme example is offered by the nem-
atode Sphaerularia bombi. In this tiny parasitic worm, the reproductive 
system of the mature female hypertrophies up to become much larger 
than the animal itself and, following prolapse from the genital opening, 
it continues to grow outside the body of the worm, while the latter ends 
up representing only a small appendage of its reproductive organs [Poi-
nar & van der Laan 1972].
Heterotopy is the term used to describe a change in shape that oc-
curs during the development of the individual or in the evolutionary 
history of a group of organisms, affecting the spatial relationships of a 
single module in respect to the remaining of the body architecture. This 
is the case, for example, of flatfish. These, at the beginning of the devel-
opment, have a normal bilateral symmetry, but in the following phases 
one of the eyes migrates towards the opposite side of the head.
Heterochrony is an evolutionary change in the rates or timing of 
developmental processes. There are several types of heterochrony, char-
acterized by different forms of temporal change: the time of onset of 
an ontogenetic process (for example, the first visible evidence of the 
forming brain) can be anticipated or postponed; in turn, the moment at 
which it ends can be anticipated or delayed; and the speed with which 
the process takes place can also vary.
The traditional approach to heterochrony [de Beer 1930, 1940; Gould 
1977; McNamara 1986; McKinney & McNamara 1991] took into ac-
count almost exclusively the variations in the temporal course of somatic 
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growth with respect to reaching sexual maturity. Thus two main forms 
of heterochrony were recognized: paedomorphosis and peramorphosis. 
In the first case the animal reaches maturity while maintaining juvenile 
or larval characteristics in the somatic features, in the second the growth 
period is prolonged and maturation is delayed. The most recent research 
on heterochrony is based, instead, on the recognition of a more extended 
modularity of the developmental processes, thus allowing an analysis 
of the variations in the order in which the different events occur within 
the ontogenetic sequence (sequence heterochrony [Velhagen 1997; Smith 
2001, 2002; Jeffery et al. 2002a, 2002b, 2005]). An example of sequence 
heterochrony is provided by the order in which the anterior and pos-
terior limbs first appear in the embryo or the larva of different groups 
of terrestrial vertebrates: in the newt, in the hedgehog and in the mole, 
for example, the forelimbs appear first, in some anuran amphibians the 
opposite occurs, while in birds and in many mammals the two pairs of 
limbs appear simultaneously [Bininda-Emonds et al. 2007].
Classic examples of heterochrony are those of animals that reach 
sexual maturity while preserving a larval aspect, such as the olm (Pro-
teus anguinus), the blind cave amphibian of the karstic regions between 
the Isonzo River and the South of Bosnia-Herzegowina, that maintains 
gill breathing throughout life, typical of the larvae of its relatives (newts, 
etc.) which instead metamorphose into adults that breath atmospheric 
oxygen.
4. Genotype and phenotype
The clamorous success of molecular biology and the explosive develop-
ment of studies on the genetic control of developmental processes in re-
cent decades could suggest that a thorough knowledge of the genotype 
of an animal or plant is sufficient to predict its structure. The possibility 
of “computing” an embryo has been discussed.4 But this would be a 
4  «Will the egg be computable? That is, given a total description of the fertilized 
egg – the total DNA sequence and the location of all proteins and RNA – could one 
predict how the embryo will develop? This is a formidable task […]. It may, however, 
be feasible if a level of complexity of description of cell behavior can be chosen that 
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hasty conclusion. In fact, the path from the genotype to the phenotype 
is anything but simple [Alberch 1991; Draghi & Wagner 2008; Pigli-
ucci 2001; West-Eberhard 2003]. It is rare that the expression of a gene 
corresponds precisely and unambiguously to the production of a given 
phenotypic trait. Generally speaking, the expression of one gene will be 
involved in many traits (pleiotropy), while identical or almost identical 
traits can be achieved even in the presence of differences in the genes 
or in the gene networks involved in their control (convergence or re-
dundancy). Moreover, the phenotype that actually shows up depends, 
to a greater or lesser extent, also on influences from the environment in 
which development takes place.
1) Not everything from genes
Phenotypic plasticity5 is the ability to produce different phenotypes in 
the absence of genetic differences between individuals: which pheno-
type is actually obtained depends instead on the environmental con-
ditions to which the animal was exposed in a (generally early) critical 
phase of its development [Pigliucci et al. 2006]. The best known ex-
ample of phenotypic plasticity is probably the development of a female 
bee into either a fertile queen or a sterile worker: in this case, the factor 
responsible for the production of one or the other phenotype is the food 
(with or without royal jelly) that the insect received during the larval 
stage.6 In the alligator and in other reptiles, under environmental control 
is the determination of sex, which depends on the temperature at which 
the egg is incubated [Janzen & Phillips 2006].
Recent studies have shown how easily alternative phenotypes con-
trolled by the environment can sooner or later fall under genetic control 
[Brisson 2010]. In the pea aphid (Acyrthosiphon pisum) individuals of 
either sex can be winged or wingless, but this difference has different 
is adequate to account for development but that does not require each cell’s detailed 
behavior to be taken into account» [Wolpert 1994, 571-572].
5  See Fusco & Minelli 2010; Pigliucci 2001; Schlichting & Pigliucci 1998; West-Eber-
hard 2003, 2005.




causes in the male, where it is the expression of a genetic polymor-
phism, and in the female, where the presence or the absence of wings is 
instead a case of polyphenism, i.e. it represents the response to different 
environmental signals. However, the difference between the two con-
ditions is subtle, since the gene responsible for the development of the 
wings in the male also plays a role in the response of the female to the 
environmental signals [Braendle et al. 2005a, 2005b].
2) Whose genes?
In many animals, including humans, normal life depends on a function-
al association between cells of different genetic identity: only a part of 
these derives from the zygote, the others are bacteria of many differ-
ent species. Collectively, these bacterial cells form a microbiome that 
accompanies the animal throughout its life and strongly influences its 
vital processes. We can therefore state that the biological system that 
we usually call an individual is actually a consortium of functionally 
integrated animal and microbial cells [Gilbert et al. 2012; Gilbert & 
Epel 2015].
The best known multigenomic biological systems are the lichens, 
each of which is the product of a symbiotic relationship between a fun-
gus and an alga. In many cases, the individual species of lichens (or 
rather, as we prefer to say today, the individual species of lichenized 
fungi) have precise and recognizable forms, expressions of processes 
of growth and development that depend jointly on the genomes of the 
fungus and the alga. Even more specific and predictable are the shapes 
of plant galls, especially of those that are induced by the puncture of 
plant tissues by the different species of cynipid wasps. From the point of 
view of comparative morphology and morphogenesis, lichens and galls 
would indeed deserve much closer attention than they have got up to 
now [Minelli 2017].
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Abstract
What does it mean to understand a biological form? Traditional approaches have 
tried to generate families of form through generative algorithms, often mathemat-
ically elegant (e.g., fractals) but very far from biological reality, or to explain it in 
terms of adaptation. In recent times, a different reading of living forms has been 
fueled by progress in developmental biology. The key point is that natural selec-
tion can only act on the products of the development mechanisms actually operat-
ing in nature. There are biological forms that, had they appeared, would have been 
successful, but simply never saw the light. There are also reciprocal examples of 
‘monstrous’ individuals whose chances of survival are uncertain and are not able to 
reproduce, yet they often reach adulthood, demonstrating that existing developmen-
tal mechanisms are capable of constructing forms other than normal ones. Thus, to 
understand living forms as these exist in nature we cannot be satisfied either with 
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the functionalist logic of evolutionary biology, or with the explanations provided by 
developmental biology in terms of ontogenetic processes: separately taken, neither is 
sufficient to explain the biological forms we find in nature. However, we can attempt 
to integrate between the two approaches, following the recent program of evolution-
ary developmental biology (evo-devo). Within this discipline, an original program 
has taken shape, focusing on evolvability, modularity and the origin of evolutionary 
novelties. Evolutionary and developmental changes of living forms can be modular 
or systemic. Modularity allows different kinds of development reprogramming: het-
erochrony, heterotopy, heterometry, which involve, in the order, changes in temporal, 
positional and quantitative aspects of the production of individual body parts during 
development. Despite the explosive development of studies on the genetic control 
of developmental processes, a thorough knowledge of the genotype of an animal or 
plant is not sufficient to predict its structure. The expression of one gene is generally 
involved in many traits (pleiotropy), while identical or almost identical traits can be 
achieved even in the presence of differences in the genes or in the gene networks 
involved in their control (convergence or redundancy). Moreover, the phenotype that 
actually shows up depends also on influences from the environment in which the 
development takes place (phenotypic plasticity), and on often standing and specific 
interactions with other organisms, as in the fungus-alga symbiosis of lichens and the 
interactions of multicellulars – humans included – with their microbiome.
Alessandro Minelli
Department of Biology, University of Padova







ANIMAL FORM BETWEEN 
MYTHOLOGY AND EVO-DEVO
Table of Contents: 1. Imaginary beings and the rules of form; 2. The 
hundred eyes of Argos: Evo-Devo, evolutionary plasticity and historical 
constraints; 3. The wings of Pegasus: architectural constraints and mor-
phospace; 4. Conclusions: from imaginary beings to fantastic beings.
Perhaps universal history
is the history of a few metaphors.
J.L. Borges, Pascal’s Sphere, 1952.
1. Imaginary beings and the rules of form
«It is the animal with the big tail, a tail many yards long and like a fox’s 
brush. How I should like to get my hands on this tail sometime, but it is 
impossible, the animal is constantly moving about, the tail is constantly 
being flung this way and that. The animal resembles a kangaroo, but 
not as to the face, which is flat almost like a human face, and small 
and oval; only its teeth have any power of expression, whether they are 
concealed or bared» [Borges 1974, 17]. With these words Franz Kafka 
describes a bizarre creature that appeared in his dreams: a hybrid in 
which the perspicuous characters of morphologically and ethologically 
different animals – such as the fox and the kangaroo – are mixed to 
human somatic traits, recalling ancient mythological beings [Borghese 
2009, 283].
Jorge Luis Borges accurately transcribes the words of the Prague 
writer in his Book of Imaginary Beings [Borges 1974], a manual of fan-
tastic zoology written in collaboration with María Guerrero in 1957 and 
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inscribed in the literary tradition of medieval bestiaries. This anthology 
appears as «a handbook of the strange creatures conceived through time 
and space by the human imagination» [ivi, 12], a reasoned catalogue in 
which harpies, phoenix, satyrs and many other beings of Greco-Roman 
mythology are collected together with biblical figures (such as Behemot 
and Leviathan) and oriental mythical creatures (such as Humbaba, the 
legendary guardian of the Cedar Forest portrayed in the epic of Gil-
gameš, or Zaratan, the huge sea turtle described in the early ninth cen-
tury by the Muslim zoologist al-Yahiz). The structure of all those imag-
inary beings is peculiar and results «from improbable combinations of 
parts of different animal species, as in the hippogryph and the chimera» 
[Minelli 2015, 33].
Since ancient times, man has shown a genuine passion for the re-
combination of visual elements in unusual and extraordinary forms, a 
skill that was already noted by the French biologist François Jacob at the 
beginning of the article Evolution and tinkering. He noted that
some of the 16th-century books devoted to zoology and botany 
are illustrated by superb drawings of the various animals that 
populate the Earth. Certain contain detailed descriptions of such 
creatures as dogs with fish heads, men with chicken legs, or even 
women without heads. The notion of monsters that blend the 
characteristics of different species is not itself surprising: every-
one has imagined or sketched such hybrids [Jacob 1977, 1161].
Hybrids. Crossings. Fantastic images that «embody a breaching of 
boundaries that at once fascinates and puzzles» [Minelli 2015, 34] and 
whose creative mechanism concerns the complex relationship between 
sensitivity, intellect, and imagination. This peculiar connection has been 
philosophically analyzed since ancient times [cfr. Ferraris 1996; Fran-
zini & Mazzocut-Mis 1996, 235-247]; however, a more accurate anal-
ysis of their mutual relationship can be found in Kantian writings. It is 
not my intention here to examine the philosophical investigations which 
led Immanuel Kant to elaborate his theories; I just want to point out that 
the Königsberg philosopher conceives the imagination as a faculty of 
mediation, a faculty that comes into action whenever a representation 
is presented to the human mind through the only possible way for man, 
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that of sensitivity and space-time intuitions. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, the imagination is defined as «the faculty for representing an 
object even without its presence in intuition» [Kant 1998, 256] and it is 
usually used in two different ways: this peculiar faculty can be used to 
faithfully reproduce real objects – allowing us, for example, to recall in 
our mind the representations of past events (imagination as memorial 
reproduction) – or to produce images not derived from experience [ivi, 
257]. These latter are the result of a “fantastic montage”, an “assembly” 
which – as in the case of the mythological beings mentioned above – 
combines separate elements, creating formal novelties.
As Kant shows, «the imagination of Homo sapiens has no limits 
in the creation of fantastic shapes, in the recombination of experiential 
elements to create monsters, hybrids, wonderful creatures» [Mandrioli 
& Portera 2013, 267]; but, if the ancients admitted the existence of such 
imaginary crosses,1 today we are fully aware that their existence is lim-
ited to the ontological domain of the “merely thinkable”. This happens 
not only because nobody on Earth has ever come across these bizarre 
animals, but also because the imaginary beings created by the human 
mind are often irreconcilable with physical and biological laws.
Thus, if the imaginary beings described by Borges seem to respect 
some construction rules shared by existing animals (they preserve, for 
example, bilateral symmetry or maintain the polarity between the front 
and the back of the body), however, they do not respect other biolog-
ical regularities, constancies that must be ascribed to a small number 
of architectural patterns, some “sedimented-over-time schemes” which 
constitute the memorial archive of nature. In most cases human imag-
ination created such imaginary beings by limiting itself in caricaturing 
some distinctive features of existing beings (lengthening, shortening or 
altering the dimensions of certain body parts) or inserting appendages 
(wings, additional limbs, fragments of other animals, etc.) in the basic 
body configuration; nevertheless, in both cases the formal laws of living 
beings are broken.
1  Jacob states that «in the 16th century these creatures belonged, not to the world of 
fantasies, but to real world. Many people had seen them and described them in detail. 
The mon sters walked alongside the familiar animals of everyday life. They were 
within the limits of the possible» [Jacob 1977, 1161].
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«The unknown artist from whose hands the chimera of Arezzo was 
created», says in this regard the Italian biologist Alessandro Minelli, 
«certainly had no concern about the rejection problems that, as we well 
know today, would have led to the failure of these improbable trans-
plants» [Bruni 2015]: this anonymous artist was not aware of the phys-
ical and biological mechanisms which regulate the construction of the 
“goat and snake part” of Chimera body, “grafted” by our imagination 
on a lion shape; equally he did not know why the addition of these ap-
pendices is impossible from a biological point of view.
In view of the above, the morphologist must ask himself what bio-
logically distinguishes imaginary creatures from some existing animals 
which are only apparently fantastic. In the attempt to settle this ques-
tion, we asked ourselves: «the domains of forms created by imagination 
and the domains of natural forms are completely separate from each 
other» [Mandrioli & Portera 2013, 270]? What differentiates the Hydra 
of Lerna, the Sphinx and the Centaur from the small South American 
Axolotl [Henderson 2013, 2-23], the Siamese twins, the hermaphrodite 
creatures, the two-headed mammals and the Drosophila born with a 
pair of legs instead of the antennae? And why do these existing crea-
tures generate in us at the same time a feeling of wonder and dismay?2
To answer these questions, in this article I try to investigate the rea-
sons for animal variability and to trace «the ways and limits of formal 
organization» [Wagner & Laubichler 2004, 97], keeping in mind that 
living form is a mobile structure, a «changeable and complex phenome-
non subject to regular and monstrous transformations» [Mazzocut-Mis 
1995, 17]. In fact, accordingly to Charles Darwin
The members of the same class, independently of their habits 
of life, resemble each other in the general plan of their organi-
zation. This resemblance is often expressed by the term “unity 
2  «From a certain point of view, the hermaphrodite is even more disturbing than a 
centaur or a mermaid», says Minelli. «These, in fact, obey the syntax of the body, 
namely the spatial and functional relationship between the different parts (head, 
trunk, limbs), as we know them in ourselves and in our fellow humans – a formal 
blueprint we take as a model when we try to decipher the morphology of other living 
beings, whether normal or monstrous» [Minelli 2015, 34].
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of type”; or by saying that the several parts and organs in the 
different species of the class are homologous. The whole subject 
is included under the general name of Morphology. This is the 
most interesting department of natural history, and may be said 
to be its very soul. What can be more curious than that the hand 
of a man, formed for grasping, that of a mole for digging, the leg 
of the horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and the wing of the bat, 
should all be constructed on the same pattern, and should include 
similar bones, in the same relative positions? [Darwin 2008, 319]
In this passage of the Origin of the species, the father of evolutionism 
considers morphology as the soul of naturalistic research (although he 
did not make a significant contribution to the development of this bio-
logical discipline)3 and he testifies that nature «always works with the 
same materials, and that she only engages in varying forms» because 
«she is subject to mandatory laws, which oblige her to always make the 
same elements appear, in the same issue, in the same circumstances and 
with the same connections» [Mazzocut-Mis 1995, 35]. To understand 
formal phenomena, therefore, we must deal with the plasticity of or-
ganic bodies and study the external and internal laws that regulate the 
emergence of new morphological events in Nature because – says the 
German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the father of modern mor-
phology – «discovering the rules of the form» «is the key to all signs of 
Nature» [Goethe 2009, 115].
3  The historian of science E.S. Russell states in this regard: «it is a remarkable fact 
that morphology took but a very little part in the formation of evolution-theory. When 
one remembers what powerful arguments for evolution can be drawn from such facts 
as the unity of plan and composition and the law of parallelism, one is astonished 




2. The hundred eyes of Argos: Evo-Devo, evolutionary plasticity and  
historical constraints
The concept of plasticity plays a central role in Darwin’s essay: it ade-
quately accounts for the evolutionary tendency of living beings because, 
as Friedrich Nietzsche states in a passage of his Untimely Meditations, 
it indicates «the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, 
to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to 
heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds» 
[Nietzsche 2007, 62]. The father of evolutionism uses the term “plastic” 
from the first pages of the Origin of the species. In the chapter enti-
tled Variation to the domestic state, Darwin states that every animal 
body shows an intrinsic character of “openness” and “modifiability” 
and, therefore, «breeders habitually speak of an animal’s organization 
as something quite plastic, which they can model almost as they please» 
[Darwin 2008, 26]. As we can see, the concept of plasticity allows him 
to articulate the relationship between the variability of individuals be-
longing to the same species and their subsequent selection, whether it 
natural (the struggle for survival) or artificial (controlled breeding prac-
tices); in fact, just the simple observation reveals a certain attitude of 
animals to change their configurations in the attempt to adapt to the 
environment. Therefore the term plasticity indicates the set of possible 
changes or, in other words, the structural laws which regulates all the 
“tolerable” morphological changes [Malabou 2010]. How is articulated 
the relationship between these structural laws and the natural selection 
process? Why is the possibility of varying almost infinite but not unlim-
ited? What contributes to the delimitation of the domain of possibilities 
granted to the living being?
In the last century, the emergence of the Modern Synthesis – the 
theoretical orientation that, integrating Darwinian theory with the ge-
netics of Gregor Mendel, can be considered the dominant paradigm in 
twentieth-century biological thought4 – has favored the affirmation of 
4  «The “synthetic theory”, or the “modern synthetic theory” […] derives from the ti-
tle of a book written by the grandson of Darwin’s most effective defender: Evolution, 
The Modern Synthesis, published by Julian Huxley in 1942» [Gould 2002, 503]. The 
term “synthesis” highlights the integration between the theory of evolution and other 
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an externalist interpretation of living beings [Newman 1995, 219-223] 
identifying in natural selection the only leading cause of evolution; 
in fact, as Fusco and Minelli point out, «in the context of the modern 
synthesis, the role of environment in organic evolution can be roughly 
summarized by the well-known phrase: ‘environment proposes, natural 
selection disposes’, which expresses the one-way relationship between 
environment and adaptation in orienting the direction of evolutionary 
change» [Fusco & Minelli 2010, 547].
Accordingly, the fundamental assumption of this theoretical move-
ment is the idea that genes find direct expression in the phenotype (the 
set of all observable characteristics) and that the animal form is the 
visible manifestation of the genotype, that is, the genetic constitution 
of an individual [Müller & Newman 2003, 7]. The affirmation of this 
approach in the twentieth-century scientific debate has therefore con-
tributed to relegate morphology – a discipline based on the observation 
and comparison of phenotypic forms – to a marginal role in biologi-
cal studies [Cislaghi 2008, 249]; however, echoing Darwin’s quotation, 
we can affirm that «the very mystery of life is revealed in a thousand 
forms, which make it manifest, and through which the intelligible can 
be recovered» [Mazzocut-Mis 1995, 112]: phenotypes «have autonomy 
that can trump that of the [genetic] programs they supposedly express» 
[Müller & Newman 2003, 6] and, nowadays, many biologists affirm 
that the approach taken by Modern Synthesis requires a “revision” and 
a greater opening towards the study of the external configurations of 
living beings.5
biological branches. In particular, the new Synthesis integrates the Darwinian The-
ory with genetics (the theory of heredity developed by Mendel), botany, systematics 
and paleontology. «Up to this point one could consider the MS as, in fact, a synthe-
sis: from Fisher to Dobzhansky, it was a fusion of neo Darwinism and Mendelism 
achieved through the theory and practice of the new population-statistical genetics. 
The other major contributions, however, went beyond synthesis to actually adding 
new concepts to the neo-Darwinian edifice, and in some cases to even contradicting 
some of Darwin’s own positions» [Pigliucci & Müller 2010, 7].
5  Cfr. Müller & Newman [2003, 3] in which the authors point out that «the appear-
ance of specific, phenotypic elements of construction must not be taken as being 
caused by natural selection; selection can only work on what already exists». As a 
consequence, «current evolutionary theory can predict what will be maintained, but 
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The recent development of the Evolutionary Developmental Biol-
ogy (or more simply Evo-Devo Theory) can be understood in this di-
rection as fundamental step to a new Extended Evolutionary Synthesis 
[Pigliucci & Müller 2010]. Evo-Devo Theory is a branch of biology that 
brings together evolution and development and aims to discover the laws 
governing the birth, the growth and the morphological organization of 
living beings. Developmental biology was an ancient field of study but, 
placing the analysis of form at the core of its researches, it had not ample 
space in the context of the Modern Synthesis. Moreover, in the past the 
scientists had few technical tools to investigate animal development. 
Today, however, «we can open this black box and understand not only 
the survival of the fittest, as evolutionary biology suggests, but also the 
arrival of the fittest, that is, how it is possible to build, through develop-
ment, the different phenotypes; once the latter are completed, they will 
then be screened for selection» [Bruni 2015]. We can even aesthetical-
ly observe this formal construction because, as the American biologist 
Sean B. Carroll suggests, «there is also a special grandeur in the view 
embryology and evolutionary developmental biology provide into the 
making of animal form and diversity. Part of it is visual, in that we can 
now see how the endless forms of different animals actually take shape» 
[Carroll 2005, 13].
The developmental biology research program can, therefore, be 
useful to provide answers to our questions: why some of the imagi-
nary beings described by the pens of poets and writers could never 
have existed in nature? And why, on the other hand, do creatures whose 
composite body structure exceeds human imagination (like, for exam-
ple, the platy pus or the yeti crab [Henderson 2013, 354-365]) exist? Or 
again: why are some mythological creatures (such as the Cyclops) not 
in contrast with natural rules and could be the fantastic repurposing of 
existing animal?
In the early eighties, a group of scientists (including Christiane 
Nüsslein-Volhard and Eric F. Wieschaus) studied the mutations of the 
fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster): it was noticed that, among the mil-
lions of larvae raised in the laboratory, some specimens had a pair of 
not what will appear» [ivi, 7].
Fantastic Morphologies
47
legs instead of the antennae and some others were equipped with an 
extra pair of wings. These specimens had nothing to envy the Greek 
Gorgons or the Persian Manticore. The researchers discovered that the 
appearance of these “monstrous flies” did not contradict the “rules of 
the form” and was due to the mutation of some specific genes which 
oversee the formation and the organization of morphological structures 
[Carroll 2005, 61-74]: the Hox genes (short for Homeobox) or architect 
genes [Caianiello 2006, 48]. These are morphogens, because their «in-
formation content is expressed in the entire construction of animal pro-
cess» [Pievani 2006, xv] and their main function is to identify in the 
embryo the expression of other genes determining the development of 
different body structures.
The secret of “animal geometry” is therefore linked to these genes: 
they allow to activate or deactivate the “switches” that, during the for-
mation of an organic process, determine the number of body parts, their 
shape, their position and their size.
Starting from these premises, in a few decades the Evo-Devo has 
produced a huge mass of experimental data which reveal an exciting 
result: it was possible to demonstrate the presence of a complex of genes 
(to be precise a sequence of 180 pairs) that organize for the development 
of body pattern: these genes are the same not only in the simpler bacte-
ria and organisms but also in the famous Drosophila melanogaster, the 
fruit fly now considered an undisputed protagonist of animal genetics 
research. A question spontaneously arises: bacteria? Flies? What can 
these tiny life forms teach us about the morphological construction of 
human body and, more generally, of the mammal ones? And what infor-
mation can they give us on the boundary between normal, pathological 
and imaginary development of forms?
«The common perception», writes Carroll, «reinforced by decades 
of zoology and a wide cultural divide between biologists who worked 
on mice, rats, or other conventional models of human biology, and those 
who worked on “lower” forms – was that the rules of physiology and de-
velopment differed enormously between mammals and bugs or worms» 
[Carroll 2005, 63]. The evolutionary lines of these animals diverged 
more than 500 million years ago and the formal differences accumulat-
ed during the geological eras are so great that for decades it has been 
Valeria Maggiore
48
considered “useless” to carry out speculations and experiments on these 
creatures in the attempt to understand something more about the genet-
ic and morphological construction of higher animals.
Moreover, as the biologist Jonathan Slack points out with a met-
aphor of great impact, the discovery of the homeobox is comparable 
to that of the Rosetta stone which allowed us to decipher hieroglyphic 
writing by means of linguistic comparison [Slack 1984, 364]: despite 
the great differences in appearance and physiology, all complex animals 
(including humans) share a small number of regulatory genes (about 
ten). «If we think that the corporeal architectures of the entire animal 
kingdom depend on the same conductors who conduct the development 
dance in very different living beings such as an insect, a frog, a worm 
and a lion, it appears, in all its dazzling clarity, the matrix of biological 
and historical unity that embraces living creatures» [ivi, 13], a “common 
frame” which explains the origins of all morphological determination.
It was soon noticed, for example, that the Distal-less gene (involved 
in the development of the fruit fly limbs) has a counterpart in human 
DNA gene and that the same happened for other Hox genes, such as the 
Tinman gene that regulates the development of the circulatory system: 
all morphogens identified in the “insignificant” fruit fly have a human 
equivalent. But there is more: it was discovered that the Eyeless gene 
(so named because the mutant flies for this gene do not have eyes) has 
an equivalent in mammals in the so-called Small Eye gene, which cor-
responds, in turn, to the Aniridia human gene. The Eyeless gene was 
experimentally manipulated and it was shown that it could be activated 
in anomalous regions of the gnat’s body structure [Carroll 2005, 66]: 
eyes appeared on the wings and paws and, even more incredible, the 
same bizarre phenomenon also occurred when homologous genes of 
other species were introduced into the fly’s gene sequences, demonstrat-
ing the equivalence of these genes. In the light of these discoveries, the 
morphology of Argus, the Greek mythological creature with a hundred 
eyes, does not appear so bizarre and seems paradoxically to have antic-
ipated the outcome of these experiments.
Furthermore, these discoveries led biologists to admit the exist-
ence of a common origin of living beings and to the formation of the 
concept of zootype, a term that indicates «the topographical scheme 
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according to which different organs would be distributed along the 
main axis of the body of all animals» [Minelli 2009, 45]. We are faced 
with a «shared body syntax» [Bruni 2015] which explains why each 
animal can be interpreted as a variation on the theme (represented 
by the so-called historical development constraints, i.e. constraints 
inherited from its ancestors) or as a different combination of the build-
ing blocks belonging to the same genetic box (each living being is «the 
result of a constructive path that has settled in evolution for different 
adaptive reasons but starting from the same basic ingredients» [Pie-
vani 2006, xiii]).
3. The wings of Pegasus: architectural constraints and morphospace
Without questioning the truthfulness of these facts, we must ask our-
selves if this approach is authentically explanatory towards form and 
its coming into being. The Evo-Devo Theory allows us «to abandon a 
version of evolutionary theory based only on genes and on the quantita-
tive variations of allelic frequencies within populations. It adds forms to 
genes, recognizing that the mechanisms involved in the development of 
forms have the same importance of other already known mechanisms» 
[Mandrioli & Portera 2013, 274]; however, we are once again faced with 
a theoretical attitude that considers phenotype development as the “ex-
plication of an acronym” kept in the cell nucleus. The current state of 
research leads us to affirm that «there simply aren’t enough genes to 
“determine” the phenotype» [Callebaut et al. 2007, 29] and therefore 
this theory “sins of excess” because, considering itself exhaustive to-
wards formal development, it does not invoke the help of other emerg-
ing biological theories.
In fact, the constraints affecting the development process of organic 
forms will be of various types: genetic and ontogenetic, physical and 
historical. For example, the American biologist Stuart A. Newman does 
not consider the organisms as the simple expressions of their genome, 
but as a «carnal entity» [Newman 1995]: the animal form is the view-
able result of a functional adaptation to the environment, but it is also 
influenced by physical forces that lies «“outside” (and prior to) the spe-
cific architectural blueprints of each particular Bauplan» [Gould 2002, 
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1181]. Only later, the «innovation linked to the phenotype and the de-
velopment systems that guide its formation can be fixed as a result of 
a genetic “program”, giving rise to defined Baupläne» [Mandrioli & 
Portera 2013, 279].
The problems related to the animal form cannot be explained only 
tracing the phylogenetic chain of living being because the formal prob-
lems of these latter «are in the first instance mathematical problems, 
their problems of growth are essentially physical problems, and the 
morphologist is, ipso facto, a student of physical science» [Thompson 
1942, 10]. Consequently, to understand the animal formal construction 
we need to analyze the “physical conditions” of our world which «im-
poses certain limitations on shapes and sizes of the various organisms» 
[Ceruti 2007, 6].
The Scottish morphologist D’Arcy Thompson underlines this aspect 
in his most famous work, the essay On Growth and Form [Thompson 
1942]. He claims, for example, that the animal body shape is regulated 
by physical principles, such as the «Galileo’s principle of necessarily de-
clining surface/volume ratios as geometrically similar objects increase 
in size» [Gould 2002, 1189]: accordingly to it animals are “sculpted” 
by natural forces in a different way because tiny animals must dwell 
«in a world dominated by forces acting upon their surfaces, while large 
animals will be ruled by gravitational forces operating upon volumes» 
[ivi, 1190].
From these premises it follows that, if only one of two imaginary 
animals exists in nature, the absence of the other is not necessarily 
attributable to natural selection; «rather, it may be that nature is not 
able to generate it, due to various types of constraints (genetic, on-
togenetic, physical, structural, mechanical, functional, historical)» 
[Mandrioli & Portera 2013, 268]: in other words, the animal form is 
built respecting some architectural constraints;6 some parameters 
6  The Italian term vincolo presents the Latin root vincire which indicates the act 
of binding, of chaining to something or someone, as still transpires today in the 
adjective of wide diffusion avvincente (compelling); although deriving from a dif-
ferent etymology, the English term constraint also conveys the same meaning, being 
attributable to a Latin verb stringo present in the Italian word costringere (to com-
pel) [Gagliasso 2009, 183]. Different and perhaps more interesting, it is the German 
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or formal restrictions derived from the generic properties of organic 
matter.7
In the article Why pigs don’t have wings [Fodor 2007], American 
philosopher and cognitive psychologist Jerry A. Fodor affirms that «no-
body, not even the most ravening of adaptationists, would seek to ex-
plain the absence of winged pigs by claiming that, though there used to 
be some, the wings proved to be a liability so nature selected against 
them. Nobody expects to find fossils of a species of winged pig that has 
now gone extinct. Rather, pigs lack wings because there’s no place on 
pigs to put them» [ibid.]. In this regard, Gould writes that «zebras could 
avoid feline predators by flying away, but even if genetic variation exist-
ed (as it almost surely does not!) for constructing a supernumerary pair 
of limbs in wing like form, zebras clearly exceed permissible weight 
limits under the venerable Galilean principle of declining surface to 
volume ratios in large creatures» [Gould 2002, 1029]. Pegasus, the most 
famous winged horse, would never have been able to fly to our planet, 
nor could he have accomplished the task assigned by Zeus to transport 
lightning strikes to Olympus, because he could not in any way free him-
self from the weight of gravity.
Therefore, the domain of imaginable things does not coincide with 
that of the possible ones and even less with that of the existing ones: na-
ture is unable to accommodate all imaginable forms because, as Minelli 
well exemplifies,
term used to indicate this concept (Bürde) and widespread in the scientific field by 
the Austrian morphologist Rupert Riedl. The latter is a synonym of “load, burden, 
weight” and, as Salvatore Tedesco points out, it is closely linked to the responsibility 
[Verantwortung] of a character towards subsequent modifications [Tedesco 2010], 
since the probability that the latter undergoes modifications «depends on the number 
and the importance of functions and characters depending on it» [Wagner & Lau-
bichler 2004, 98]. For a more in-depth analysis of the notion of terminological and 
conceptual constraints see Sarà 1998.
7  The constraint is in fact defined by Gould as «coherent set of causal factors that 
can promote evolutionary change from a structuralist perspective different from – in 
the helpful sense of “in addition to” or “in conjunction with, and yielding interesting 
nonlinear conclusions in the amalgamation,” rather than “in opposition to” – the 
functionalist logic of Darwinian natural selection» [Gould 2002, 1026].
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it is not sufficient to know the mesh size of a sieve to make fore-
casts about the characteristics of the flour or sand that will pass 
through it. It is also necessary to know what mix of materials we 
place in it. And one cannot tell whether in this material there are 
particles of all possible dimensions. […] it is probable that some 
fraction of small particles that would have easily passed through 
the sieve, but which in actuality did not, is missing from this 
material because it was not present in the material to be sieved in 
the first place [Minelli 2009, 63].
4. Conclusions: from imaginary beings to fantastic beings
At the beginning of this article, I asked myself: what makes the crea-
tures imagined by poets at the same time dismay and marvel? What 
regularities has the human mind implicitly followed in creating them? 
And what constraints these imaginary creatures are not able to respect? 
In this analysis, I tried to trace the path that guided Evo-Devo schol-
ars to identify the genetic and historically constraints of animal con-
figurations. These “biological restriction” allows us to understand, on 
the one hand, why a mythological being like the Cyclops Polyphemus 
seems intuitively more adequate for us than Sirens, Satyrs and Cen-
taurs; on the other hand, they help us to elucidate why nature admits 
the existence of “bizarre animals” (individuals with more appendages 
than normal or which presents body tissues in unusual sections). We 
have also highlighted the existence of some architectural constraints, 
i.e. limitations that can be attributed to the Physics of our world and 
are not “genetic sedimentations”. Harpies and Griffons could never fly 
in our world because their wings would not sustain their body mass; 
conversely, “unusual” and “bizarre” creatures (such as the platypus, the 
Aye-Aye of Madagascar or the Marcidus Psychrolutes) are possible in 
Nature because – as Minelli says – they pass through the “sieve” of re-
ality [Minelli 2009, 63].
These reflections lead us to a paradoxical outcome: nature allows 
the existence of individuals whose formal configuration has nothing to 
envy the most famous mythological creatures. However, if this mor-
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phological structure can be explained from a biological point of view, 
it is not equally clear why we instinctively experience a feeling, at the 
same time, of amazement and fear observing these creatures: why does 
a mutant fly intimidate us more than the description of Cerberus? Can 
aesthetic reflection be useful to find an answer to our questions by com-
bining literary suggestions, scientific experiences and philosophical 
considerations?
In the work Le Change Heidegger. Du Fantastique en Philosophie, 
French thinker Catherine Malabou confronts the theme of fantastic, 
strongly influenced by the reflections of Roger Caillois in the essay Au 
cœur du fantastique [Caillois 2004].
To clarify the importance of this theoretical reference, it is first of 
all necessary to analyze the definition of the term “fantastic”. In his 
writing Caillois gives an unusual definition of this term: it does not 
indicate the “fruit of the imagination”, the “supernatural” or, more gen-
erally, something different from “the photographic reproduction of real-
ity” (i.e. the unreal of fairy tales or the bizarre creatures of mythology); 
the fantastic is instead the “impossible that comes suddenly”, «break 
in the acknowledged order, an irruption of the inadmissible within the 
changeless everyday legality» [ivi, 152].
To mark the difference between the unreal fairytale and the shock-
ing fantasy, Caillois distinguishes two literary genres dominated by 
imagination. The first one is the world of the fantastic declared: this 
is characterized by the deliberate invention of an alternative environ-
ment, with different laws from the terrestrial ones. In this world Pe-
gasus, the Minotaur, Medusa and other famous literary creatures are 
logically possible and not biologically in contrast with the surrounding 
reality. In this context, warns the French thinker, it makes no sense to 
speak of something “unusual” or “extraordinary” because the excep-
tion is everywhere and indeed constitutes the rule. The second one, the 
fantasy that emerges “by leaps”, is perhaps more interesting: it derives 
from everyday life and not exceeds the laws of our world; however, it 
reveals a contradiction inherent in our existence and, for this reason, it 
is sublime (in the Kantian sense of the term) because at the same time it 
excites and frightens us. Even Tzvetan Todorov – one of the best-known 
theorists of the structuralist movement – agrees with this theoretical 
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perspective, addressing the defining problem of “fantastic” in a 1970 
essay entitled Introduction à la littérature fantastique. In this work, the 
Bulgarian critic is ideally connected to Caillois and defines the fantastic 
as «the hesitation felt by a being who knows only natural laws, in the 
face of a supposedly supernatural event» [Todorov 1988, 28]. Therefore, 
for both authors, the fantastic is something “extraneous in the same”: it 
is the inexplicable that, precisely because of its being anchored to reali-
ty, arouses a feeling of uneasiness in us.
In our opinion, the “bizarre but natural” creatures described in this 
article are of this type: formal modifications which, however amazing, 
took place in a “customary universe” and these strange living forms 
testify that evolutionary biology «gives us a richer and more rewarding 
sense of the nature of existence than a view informed by myth and tra-
dition alone» [Henderson 2013, XV].
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Abstract
Since ancient times, man has shown a genuine passion for the recombination of vi-
sual elements in unusual and extraordinary forms; but, if the ancients admitted the 
existence of mythological creatures, today we are fully aware that their existence 
is limited to the ontological domain of the “merely thinkable” because imaginary 
beings are irreconcilable with physical and biological laws. In this article I try to 
elucidate what differentiates from a morphological point of view the imaginary be-
ings described by the pens of poets (such as Sphinx, mermaids and centaurs) from 
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bizarre but existing animals (i.e. the small South American Axolotl, the Yeti Crab, 
etc.) or from some specimens belonging to common animal species, but which pres-
ent strange morphologies due to genetic errors. In dialogue with some positions of 
contemporary biology and literary criticism, I tried to investigate the rules of form to 
understand how historical and architectural constraints can influence the morphol-
ogy of the living and why these existing creatures generate in us at the same time a 
feeling of wonder and dismay.
Valeria Maggiore






MORPHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN RUYER, 
SIMONDON AND DELEUZE
Table of Contents: 1. Fortunes of the morphological idea; 2. Ecstatic 
and melodic temporality; 3. Topology of the affects; 4. Nature of the autós.
1. Fortunes of the morphological idea
If we can discuss a subterranean morphological tradition in France, it is only by approximation. Following such a tradition means under-
standing a philosophical impulse, a grounding idea or intuition, that 
raises in Goethe’s thought as the question of a specific kind of knowl-
edge and stems from the necessity of understanding the living form 
before and beside its biological definition. This idea inspired a peculiar 
turn of the post-Kantian undertaking, insofar as the knowledge of the 
living form evokes the reunion of the conditions of experience with the 
causes of reality. Indeed, understanding a form means connecting to its 
specific becoming, to its vivum; and this cannot be accomplished other 
than by corroborating the continuous act of genesis, therefore by consti-
tuting oneself as a co-cause of uncodifiable results. The morphological 
sight is about participation in an act of inner vision, in incorporeal up-
heavals – as the “living” corresponds to an ideal dimension that belongs 
to the corporeal as both its rhythmicity and its effectuality: the «life of 
the essence» as the essence itself [Van Eynde 2005, 108]. More or less 
explicitly, all these solutions tend to a metaphysical view in which the 
Being is the concrescence of reality and knowledge takes form as – 
in Schelling’s words – «the empiricism extended to unconditionality» 
[Moiso 1998, 75]. Here, the utopia of a «purely heterological knowl-
edge» [Derrida 1967/1980, 189] corresponds to participation in nature’s 
archetypal power. Of such magnitude is the legacy of Goethezeit [see 
for example Poggi 2000; Breidbach & Vercellone 2010].
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It is interesting to notice how this philosophical enterprise reap-
pears in original terms in the middle of the 20th century in France, as 
Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible, reflects upon a «Being» 
that is «what requires creation for us to experience it» [Merleau-Ponty 
1964/1968, 197], Gilbert Simondon seeks the reunion of the «condition 
of possibility of knowledge» with the «causes of existence» [Simondon 
2005, 257, my translation], and Deleuze, very similarly, tries to solve 
the «wrenching duality» between the «conditions of experience in gen-
eral» and the «conditions of real experience» [Deleuze 1969/1990, 260] 
through a «superior empiricism» in which «the concept is identical to 
the thing» [Deleuze 2002/2003b, 43]. The spirit of those years is reflect-
ed in an atmosphere of renewed metaphysical assertiveness.1 The rise 
of a post-critical paradigm reintroduces the idea of a living transcen-
dental, be it Flesh or Nature as «wild Being and Logos» [Merleau-Pon-
ty 1964/1968, 169], a principle of individuation as the trans-objective 
genesis of the Being (Simondon) or a process of becoming caught in its 
differentiation (Deleuze). Such perspectives aim at that «life of the es-
sence» which is the form intended as its power of appearance, constitut-
ing the radicality and the unconditionality of experience: generativity 
as the only possible generality [see Barbaras & Milan 2001]. This great 
attempt has been recognized as the effort to make the morphogenetic 
order of nature transcendental [Malabou 2014/2016]. It remains inexpli-
cable, especially in its surprising relations to the philosophical achieve-
ments of Goethezeit, if not traced back to two cores of thought, Henri 
Bergson’s metaphysics of life and Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of 
the living, as two major historico-philosophical attractors.
Bergson’s thought will be decisive for more than one of the follow-
ing generations, even if as a heritage to repudiate [Bianco 2016]. Its in-
1  Ruyer, Simondon and Deleuze can all be considered “post-critical metaphysicists”. 
The «dogmatisme hypothétique» proclaimed by Ruyer in his doctoral thesis [1930, 5] 
will evolve into a full-fledged mythological dogmatism. During a memorable discus-
sion with Paul Ricoeur, Simondon [1960, 188] defines his philosophical perspective 
a «transobjectivism»; the first part of his work on individuation is indeed bluntly 
metaphysical. Deleuze revealed that in his youth he considered himself as the «most 
naïve» among his colleagues [1990/1995, 88] and he is now recognized unanimously 
as a 20th-century metaphysicist.
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fluence is of utmost importance for what concerns our subject: Bergson 
was in fact the most important French philosopher of his time to take 
an interest in the problems of theoretical biology beyond Darwinism 
(mostly received through Spencer) and to come into contact with the 
German tradition in the field of Lebensphilosophie. Creative Evolution 
(1907) approaches the great flourishing of 19th-century German biology, 
through theories such as August Weismann’s, Hans Driesch’s, Theo-
dor Eimer’s, Johannes Reinke’s; Bergson retrieves the French vitalist 
and life sciences tradition from the Montpellier School to Claude Ber-
nard and inserts this large number of authors in a consistent – and later 
dominant – philosophical framework worthy of contemporary sciences. 
Bergson’s philosophy comes to Haeckel in Jena, to Simmel in Berlin, to 
Driesch in Heidelberg and to Scheler in Göttingen, with numerous re-
ciprocal influences [Zanfi 2013]. It can be stated, then, that Bergson re-
ceives, elaborates and dialogues with a tradition that had never severed 
ties with the biocentrism of the Goethezeit and with the vitalist tradition 
itself. Thanks to the importance of his reflection, Bergson will decisive-
ly contribute to revitalizing ancient problems under the aegis of the sta-
tus of the living and of «integral experience»; although his successors 
will often point out his philosophical failures and hide the significance 
of his influence. It would be no historical inaccuracy to affirm that the 
20th-century French philosophy of life takes as its springboard «the fail-
ure of Bergsonism» as much as his achievements [Barbaras 2008].2
Georges Canguilhem, instead, was the one philosopher to devote 
his research to the problems of the living and to vitalism «as a perma-
nent exigency» [Canguilhem 1965/2008, 62]. Canguilhem’s approach 
to Bergsonism can be divided in three different phases, as summarized 
well by Bianco [2013]. After a first rejection, not far from Merleau-Pon-
2  From a theoretical viewpoint, this failure is linked with the “pureness” of Bergsoni-
an vital principle, i.e. with the background spiritualism that leads him to subordinate 
the inorganic along with all the mechanical processes, and to emphasize an abstract 
idea of Life, originally deducted from consciousness. Simondon shares Canguilhem’s 
aversion to Bergson as a philosopher of the «pure process», of the continuous flux, 
but he shows having read him carefully. Ruyer often takes divergent positions from 
Bergson, especially on the theme of perception. Only Deleuze will restore Bergsoni-
an philosophy almost completely, though with considerable elaborations.
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ty’s and Sartre’s criticisms, he deals more thoroughly with Bergson’s 
philosophy during the 1940s and he finally defines his reading in two 
lectures of the 1960s, later gathered in La vie et le concept. In general, 
Canguilhem’s attention to the living does not derive directly from Berg-
son, but allows him to restore Bergsonism in light of some common 
grounds.3 His mediation holds the merit of shifting the focus from the 
Bergsonian metaphysics of life to the living singularity in itself. By 
focusing on the problem of the organism4 and its specific logos, Can-
guilhem gives French historical epistemology a breakthrough towards 
«biological philosophy» as a philosophy of the living form, drawing 
directly – just like Merleau-Ponty5 – from the morphological tradition 
(von Weizsäcker, Buytendijk, Goldstein, von Uexküll) and facing spe-
cific issues such as the conceptual status of the pathological, the physio-
logical notion of reflex, or the concept of milieu. In Canguilhem’s view, 
morphogenesis is recognized as the living’s only norm, to which the 
formation of concepts itself must be traced back. Biological knowledge 
is such that «it is the pathos which conditions the logos» [Canguilhem 
1966/1991, 222]; in general, as Foucault puts it, «forming concepts is 
one way of living, not of killing life» [Canguilhem 1966/1991, 21], since 
life is defined by its creative auto-normativity.
Once having linked Bergson’s and Canguilhem’s theories to some 
of their scientific references, it is easier to understand how the specu-
3  One possible link between Canguilhem’s research and the Bergsonian legacy – 
considered as relatively independent from Bergson’s philosophy – could be recog-
nized in the field of theoretical psychiatry, a not strictly philosophical area where 
Bergson’s ideas exerted a deep and wide influence, in figures such as Pierre Janet, 
Eugène Minkowski, Constantin von Monakow and Raoul Morgue [see Babini 1990].
4  Between the 1920s and the 1930s, organicism established itself as the leading para-
digm in biology, overcoming the feud between vitalists and physicalists [Mayr 1997, 
16-17]. One of the most relevant organicist scholars of the first half of the century, 
the neurologist Kurt Goldstein, was a major source of both Canguilhem and Mer-
leau-Ponty.
5  Merleau-Ponty’s reflection, coeval to Canguilhem’s, comes autonomously to a mor-
phological (and specifically naturphilosophisch) comprehension, drawing directly 
from authors like von Weizsäcker, Buytendijk and Kurt Goldstein, and deals with 
Bergsonism as well. His interest for the living, however, remains inseparable from 
the phenomenological tradition and subordinated to it.
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lative migration took place: authors like Driesch, von Weizsäcker, von 
Uexküll, Buytendijk and Goldstein (to name only the most important) 
are dense with echoes of a tradition that goes back to the age of Goethe 
throughout the history of life sciences. Hans Driesch above all had al-
ready carried out a profound work of reconstruction of such a tradition, 
starting from Stahl (and therefore from Leibniz) up to the «neo-vital-
istic» conception of his time, passing through Wolff and Blumenbach, 
Kant and the nature-philosophers, the consolidation of physiology and 
the physicalist tradition [Driesch 1905]. The morphological idea, in 
this sense, corresponds to the survival of certain issues: the problem of 
living individuality, perfectly sketched by Driesch himself during his 
Gifford Lectures [1908] and the ensuing lessons at London University 
[1914]; the problem of what “living” is, whether a property, a force, or 
a structure, and the consequent problem of the duality between life in 
general and living singularity (seen as an organism or not); lastly, the 
relation between life and human knowledge, or the possibility of an 
in actu understanding that does not reduce its object to a collection of 
data, hence to the laws of identity and causality.6 The actual subject of a 
philosophy of the living is a paradoxical and impossible one as such, as 
it is not objectual: it is the impersonal act in which the living consists, 
the act of generation or genesis, the morphogenetical a priori.7
These were the problems of Goethe, and of Kant in the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft and in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissen-
schaft; then of an entire generation of scientists and philosophers. These 
problems formed the core of gestating German biology [Zammito 2018] 
and survived through both materialist and vitalist trends in theoretical 
biology, up to their elaboration in 19th-century philosophy. The condi-
6  These three issues are easily recognizable as aspects of the same phenomenon. 
«A finite living being partakes of infinity, or rather, it has something infinite within 
itself» which ensures that it eludes the mereological inquiry [Goethe 1988, 8]. The 
epistemological consequence is that «a living thing cannot be measured by some-
thing external to itself» [ibid.]; the ontological consequence, instead, is that «no liv-
ing thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality» [Goethe 1988, 64]: not 
a plurality of parts, but rather a plural whole, a manifold totality.
7  Whence the most important statement of philosophical morphology: the substi-
tution of the morphogenetical process of formation for the individual form, of Ge-
staltung for Gestalt [Goethe 1988, 63-64].
Gregorio Tenti
64
tions of knowledge were clearly adequate, in the France of the first half 
of the century, to produce such a fruitful resumption. Suffice it to look 
at the number of sources, both biological and philosophical, used by 
another thinker of the generation of Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhem – a 
much more isolated, but not less significant figure who orientated his 
research towards the problems of the living during the 1930s, Raymond 
Ruyer (1902-1987). The references made on the pages of Néo-finalisme 
[1952a] count works by Bertalanffy, Driesch, Waddington, Goldstein, 
von Uexküll and Darlington, studies devoted to animal mimicry, and 
wide-ranging theoretical works by French scholars.8
Ruyer is in all respects a solitary figure, who is only in present 
times receiving the attention that he deserves. Nonetheless, he played an 
active part in the philosophical elaboration of an epistemology of quan-
tum physics (and in the peculiar vitalism that many quantum physicists, 
like Niels Bohr, were developing at the time); he was also one of the first 
philosophers to reflect upon the significance of cybernetics. After some 
first works of mechanist orientation, Ruyer built a metaphysics of life-
forms becoming influenced by Whitehead and Samuel Alexander, espe-
cially in Néo-finalisme [1952a] and La genèse des formes vivantes [1958, 
1967]; through an understanding of the life of matter and systems, he 
theorized in favor of a «true form» by facing one of deepest problems of 
morphology, that of auto-normativity. His initial theses benefited of an 
in-depth elaboration of the processes described by embryology, a real 
science guide until his last book, L’embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu 
silencieux (1983-87, published in 2013). Deleuze was a careful reader of 
Ruyer, from Difference and Repetition to the last pages of What is phi-
losophy? [Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 213], where Ruyer is declared 
the last representative of a vitalistic metaphysics of becoming and the 
only philosopher who understood the concept of form.
We can affirm that Deleuze (1925-1995) himself was a brilliant 
morphologist malgré soi. It has been established that Deleuze is in 
great debt to both Bergson’s philosophy of life and to many coeval re-
flections on life sciences [see Pearson 1999]; he refuses the tradition-
8  For example L’autonomie de l’être vivant by Louis Bounoure [1949], Invention et 
finalité en biologie by Lucien Cuénot [1941], La science des monstres by Étienne 
Wolff [1948] (Ruyer’s companion in captivity during the war).
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al concept of form and often criticizes Goethe, but faces most of the 
philosophical issues linked to the living, using many authors ascribable 
to the above-mentioned tradition (let us just name the re-elaboration 
of Dalcq’s embryology and of August Weismann’s Neo-Darwinism in 
Difference and repetition, the interpretation of von Uexküll’s etholo-
gy and of Saint-Hilaire’s transformism in A Thousand Plateaus, or the 
reconstruction of Leibniz’s philosophy of nature in The Fold). Finally, 
he builds a greatly relevant theory of the living based on the concepts 
of genesis and affect.9 The form, as has already been noted [Buydens 
1990], ends up constituting a spectral presence in Deleuze’s philoso-
phy, whereas its actual enemy is organicist structuralism. A perspective 
centered on form as the ever-individuating, in any case, has never been 
contrary to the morphological assumption: in fact, the action and the 
status of the “force” as well as the inextricability of form and force have 
always been part of the problematic field revolving around the living 
[see Moiso 1999]. As regards the stress on speculative creativity and 
its power to trace back the conditions of reality by taking active part in 
them, Deleuze’s «transcendental empiricism» can be seen as a real heir 
of Goethean empiricism (though under the auspices of Bergsonism).
Another essential source of Deleuze’s philosophical fortune are the 
works of Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), whose influence has been ac-
knowledged since Difference and Repetition.10 Only quite recently re-
appraised as an autonomous thinker, Simondon is author of a complete 
and original philosophy of the living, ingeniously extended to technical 
objects and becomings. Not unlike Ruyer, he sees in quantum physics 
and in cybernetics the chances for a new perspective on reality (but 
unlike Ruyer, with whom he enters discussions, he grants greater im-
9  It is difficult to separate, from a certain point onwards, Deleuze’s philosophy from 
Félix Guattari’s contribution. However, there are numerous shifts of focus in the 
works written by Guattari alone in the same period: in Chaosmosis [1992], for ex-
ample, genetic becoming is considered more from the perspective of production of 
subjectivity and of the chances of political resistance to codification, with greater 
interest in a redrafted systems theory.
10  Simondon and Deleuze are practically the same age and they were both disciples of 
Georges Canguilhem, but Simondon came to write his most important work in 1958, 
whereas Deleuze wrote his first masterpiece (which is Difference and Repetition) ten 
years later, in 1968.
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portance to the latter [see Bardin 2010/2015, 30-31]). His doctoral the-
sis on individuation (1958, entirely published only in 2005) presents a 
massive criticism of history of metaphysics, whose biggest unthought 
is the priority of relations upon structures: whence the sheer morpho-
logical project of substituting the notion of form with a concept of the 
living act of morphogenesis. From Simondon’s relational metaphysics 
of individuation emerges the project of a new criticism – mindful of 
Bergson’s notion of intuition – that will flourish in Deleuze’s philosophy 
[see Sauvagnargues 2012; Alloa & Michalet 2017]. In the Simondonian 
masterpiece of 1958, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme 
et information, form is the concept to designate the constant prise-de-
forme of the Being as creative and material semiosis without origin.
French «biophilosophy» [Gayon 2010] or «philosophie biologique» 
[Lecourt 2018]11 stands out from a more general “philosophy of biology” 
due to its assertiveness, which could be mistaken for a naïve, pre-criti-
cal metaphysical gesture [see Wolfe & Wong 2015]. In fact, this school 
of thought participated in a larger effort towards what we have men-
tioned as «post-criticism». Nowadays an analogous trend is deepening 
the link between the never-ending overcoming of Kantian transcenden-
talism and the categories of the living, in authors such as Catherine 
Malabou, Renaud Barbaras, Pierre Montebello, Iain Hamilton Grant; 
so that we can observe the 1950s-1960s «moment du vivant» [Worms 
2009] from the viewpoint of a similar one [Worms 2013; Arnaud & 
Worms 2016]. Ruyer’s, Simondon’s and Deleuze’s speculations on the 
living assume ever greater significance then, not least in relation to 
current life sciences [DeLanda 2002; Marks 2006; Protevi 2006, 2012, 
2013; Koutroufinis 2014]. We have tried to emphasize the thread linking 
this particular moment, which we are going to explore theoretically, to 
a more dispersed, yet specific tradition that we have placed under the 
name of “morphological idea”. A narrowing of the focus is motivated by 
the fact that even more than the idea of life, the one of form still raises 
a certain amount of interest, both in current philosophy and theoretical 
11  This category was used by Canguilhem [1957] in a review of Ruyer’s book Élé-
ments de psychobiologie, titled Note sur la situation faite en France à la philosophie 
biologique, but it has already appeared in the work of a most interesting philosopher 
of Bergson’s time, Éléments de philosophie biologique by Félix Le Dantec [1907].
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biology [see Vercellone & Tedesco 2020]. It would be utterly inaccurate 
to understand 20th-century French biophilosophy as merely derivative 
of the 19th-century German tradition, without considering the autono-
my of French theory of life – let us just think of the Montpellier School 
(Bichat, Cabanis, Bordeu, Barthez), of French materialism (Maupertuis, 
Buffon, Diderot, and La Mettrie), and of such important figures as Louis 
Pasteur and Claude Bernard – and the long-standing and complex os-
mosis between the two traditions. Nonetheless, all the hopes of a newly 
found non-«biochauvinist» [Wolfe 2015] or «critic» [Worms 2018, 188] 
vitalism lie – this is our opinion – in the fortunes of an enriched, re-
formed morphology.
Many changes in today’s life sciences lead one to reconsider the 
ban on vitalism, but as a back-up paradigm for the explanation of “the 
living” and its morphogenetic processes, beyond any temptation of bio-
centrism, hypostatization, or spiritualization. The current “vital turn” 
encourages one to comprehend and privilege the strategies of the living 
as models of creative consistence; this very sense of the current trends 
can be traced back to French biophilosophy as a sort of renewed mor-
phology. Morphology, in its widest sense, corresponds to the problem 
of the consistency of becoming, hence to the problem of genesis – even 
as regards those “structural” solutions that should have solved the age-
old problem of living individuality, like cellular theory and organicism 
[Moiso 1999]. Beyond the simple study of configurations as opposed 
to the anatomical study of internal structures and to the physiological 
study of living functioning, philosophical morphology’s traditional do-
main extends by vocation to a philosophy of genesis. The theoretical 
path of this article will focus on outlining this aspect through the bio-
philosophical thesis of Ruyer, Simondon and Deleuze. These authors 
hold the fundamental merits of correcting the hierarchical centrality 
of organism in light of the priority of processes over structures, and of 
liberating vitalism from spiritualist reductionism through a broadened 
materialism. The issues of temporality, spatiality, and individuality will 
be taken as frames of reasoning.
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2. Ecstatic and melodic temporality
Biological time has usually been ignored by philosophy of science in 
favor of its physical notion [Bouton & Huneman 2017]. In a morphology 
understood as ontology of becoming, the temporal dimension of form 
is the first problem to address. The oxymoron of morphological devel-
opment is that of a non-sequential situation in which the result does 
not linearly follow the starting conditions, in which a genesis therefore 
takes place by virtue of a difference; a situation that nonetheless com-
poses a recognizable rhythm, a nonpunctual path, a regime of stylistic 
orientations. There is a question of temporal punctum, writes Viktor 
von Weizsäcker in Gestalt und Zeit, and a question of temporal rhythm. 
This is the very problem displayed by embryogenesis: life is capable 
of rebuilding itself and of increasing in information through nonline-
ar paths, regulating a creative composition according to a not-entirely 
programmed norm and a seemingly oriented process of expression, in 
which the program is one with its own inflection. It is difficult to de-
fine, thus, when a genesis takes place. Just like the rise of epigenetics 
paved the way for Romantic vitalism, the philosophical implications 
of modern embryology – opposed to the emerging field of molecular 
biology – provided a starting point for our set of authors’ speculations.12 
Ruyer has specifically reflected upon the impossibility of reducing an 
embryo’s development to mechanist causality. The kind of causality 
that he calls «de proche en proche», by contiguity and juxtaposition 
(and therefore essentially spatial), reduces any becoming to identifiable 
parts in order to connect them by means of linear causality, like objects 
moved by Newtonian laws of motion. This kind of mechanist explana-
tion has never been sufficient for explaining genetical processes, which 
are based on a conatus recognizable only post festum.
Especially in Néo-finalisme [1952a] and La genèse des formes vi-
vantes [1958], Ruyer describes the life of matter as intrinsically proces-
sual: every existence is activity and every real entity, insofar as it is a 
«form», is «forme-activité» [Ruyer 1952a, 162]. The movement is not 
12  Karl von Baer, father of modern embryology, was indeed a disciple of Karl Fried-
rich Burdach, the one who tried to realize the Goethean project of morphology as 
an actual science. Von Baer maintained in many ways the morphological approach.
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the property of a structure, it is instead constitutive of a structure. First 
comes the «sense», which is the spontaneous activity of forming, inher-
ent to bodily structures as their non-psychological memory.13 One must 
imagine «une sorte de mélodie mnémique, immédiatement inhérent au 
tissu vivant, combinant son action avec celle des régulateurs secon-
daires, et présidant au jeu des relais chimiques» [Ruyer 1952a, 46]. 
The genetical passage from one developmental stage to another is con-
ceivable, then, through the concept of an immanent rhythm of matter, 
irreducible to a physical energy or to a single instant: like a melody, it 
corresponds to a whole domain, «un certain rythme prolongé d’activ-
ités» [Ruyer 1952a, 158-59], that belongs to a non-actual dimension of 
reality and keeps acting in every atom as a power of liaison. The mne-
mic potentials must interact, on a material level, with physico-chemical 
affects, which operate as triggering signals of the theme and regulate its 
unfolding within the space-time (for instance through genes).14 But the 
actual path has always to be improvised: the whole precedes the parts as 
their relational and directional regime without causing them in a proper 
sense, since it is not external to them. In fact, the theme does neither 
resemble nor precede its realizations, which means that the process of 
actualization has an axiological status: it is never only a functioning 
operation, but rather an invention (since the previous stage does not 
necessarily imply the following).15
The accent is put on the activity in itself as a presence of the form 
13  In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze decomposes Ruyerian memory in three 
passive syntheses (biological present, reminiscence, and creation), making Ruyer’s 
theory less vague and more complex. Already since Bergsonism, Deleuze designates 
with the Ruyerian term of «reminiscence» the active and virtual nature of the past.
14  Ruyer argues against molecular genetics as a computational paradigm incapable 
of explaining the developmental processes and a new kind of preformism. He instead 
considers the genes not as direct causes in the morphogenesis, rather as occasional 
vehicles, signals useful to guide the process, simple means, as much as embryologi-
cal inductors. Similarly, Simondon [2005, 180-182] underlines the equal value or the 
coextensivity of soma and germen in the construction of the living and links morpho-
genesis to non-codifiable informative dynamics.
15  «Le passage des potentiels dans un monde d’individus actualisateurs est une 
opération enrichissante, une nouveauté incessante, toujours un effort et parfois un 
drame. Ce n’est pas une vaine redite» [Ruyer 1952b, 418].
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inherent to the structure, i.e. on its semantic status, its constitutive 
life. The temporal essence of things emanates from their non-temporal 
dimension. What is left unthought is the genetic event, that is when 
and where exactly life melds with matter. Albeit, as we have seen, it is 
wrong to start with such a duality (since matter is intrinsically alive, and 
life is material), one can conceive a specific point where the line bends: 
the moment of the force, the affect, the consistency of application of the 
flux. Such a genetical moment must be external to the series of points, 
as the unquantifiable source of quantification, neither discrete nor con-
tinuous but rather “ecstatic”. The affect corresponds to the ecstasy of 
matter made ideal.
This dualism of vertical instant and horizontal rhythm can be de-
scribed well with the categories of Deleuzian philosophy. Deleuze re-
trieves the notion of melody from Ruyer,16 generally associating it with 
the concept of rhythm. Deleuze distinguishes between a rhythm which 
is «a regular division of time, an isochronic recurrence of identical ele-
ments», and a rhythm where «tonic and intensive values […] create dis-
tinctive points, privileged instants which always indicate a poly-rhythm» 
[Deleuze 1968/1994, 21]. The distinction is drawn between repetition as 
a measure of the identical and repetition as «difference without con-
cept», that forms a landscape of heterogeneous singularities, accents, 
points of valence, zones of expression. As in Ruyer, rhythm is both a 
force and an idea that produces synchronic environments of variations.
Deleuzian singularities are indeed the germinal instantaneities 
that fabricate chronic time. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze describes 
the platonic ἐξαίφνης as an extra-temporal threshold or gradient, a 
non-subsistent interval: singularity constitutes the evenemential limit 
of the pure and incorporeal affect separated from body. Its consistency 
16  «What is primary is the consistency of a refrain, a little tune, either in the form of 
a mnemic melody that has no need to be inscribed locally in a center, or in the form 
of a vague motif with no need to be pulsated or stimulated» [Deleuze & Guattari 
1980/1987, 332]. This is one of the passages where Deleuze refers explicitly to Ruyer. 
Analogous meanings of the concept can be found not only in Merleau-Ponty, who 
speaks of nature as a «melody that sings itself» [Ruyer 1952a, 217]; but also and 
foremost in Jakob von Uexküll, who first spoke of organic development as a melodic 
becoming, discovering «Nature as music» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 314].
The Living Difference
71
is of intensive nature: it is an effectivity rather than a physical reality. 
The problem of the affect – as in Spinoza and Nietzsche – is the problem 
of the existence of pure potency. A coherent vitalism must conceive the 
affect not from the viewpoint of an external observer, as action without 
being, but rather from the perspective of the affect itself, as being that is 
for itself and that does not “take action” [Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 
213]. Following this radical program, both Deleuze and Ruyer arrive at 
an absolutization of the sensation. A formation, thus, is not only when it 
affects a body, on the model of perception: the genetical affect is rather 
always for itself, it is auto-affection, eternal self-enjoyment. However, 
the opposite is also true: auto-affection is always a semantic pulsation, 
an event, as an «a priori form of time, which in each case fabricates 
different times» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 349]. The idea of the 
movement is in every germinal point of the line, which is not individual, 
but singular, hence ubiquitous and diffused, and of the same nature as 
the whole; the point and the line cannot be abstracted, as they share a 
common ideal essence. Pulsation and rhythm represent two faces of the 
same a priori of time.
How do we “watch” a force, asks Deleuze, or how do we “listen” 
to a force [1981/2003a, 56]? We do not simply perceive its effects on 
dead matter: we enter the rhythm of its spontaneous organization, and 
we place ourselves at the level of the ideal material where it lives as 
pure sensation, shifting from vision to a sort of speculative tactility. 
The body, in fact, is of the same nature as the force. The question about 
the force, hence, is a question about generation of ideal materials. Every 
entity is, to different degrees, a prism of speed and interactions: it mod-
ulates, amplifies and conveys semantic information. The theory of enti-
ties as semantic machines, as well as the theory of the speed of matter, 
refers to Simondon’s masterpiece, L’individuation à la lumière des no-
tions de forme et d’information [2005], whose influence is visible since 
Difference and Repetition [see Hui & Morelle 2017]; but it finds surpris-
ing analogies in much earlier monistic reflections on nature like that of 
Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) [Poggi 2000, 455-57]. According to the Spi-
nozist doctrine of A Thousand Plateaus, nature is «a fixed plane, upon 
which things are distinguished from one another only by speed and 
slowness», and enters in ever different assemblages [Deleuze & Guat-
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tari 1980/1987, 254]. Matter itself is intrinsically ideal and traversed 
by infinite grades of speed, which represent its heterogeneity. There 
are specific regimes of individuation or strata that may correspond, 
for example, to slowdowns needed for further accelerations, in order 
to reach new speeds on different directions. This is the case – among 
many others17 – of the passage from the physical to the vital regime 
of individuation as described by Simondon. According to his theory, 
a biological becoming takes place when the physical ceases to repeat 
its periodical traits, following a sort of curving dynamic. The physical 
becoming slows down on its inchoative stages (neotenization), which 
will be kept alive in the recursive dynamics of a non-periodical equilib-
rium [Simondon 2005, 152-53]. These variations in speed determine a 
full-fledged «conversion» of space-time, a radical variation in rhythm. 
The a priori of rhythmic and singular pulsation, thus, is also a matter of 
morphogenetical speed.
3. Topology of the affects
Deleuze, Simondon and Ruyer are all thinkers of space-time, for whom 
what applies to time applies also to space. The concept of «speed» sums 
up this chrono-topological complementarity. The lesson of embryogen-
esis itself can be drawn from both a temporal and a spatial dimension. 
It is a lesson on the manifestation of the novelty of life: the real novelty 
is what synthetically emerges from previous stages of the matter by no 
means of deduction or linear causality. From this perspective, synthesis, 
or the production of sense, takes place entirely within nature.18 This ge-
netical passage is realized through a differential relation, by a break of 
the similarity chain or a «symmetry-breaking». After Hermann Weyl’s 
theories, symmetry is defined as an equality in the application of certain 
constructive rules (invariants) to figures; hence a symmetry-breaking 
17  Morphogenetic processes of heterochrony (e.g. paedomorphism, peramorphism…) 
and neoteny started to be conceptualized from the late nineteenth century.
18  Analogous conclusions can be found in Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and De-
ity (1920) and in Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and Reality (1929), both impor-
tant references for Ruyer and Deleuze.
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represents the creation of a new form, usually on an infinitesimal level. 
Forms, in this manner, are considered from the viewpoint of their event, 
not of some intrinsic properties that constitute an essence [DeLanda 
2002, 18]. Whenever a morphogenesis occurs, a symmetry-breaking 
may be brought up: Simondon for instance extends the physical concept 
of «phase transition» to every event of individuation; Deleuze talks of 
ontological bifurcations since Bergsonism (1966), and later makes it a 
characteristic of the «rhizomatic» becoming of nature in A Thousand 
Plateaus; Ruyer argues that biological causation is not attributable to 
proper “causality”, since it is nonmetric, nonquantitative, nonlocaliza-
ble (what induces today’s research to speak of a case of «entanglement» 
[see Vecchi et al. 2019]).
«Strictly speaking, symmetry exists only between different poles or 
focal points of interiority» to which a force is always exterior [Deleuze 
& Guattari 1980/1987, 399]. Symmetry is a quality of the organism, 
which represents, in Deleuzian philosophy, the hierarchical structure of 
the Being; whereas the anorganic is the concept of Becoming in itself. 
The two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are a great hymn to 
the anorganic force and to its effects on bodies, but above all to the force 
as an effect of bodies, as their immaterial resonance [Deleuze 1969/1990, 
70]; in other words, to the paradoxical coincidence of soma and germen 
in the intensive consistency of sense. The argument exposed in The 
Logic of the Sense represents the solution to a matter which Deleuze 
addresses from the first works on Nietzsche until the last courses on 
Foucault: the problem of forces (which is again, in a way, the problem 
of the living itself in its seminal form). Is the force that pertains to the 
living separated from physical matter, or does it consist only of its ef-
fects upon the otherwise dead matter (as Blumenbach and Kant thought 
of the nisus formativus)? Is the force all in the affect? And if not, where 
is it? 
In the already mentioned last pages of What is Philosophy?, Deleuze 
gives the following (partial) answer: «Vitalism has always had two 
possible interpretations: that of an Idea that acts, but is not – that acts 
therefore only from the point of view of an external cerebral knowledge 
(from Kant to Claude Bernard); or that of a force that is but does not act 
– that is therefore a pure internal Awareness (from Leibniz to Ruyer). 
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If the second interpretation seems to us to be imperative, it is because 
the contraction that preserves is always in a state of detachment in rela-
tion to action or even to movement and appears as pure contemplation 
without knowledge» [Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 213]. If such an 
“objective” vitalism is necessary, it is because Becoming is not a mere 
property attributable to a logically precedent structure. As we have 
seen, an immanentistic view of the force does not necessarily lead to 
stasis or ineffectiveness: in Ruyer, for example, the ideal performs and 
actualizes itself constitutively, being it a genetical force; likewise does 
the Deleuzian «virtual» (though with the due differences [see Bogue 
2017]). We must therefore put the stress on «the act of ontogenesis» 
itself, instead of on the simple structures or on the pure operations. The 
act of ontogenesis is neither the action of a structure nor that of an im-
material subject: the mistake of old vitalism, states Ruyer [1952a, 223], 
is indeed conceiving the force as a macroscopic influence that moves 
and animates matter. The “life” of the living is to be found elsewhere.
Every morphogenesis takes place by a break of interiority, which 
means that it comes from “outside” the constituted structure: it is al-
ways «heterogenesis» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987]. It affects the 
body; its consistency is one of application and of affection. But as we 
have already seen, affection has to be taken in itself, as preceding and 
composing the bodies, insofar as it is genetical. The Becoming owns a 
specific ontological status: the “force” is, but not in the same order of 
the Being. It «insists» [Deleuze 1969/1990] on the matter as its semantic 
dimension, as its effectuality, its variation, and its singularity. In The 
Logic of Sense it is described as a wind among the series, a «vapor» of 
the structures that corresponds to their pure relations: «it belongs to no 
height or depth, but rather to a surface effect, being inseparable from 
the surface which is its proper dimension» [Deleuze 1969/1990, 72]. It 
is also «neutral» and «impassible», beyond determination (of quantity, 
quality, mode, etc.). Life (or «sense») is genetic, but also sterile (not 
fecund, not directly productive); it has «eternal truth» but cannot «be 
distinguished from its temporal actualizations» [Deleuze 1969/1990, 
100].19 It does not belong to bodies as their property, it rather is their 
19  The ground principle, already fully formulated in Difference and Repetition, is 
that «the world […] pre-exists its expressions. It is nevertheless true that it does not 
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effect of genetical consistency, which nonetheless comes before them.
The answer to the question on “where is the force” cannot be given 
from the viewpoint of the structure that defines an inside and an outside. 
The force is at the same time interior and exterior to macroscopic struc-
tures, being fundamentally «preindividual». The notion of preindividu-
ality, coined by Simondon and repeatedly used by Deleuze, refers to the 
semantic and virtual thickness of the individual, which finds place in its 
folds, constituting its «associated milieu». As argued by Simondon, this 
kind of exteriority (Deleuze’s «dehors») is not located outside and all 
around a structural interiority like an Umwelt: it is instead ubiquitous 
and medial, much more similar to a fluid,20 as in ancient vitalism (but 
again not comparable to a macroscopic force). Both Ruyer and Simon-
don, in fact, place the genetical force in the ontological regime of the 
sub-atomic level, showing great philosophical faith in the conquests of 
quantum physics [Leblois 2007]. Quantistic dynamics reveal that the 
condition of the Being is one of constant activity, and specifically a rela-
tional activity without synthesis [Simondon 2005, 111], that avoids both 
the physicalist and the vitalist approach (the essentialism of the struc-
ture and that of the pure flux, discontinuism and continuism). In the 
quantum realm lies the «potential», the power of heterogeneity which 
corresponds to the first and purest genetical events. On a quantic level, 
everything is – again – a matter of speed [Simondon 2005, 129], «since 
each intensive quantum in itself is difference» [Deleuze 2002/2003b, 
87]. Nowadays, the hypothesis of the role of sub-atomic matter in the 
biological processes is far from being a fanciful conjecture [see Longo 
& Montévil 2014]: quantum mechanics show acausal physical process-
es that can be applied – just as Ruyer does – to explain consciousness 
[Penrose 1989] and to comprehend the action of mind over body [Kauff-
man 2010, 224-25].
We argue that this perspective on the quantic status of the virtual 
(or potential) preindividuality should be thought of in continuity with 
exist apart from that which expresses it […]; but these expressions refer to the ex-
pressed as though to the requisite of their constitution» [Deleuze 1968/1994, 47-48].
20  Canguilhem [1965/2008, 98-120] traces back the origin of the notion of milieu 




Deleuze’s topological approach to the infinitely small «matter-fold» as 
«matter-time» in the pages of The Fold [1988/1993, 7]. Deleuze had 
already noticed the relevance of organic “folding” in A Thousand Pla-
teaus, where he evokes a puppet theater composed by Cuvier, Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire, von Baer, and Vialletton [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 
46]. Through Leibniz’s philosophy of nature, and later in What is Phi-
losophy? and in the courses dedicated to Foucault, Deleuze develops 
a speculative topology of the living centered on the idea of complete-
ly virtual sets of relational modes that drive fluxes and influence the 
structures. While current topology looks for universal principles to be 
applied also in the field of the living from the viewpoint of transcen-
dental schematics [Boi 2005], the topological law set out by Deleuze is 
one of transversal change and differentiation: that of «folding» and un-
folding, involution and evolution. Development does not simply go from 
undifferentiated to more differentiated, it does not necessarily represent 
a growth in complexity; the ubiquity of germinal fields is the contem-
poraneity of the primordial Egg [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 164], 
which is far from constituting an original and primal stage. Between 
the macroscopic folds and below perception, there are other folds (not 
particles) of which material bodies are «zones of expression» [Deleuze 
1988/1993, 98].21 Singularities consist in this very activity of matter, this 
constant bending of constraints:22 life is matter that folds.23 This inces-
sant bending is what Simondon describes as topological information, 
insofar as «les vraies formes implicites ne sont pas géométriques, mais 
topologiques» [Simondon 2005, 53].
21  Deleuze comes to the same conclusions as Ruyer and Simondon: the processes of 
forming «do not apply to living organisms, but to physical and chemical particles, to 
molecules, atoms, and photons» [Deleuze 1988/1993, 103].
22  From a topological perspective, elements are defined by their sense in a pre-exten-
sive space of effects, comparable to a vector field in which invariants are topological 
accidents [DeLanda 2002, 72].
23  Matter, in other words, is made plastic by the forces that inhabit it. The conti-
nuity between variation of constraints and apparition of novelty is explainable by 
underlining the role of the expressive processes, the moment of material passage of 
information. The concept of expression is, in fact, what allows Deleuze to take up 
Spinoza’s monism. On the role of material expression in current life sciences and its 
philosophical relevance see for example Tedesco [2012], Mandrioli & Portera [2013].
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4. Nature of the autós
A large part of Ruyer’s thought is devoted to grasping the concept of 
«true form». Deleuze, as we have seen, follows the same program, albe-
it with different adversaries. Deleuze argues against the central, interior 
and organic form, which is rooted in the transcendence of the Idea and 
which he associates with historical morphology: Goethe «passes for a 
Spinozist» when allied to Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, but he «retains the 
twofold idea of development of form and a formation-education of the 
Subject» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 542, note 52]. The Goethean 
form, in Deleuze’s view, is still too subjective. A similar criticism to-
wards organicism belongs also to Ruyer [1940a, 1940b], though Ruyer 
has opposed himself more to the mechanistic tendencies in contempo-
rary sciences than to the organicist ones. As for Simondon, he admits 
that Goethean metamorphosis of plants is the model of his own concept 
of morphogenesis [2005, 517, note 37], but he also affirms that Goethe 
takes interest in Saint-Hilaire’s transformism just to make it a system of 
classification [2005, 500, note 34], and that he does not clearly define the 
relation between individual and nature [2005, 503, note 35].
We can state that despite a general phase of coldness towards Goe-
thean philosophy, the problems of Goethe were to a significant extent 
the same problems of French biophilosophers. From a very different 
starting point, most of Simondon’s efforts, for example, are directed to 
demonstrating the priority of formation on form and of individuation on 
the individual already affirmed by Goethe. «Qu’est-ce qu’un individu?», 
asks Simondon: «À cette question, nous répondrons qu’on ne peut pas, 
en toute rigoeur, parler d’individu, mais d’individuation» [Simondon 
2005, 190]. «L’individu n’est à proprement parler en relation ni avec 
lui-même ni avec d’autres réalités; il est l’être de la relation, et non 
pas être en relation, car la relation est opération intense, centre ac-
tif» [Simondon 2005, 63]. The mistake of Aristotelianism is to place 
a proto-structure as substrate of every operation, hence to understand 
relations on the basis of their terms (and development, for example, on 
the basis of the formed adult). The priority of act over potency is at 
the origin of subjectivism and of the obsessive search for identity that 
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characterizes the scientific enterprise of modernity.24 The fixed and sta-
ble structure is no less than a moment abstracted from a much more 
complex condition, in which certain regimes of formation influence the 
acts that take place in them. A chaotic state, as Simondon often notes, 
is much more “stable” than an ordered one: order does not go along 
with stability, but with dynamic tension, with living equilibrium of pro-
cesses. Moreover, the concept of order is – as demonstrated by physics 
– relative to scale and size. Perceptive constancies are abstractions that 
cannot provide morphological norms for the natural becoming.
What is analogous throughout the whole of nature is instead a prin-
ciple of information, morphogenesis, and active relation. The principi-
um individuationis does not lie in a proto-structure, nor in an abstract 
flux or substantial becoming (as in ancient vitalism), but rather in the 
concrete act of manifestation, which is a «complete system» of syner-
gies, with structural and energetic conditions. The individual exists in-
sofar as he transmits, amplifies, articulates sense: by every act of prop-
agation of sense, it individuates itself. «L’individualité est un aspect de 
la génération» [Simondon 2005, 190]. Individual equilibrium is a case 
of ever-acting tendencies, at the intersection between many rhythms or 
«phases» of individuation.
The fact that there is no such thing as the isolated individual does 
not deny the singularity of particular individuations. Simondon points 
out that every process has «un terme non probabilitaire» [Simondon 
2005, 549], something beyond quantity (for example the number of sig-
nals) and quality (the semantic structures) that justifies the apparition of 
novelty; but he still binds this character of «intensity» to the presence of 
a perceptive subject, without substantially overcoming the Bergsonian 
view of Les données immediates [Simondon 2005, 238]. Deleuze will 
be the one to decidedly turn the notion of intensity into an ontological 
concept. If morphogenesis is an act of concrete expression of novelty 
rather than a simple communication of signals, if it stems from a «real 
potential» rather than from logical possibility or representation, then 
it must correspond to a field of affections even without involving an 
24  As Ruyer puts it, the description of structures is the “easy part” of morphology 
and of classic science in general, while the study of genesis is the most complex and 
mysterious [Ruyer 1958, 5-6].
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individual; insofar as it entails a difference (or a real transmission of 
information), it must have intensive nature even without depending on 
a psychological subject. Intensity is, for Deleuze, the concept of crea-
tive difference, inseparable from the affect, the zone where the force 
composes its structure and therefore consists. Every grade of affection 
establishes thresholds, valences, and orientations, reconfigures a sys-
tem of meaning by virtue of a pure change, a non-identical condition, a 
posture. Objectivity and subjectivity are constituted after the act itself. 
Singularity is this ontological «inflection», this «axiomatic» (or genetic) 
novelty [Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 91]. The same idea of orienta-
tion or inflection can be found in Simondon’s «axiontology»25 and in 
Ruyer’s understanding of finalism.
«Consistency necessarily occurs between heterogeneities», and it 
is a matter of expression [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 330]. A mul-
titude holds together not by repeating a hierarchical order, but through 
a genetic nomos regulated through a memory of matter. «The forms 
do not preexist the population, they are more like statistical results», 
writes Deleuze. «The more a population assumes divergent forms, the 
more its multiplicity divides into multiplicities of different nature, the 
more its elements form distinct compounds of matters». Moreover, «the 
degrees are not degrees of preexistent development […]. Degrees are 
no longer measured in terms of increasing perfection or a differentia-
tion and increase in the complexity of the parts, but in terms of differ-
ential relations and coefficients» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 48]. 
Once having dismissed the structural standpoint, it is easier to see the 
flaws of every perspective centered on the conservation of the living 
individual rather than on its formation. Autopoiesis, for example, is a 
notion of clear physiological origin that implies the exteriority of the 
environment and subordinates processes to the constitution of the autòs 
by means of reflection; that reveals, finally, all the ambiguous political 
implications of system theories [Protevi 2009]. The morphological in-
terrogation of that omnitudo which is also a multitudo, that unitas mul-
tiplex which cannot be thought according to the absolute metaphor of 
25  Deleuze acknowledges Simondon’s influence on this point, but writes that he 




organism, points towards the notion of a «perfect individuality lacking 
nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing 
or a subject» [Deleuze & Guattari 1980/1987, 261], «singular without 
being individual» [Deleuze 2002/2003b, 87].
Thus, the “self” of the processes typically attributed to the form 
(self-organization, self-realization, self-design…) becomes problematic. 
From the viewpoint of genesis itself, we can conceive only «self-en-
joyment», not after the model of spiritual reflection but after the one of 
natural praxis, of internal action. As Ruyer intends it, self-enjoyment 
is a primary activity that possesses itself, being in every part of itself: 
like the Goethean Urpflanze, the form «enjoys» its own transformation, 
its virtual entirety, perpetually [Moiso 2005, 294]. What is «enjoyed», 
therefore, is an infinite affection, which is an infinite (and simultaneous) 
generation. This is the only alternative – also according to Deleuze – to 
understanding genesis on the model of a representative process, with 
“someone” who generates or perceives the generation and something 
which is generated. When the affection or the transformation is untied 
from a subject and an object, the affect coincides with the space-time-
less becoming of the being.
Instead of a celestial Hyperuranion, we could think of an infinite 
and non-subjective speculative dimension like the «Infinite Fun Space» 
that, in the fictional universe of Iain M. Banks, is the unsuspected dream 
of the mind-machines when left alone; or again to the quantic domain. 
What is crucial is that such an infinite ideality is not previsional (like 
a mathesis universalis), but is immediately creating. This is why Ruyer 
comes to a panpsychist conception, in which every form is active insofar 
as it exists and follows virtual paths without psychological deliberation: 
what is traditionally called “spirit” corresponds here to the virtual and 
differential thickness of living entities, the equipotentiality of the em-
bryo and of the brain, the rhythms of the organs, the patterns in animal 
behavior, as well as any becoming in nature. The characteristic of equi-
potentiality shared by the embryo and by the human brain is the most 
vivid representation of the ecstatic state of matter: «la norme spirituelle 
se transforme en “tâche” psychique; cette tâche à son tour tend à se 
transformer en liaisons physiologiques matérielles fonctionnant d’une 
manière automatique» [Ruyer 1952a, 124]. A spiritual principle is not 
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distinguishable from nature itself [Simondon 2016, 34] as the «pouvoir 
d’hétérogénéité» of the Being [Simondon 2005, 358].
In the case of the living, the «form» is inseparable from the «for-
mation». A living being is never entirely configurated, and it can never 
limit itself to functioning: it forms itself incessantly. Since every forma-
tion is inseparable from a norm, we must say that the form is what gives 
itself its own norm in the act of existing [Ruyer 1952a, 157]. Forms, 
unlike figures and structures (which are mere aggregates), require a 
supplementary dimension to be understood [Deleuze 1988/1993, 102], 
that is what Kant recognized as their ideal nature,26 since it refers to 
nonlocalizable relations instead of horizontal, causal, mechanically un-
derstandable linkages. As such, the form’s ideality does not resemble a 
“glue” for the otherwise separated parts, because that would generate 
the regressus in infinitum that has been typical of an animist conception 
of life as macroscopic force (what is between the glue and the glued?). 
«We are contemplations», writes Deleuze [1968/1994, 74], insofar as we 
live.
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Abstract
Philosophical morphology carries on a difficult tradition, bound with different cur-
rents and periods of thought. During the 20th century, an original and profound re-
flection on the living form can be recognized in the so-called French biophilosophy. 
Morphology, thus, seems to re-emerge under the guise of a post-critical ontology 
of becoming. Thinkers like Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze 
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showed that they were deeply aware of the manifold issues revolving around the no-
tion of form and of their interconnections, and were able to provide original solutions 
to these problems in the framework of their thought systems. More recently, these 
reflections have asserted themselves in virtue of their coherence and their specula-
tive force. This paper aims at a theoretical overview of the morphological spirit of 
biophilosophy that retraces the complex exchanges of influences between these three 
significant thinkers, Ruyer, Simondon and Deleuze. Along the focal nodes of tem-
porality, spatiality and individuality, a renewed image of philosophical morphology 
will result from the vitality of their theoretical proposals.
Gregorio Tenti





THE “HISTORY” OF BIODIVERSITY.
A BERGSONIAN LOOK AT THE 
THEORY OF EVOLUTION
Table of Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Evolution is not a Panglossian 
tale; 3. Biological evolution: A Metaphysical Object; 4. The history of 
biodiversity: a creative spiral of novelties; 5. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
The Darwinism of our times is based on two principles: natural se-lection as a mechanism that explains evolution; the gene as the unit 
on which selection acts. From the initial conditions – the genes that tend 
to reproduce through the organisms they program, and the environment 
in which these organisms develop and struggle for existence – one can 
deduce, through the mechanism of “natural selection”, the way in which 
these organisms will evolve, that is, the genes that have been selected. 
Hence Richard Dawkins was able to say that evolution is almost fully 
understood today. And it is true that most of the questions about adap-
tation can be answered: i.e. how a species with such and such character-
istics can evolve under such and such a condition.
Stephen Jay Gould, on the other hand, considered evolution to be a 
phenomenon about which almost nothing is known. Indeed, Gould was 
less interested in the mechanisms underlying adaptation, which indeed 
seem to be explained by the combination of Darwinism and genetics, 
than in the form taken by biodiversity: Why this form and not another? 
Why this organization and not another? While Neo-Darwinism may 
provide an explanation for the sexuality of Thyme, it does not tell us 
why pigs have no wings. Certainly, the metaphor of the “selfish gene” 
shows what is maintained throughout Evolution, and natural selection 
provides an adequate description of a large part of evolutionary change, 
but they do not give an understanding of why there is change, let alone 
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to predict the form it will take. Bergson had already formulated this 
critique in 1907 in Creative Evolution against the evolutionary theories 
of his time: they do not allow to grasp the formation of novelties in evo-
lution because they do not conceive of duration. It is because Bergson 
brings to light the temporal aspect, this memory of the evolutionary 
process, that his theory seems to highlight, even today, the problems 
posed by evolutionary explanations. By making biology a world strictly 
determined by necessary laws, Neo-Darwinism in fact misses the his-
torical dimension of evolution which Darwin himself tried to account 
for through the all too often forgotten “principle of divergence”. What 
does it mean to claim that biological evolution is history? What does 
that bring to the understanding of evolution?
2. Evolution is not a Panglossian tale
To begin with, it must be understood that evolution is not the history 
of adaptations towards an optimum: it does not work like a Panglos-
sian tale. Voltaire’s character believes «that things cannot be otherwise, 
because everything being made for an end, everything is necessarily 
for the best end. [...] Noses were made for wearing glasses, so we have 
glasses» [Voltaire 1759/2017, 4]. For Pangloss, the history of the world 
looks like a tale where obstacles lead to a crisis situation that exists only 
through its resolution, which brings about a more desirable state. All 
characters and events are oriented towards this optimal situation. What 
is the relation between Panglossian finalism and the theory of evolution 
by natural selection? 
For Darwin, in The Origin of Species, the adaptation of organisms 
to their environment is the problematic phenomenon. To explain that, 
Darwin starts from domestic selection: our pears are juicier than Pliny’s 
because over the centuries man has replanted the seeds of the juiciest 
pears not the blandest: pears were selected to be juicier. From that, he 
deduced the existence of variations between individuals and the pos-
sibility of a natural selection of these variations, in other words, the 
preservation of useful variations in the struggle for existence, however 
small the advantage provided, and the disappearance of the harmful 
ones. But it led some interpreters of Darwin to adaptationist explana-
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tions: the use of the organ could make it possible to deduce the reason 
for its genesis. Darwin proposes natural selection as an explanation for 
adaptation; adaptationists propose to explain the appearance of the trait 
by its adaptation, which implies that one can ask what a trait is select-
ed for and give the reason for its appearance based on this purpose. 
Thus, if seagulls have wings it is because they are «excellently adapt-
ed for flight in a medium having the specific density and viscosity of 
the atmosphere within a thousand meters or so of the surface of the 
Earth» [Dennett 2014, 197]. Adaptations are understood as answers to 
the problems raised by the medium, and the similarity between living 
beings on different phyla by the similarity of the problems encountered. 
Hence, under the guise of a strictly mechanistic explanation by natural 
selection, it is the old finalism that we find. This implicit recourse to 
the finalism inherent in evolutionary theories was already the subject of 
Bergson’s criticisms at the beginning of the twentieth century:
If there is [...] adaptation, it will be in the sense in which one may 
say of the solution of problem of geometry [...] that it is adapted 
to the conditions. [It] explains why different evolutionary pro-
cesses result in similar forms: the same problem, of course, calls 
for the same solution. But it is necessary then to introduce, as 
for the solution of a problem of geometry, an intelligent activi-
ty, or at least a cause which behaves in the same way [Bergson 
1907/1911, 58].
The deterministic mechanism, supposedly metaphysically neutral, sup-
poses in reality a finality «more than ever charged with anthropomor-
phic elements» [ibid.]: the metaphor of the machine only hides the di-
vine reference.
That explanation is not only finalist, it is also heuristically circular. 
That’s what philosopher Jerry Fodor points out in his controversial book 
What Darwin got wrong. In Darwin’s artificial selection, organisms are 
selected for an interest defined by the breeder. But in the case of nature, 
the selection happens without a defined interest; what an organism is 
selected for is adaptation to the environment. But how to define the en-
vironment of a living being? One usually finds in the environment what 
is relevant to a living being, calls it a niche, and then says that the living 
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being has adapted to that niche. «But that there are spiders, who would 
have guessed how to spin webs to catch flies is an ecological problem?» 
[Fodor et al. 2011, 140]. The evolution of biological forms cannot be 
understood as answers to the successive problems posed by their envi-
ronment, since the environment and the problems it poses are defined 
on the basis of phenotypical traits that are assumed to be adaptations. 
Wondering whether the dodo has lost its ecological niche or whether 
the opposite has happened, Fodor answers: «The extinction of the dodo 
was the very same event as the extinction of the dodo’s way of making 
a living so neither can serve to explain the other» [ibid., 147].
Finally, while natural selection seems to adequately describe the 
apparition of a form adapted to an environment, it cannot explain the 
absence of a certain form. As Fodor points out, if, instead of asking 
why organisms have similar traits in similar environments, we ask why 
certain traits do not exist, the selectionist explanation becomes absurd. 
«Nobody, not even the most ravening of adaptationists, would seek to 
explain the absence of winged pigs by claiming that, though there used 
to be some, the wings proved to be a liability, so nature selected against 
them. Nobody expects to find fossils of a species of winged pig that has 
now gone extinct. Rather, pigs lack wings because there’s no place on 
pigs to put them» [Fodor 2007, 21].
Thus, an explanation of evolution that would stick to natural se-
lection alone is implicitly finalist, and, purged of this finalism, it risks 
falling into tautology. Moreover, it would be insufficient, since it would 
not take into account the internal constraints of organisms. Let us now 
examine these constraints, starting with those that have been crucial in 
the Modern Synthesis: genetics.
What genetics brings to the mechanism of natural selection is the 
unit of selection: the gene. But again, the explanation does not escape 
finalism, since nature is interpreted as having a purpose: the survival 
of the gene. For Dawkins, in The Selfish gene, to define evolution by 
natural selection as the process by which genes increase their reproduc-
tive capacity is to say that biodiversity in its entirety can be understood 
by referring to the interest of the gene. Accordingly we read that what 
is important in evolution is «the good of the individual (or the gene)» 
[Dawkins 1976/2006, 2], an argument from which it can be said that 
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«the predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruth-
less selfishness» [ibid.] and that the «fundamental law» of evolution is 
«gene selfishness» [Dawkins 1976/2006, 6]. Every phenotypic trait is 
explained by the interest of the gene. In consequence, if organisms can 
behave altruistically, it is precisely for the survival of genes. According 
to Dawkins, genes behave in this way because of «blind natural selec-
tion» [ibid., 196]. To truly understand evolution by natural selection, we 
must therefore consider that it acts with an apparent goal: the survival 
of genetic information, the destiny of evolution resulting this time from 
the “goals” of each gene, and no longer from the intelligence of an om-
niscient engineer. If genes do not have conscious purposes, they do have 
an unconscious one: survival, which explains the finalized appearance 
of evolution in general.
Coordinated this way, genetics and natural selection present a dou-
bly finalized mechanism. Genes seem to be both the programs and pro-
grammers of the biosphere: they appear as small engineers designing 
the machines (organisms) for the sole purpose of their own survival. 
Natural selection, on the other hand, appears to be a finalized mecha-
nism directed towards the increasingly optimal adaptation of species 
to their environment for genetic survival. Although Darwin was more 
cautious than his interpreters, there was already a temptation of this 
kind in his early works:
Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to per-
ceive differences in the outer and innermost organization quite 
imperceptible to man, and with forethought extending over fu-
ture centuries to watch with unerring care and select for any ob-
ject the offspring of an organism produced under the foregoing 
circumstances; I can see no conceivable reason why he could not 
form a new race (or several were he to separate the stock of the 
original organism and work on several islands) adapted to new 
ends [Darwin 1909, 85].
There would thus be a “demon of natural selection”, similar to Laplace’s 
“demon”. Laplace’s hypothesis was that an omniscient observer who 
knew the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the motion of each 
body in the universe at a time t1 would be able to predict its final state 
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at t2. In this case again, Bergson’s philosophy offers a valid critique 
of this hypothesis of a superhuman intelligence capable of embracing 
the entire universe precisely because it implies the universe thought of 
as a whole: a closed system analogous to that which the machine is to 
the engineer who designs it [Bergson 1907/1911, 37-39]. Therefore, the 
universe is reduced to an object, which can only exist if we implicitly 
accept the existence of a metaphysical entity capable of embracing it: 
the eye of the demon.
To think of evolution as a system strictly determined by a single 
mechanism towards an optimal situation is in fact to think of nature as 
a closed system, where nature appears as doubly indefinite, both dia-
chronically (it is a process) and synchronously because of the multitude 
of its interactions sometimes conflicting, and the different levels of cau-
sality involved.
3. Biological evolution: A Metaphysical Object
Evolution, in fact, cannot be a deterministic system of the Laplacian 
type, because it is not closed, it is not an object that an observer could 
walk around. There is a meta-physical dimension to life as well as to 
the world in Kant’s philosophy: it goes beyond the experience that we 
can have of it, not because of our ignorance, but because of this double 
openness, synchronic and diachronic, which characterizes evolution in 
general as well as each living being. «A living being [is] distinguished 
from all that our perception or our science isolates or closes artificial-
ly» [Bergson 1907/1911, 15]. Because of this indeterminacy of life and 
the complexity of interactions that characterizes it, it seems impossible 
to order by any kind of algorithm, without falling into a peremptory 
anthropomorphism. Yet, it is what Daniel Dennett claims to do in Dar-
win’s dangerous idea. He posits that natural selection is a machine for 
sorting out blind variations, a technological tool, i.e. a set of constraints 
added to the physical conditions to allow the emergence of a function. 
Dennett presupposes a Mendel Library, which would correspond to all 
possible genomes; and a Design Space, which would contain all possi-
ble phenotypes that may result from a combination of genes. The algo-
rithm updates the phenotypes by searching for them in the Possibilities 
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Space and constructing them on the basis of the available genetic “rec-
ipes”. This implies, on the one hand, that the organisms are artifacts 
constructed unilaterally by an ingenious genetic mechanism (whose 
engineer cannot be found), on the other hand, that all biological possi-
bilities are already given. Bergson already criticized this fixed vision of 
the organism, and this excessive pretension of logical intelligence in the 
face of the unpredictability of living things:
We [...] feel that not one of the categories of our thought [...] ap-
plies exactly to the things of life: who can say where individuali-
ty begins and ends, whether the living being is one or many [...]? 
In vain we force the living into this or that of our molds. All the 
molds crack [...]. And most often, when experience has finally 
shown us how life goes to work to obtain a certain result, we find 
its way of working is just that of which we should never have 
thought [Bergson 1907/1911, X].
Indeed, the living world is characterized by unpredictability that is not 
due to our ignorance, but to the very nature of evolution: because of its 
causal pluralism, each biological situation is unique. Therefore, laws in 
biology would imply taking into consideration a quasi-infinite number 
of particular parameters. It is only arbitrarily that we can turn nature 
into a closed system with only a few parameters, unchanged from place 
to place and from time to time. In order to find laws in biology as pre-
dictive as physicochemical laws, we would have to take into account 
interactions at extraordinarily heterogeneous levels: the molecule, the 
gene, the cell, their interactions, development, the interaction of tissues, 
the interaction of organisms... Moreover, these different levels are stud-
ied by sciences just as diverse: genetics, molecular biology, ethology, 
geology... Finally, these levels are distinguished only artificially: one 
cannot close a living system with regard to another in order to study 
natural selection only at its level. Symbiosis phenomena in particular 
defy traditional distinctions: some organisms are composed of several 
distinct species, inviting us to think of the evolutionary process not only 
as an intergenerational phenomenon, but also as “horizontal”, by com-
munity assembly. For instance, mycorrhizae, born from the association 
between a mycorrhizal fungus and the root of a plant: the fungi promote 
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the absorption of nutrients while providing a bulwark against pollut-
ants for the roots also gain sugar. The complexity required by the laws 
of evolution is unprecedented in other sciences. As Fodor points out, 
where the laws of gravity need only a few parameters to account for the 
multitude of phenomena they explain, the laws of evolution would re-
quire placeholders for each type of living being to which they apply and 
for each type of environment with which these creatures interact [Fodor 
et al. 2011, 183-186]. The organism is at the intersection of extremely 
diverse levels of causality, and it is precisely this interpenetration of 
causal chains that we could describe as contingent, i.e. unpredictable.
Besides, biodiversity is not a fixed entity, but is always in the pro-
cess of becoming. We do not have before us evolved species, but evolu-
tionary change. When it comes to living beings, nature, which is always 
thought of as the realm of ahistorical necessity, comes curiously close to 
our history. As with human history, it is impossible to make predictions 
about biological evolution, because the temporality of the phenomenon 
implies the bringing together of beings and environments that had never 
been brought together before. This is what Bergson already understood 
very well: there is a historicity of biological phenomena, which means 
that, if the birth of a species can be linked to precise causes, «this can 
only mean that if, after the fact, we could know these causes in detail, 
we could explain by them the form that has been produced; foreseeing 
the form is out of the question» [Bergson 1907/1911, 27]. Despite being 
fiercely Darwinian, biologist Ronald Fisher nevertheless underlines the 
radical unpredictability of evolution by referring to Bergson: it is «think-
able in an indeterministic world, in which the causative system might 
indeed have been different. It is quite unthinkable in a strictly determin-
istic world. Looking back at the cause we can recognize it as creative; 
it has brought about something which could not have been predicted – 
something which cannot be referred back to antecedent events» [Fisher 
1952, 350]. This unpredictability stems from the fact that the phenotype 
of an organism is not simply the product of its genotype and the envi-
ronment in which it evolves, but also of its phenotypic history. Darwin 
said something similar about Malaxis paludosa. The ovary of the orchid 
is twisted 180 degrees in a normal situation (so that the labellum serves 
as a landing strip in Ophris). In Malaxis, the labellum, which is used to 
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protect the pollen bags, is twisted 360 degrees. Without torsion, there 
would be exactly the same result. But because of the orchid’s antecedent 
torsion, the adaptation was made in the sense of an accentuation of the 
torsion [Darwin 1862/2016, 200]. This irreversibility is linked to hered-
ity, which transmits both the traits born of adaptation through natural 
selection (even if they are no longer adaptive at present; as long as they 
are not harmful either) and the consequent non-adaptive traits of other 
structural traits. These traits, which Gould and Lewontin call “struc-
tural expansions”, become structural constraints but form an exaptative 
reserve: they can be co-opted later according to their usefulness in rela-
tion to the environment. Thus, some traits not directly shaped by natural 
selection that constitute structural constraints may prove adaptive later 
on [Gould et al. 1979]. The inadequacy of cause and effect, in such a 
way that the cause does not make it possible to predict the effect, is part 
of the contingency of the evolutive process. In an article Ruyer devotes 
to one of Bergson’s examples, one reads that the evolutionary history 
of Paralytic Hymenoptera resembles a «“history” in the strong sense 
of the word, a complex and capricious political or linguistic evolution. 
[… It is] a mixture of organization and chance, of fortuitous displace-
ments of meaning, of improvisations according to circumstances, and 
of catching-up by makeshift means» [Ruyer 1959, 176, my translation]. 
Evolution is not a harmonious story: it is made up of maladjustments 
and antagonisms. It does not function at all like a well-oiled machine in 
which each part is perfectly adapted to all the others; on the contrary, it 
manifests conflicts, inappropriateness, regressions; there is contingency 
everywhere. Ruyer’s description of the dynamic “history” of evolution 
seem to reveal all his debts to the Bergsonian idea that the organized 
world is not all harmonious: «Nature […] everywhere presents disor-
der alongside of order, retrogression alongside of progress» [Bergson 
1907/1911, 40].
In that case, would we be facing a vaudeville, where the story is 
interspersed with songs unnecessary to the plot? A plot that is itself 
constantly interspersed with unexpected jolts due to misunderstandings 
that bring together the most unlikely causal chains, to the point of end-
ing up in funny situations like the panda’s thumb (which is actually a 
carpus bone) [Gould, 1980]?
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4. The history of biodiversity: a creative spiral of novelties 
«The present moment of a living body does not find its explanation in 
the moment immediately before […] all the past of the organism must 
be added to that moment, its heredity – in fact, the whole of a very long 
history» [Bergson 1907/1911, 20]. Evolution is a historical phenome-
non; namely, it is part of duration, or rather it is duration: a continuous, 
dynamic and multiple totality – not a simple succession. What makes 
biodiversity what it is today is not the immediately preceding moment, 
but its entire history, just as a person who falls asleep looking at a pen-
dulum does not fall asleep because of the last perceived movement but 
it is «the rhythmic organization of the whole» that leads him to sleep 
[Bergson 1889/1910, 106]. Biological evolution has a memory that pro-
duces future biological novelties. There is a «real persistence of the past 
in the present» [Bergson 1889/1910, 22]. The complexity of the inter-
actions within the living implies a particular contingency which is not 
pure probabilistic chance, but which is part of the historical character of 
the living. The same contingency implied by this durational aspect of 
evolution has been more recently suggested by Stephen J. Gould, inas-
much as it keeps the biologist from seeing evolution under the eye of the 
Darwinian demon. Through punctuated equilibrium (the idea that the 
variability of species has a certain rhythm: phases of stability then phas-
es of rapid change) and the discreet introduction of the possibility of 
catastrophic factors, Gould introduces historical contingency through 
a thought of duration: according to him, the living weaves together and 
without contradictions scientific determinism and historical contingen-
cy. Nature is neither a closed system artificially objectified by science, 
nor an abstract metaphysical entity, but a historical process: biological 
history creates its own possibilities.
Does this mean that we are dealing with an inconsistent phenom-
enon? Can we understand the complexity of this creative process of 
novelty? I think so, as long as we limit our claims to an understanding 
rather than a prediction of the evolutive process. For this, we will refer 
to the work of Brooks and Wiley in Evolution as entropy. Their aim is 
to untie the apparent paradox of the law of entropy in physics and of the 
increase of organization in organisms as well as in biodiversity. They 
want to show that evolution is indeed an entropic phenomenon, but that 
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it does not prevent the growth in complexity and the realization of in-
novative forms. They begin with the observation that organisms are the 
only systems that have instructional and not only structural informa-
tion. Organisms carry their detailed blueprint with them and are able to 
refer to it to self-organize where the steam engine plan remains on the 
engineer’s desk. In terms of information, living systems are closed: the 
environment cannot directly produce instructional information although 
it can indirectly cause changes in that information. As with any closed 
system, an increase in informational entropy will be observed through 
the processes (translation, transcription, duplication...). Suppose there is 
a phase space which corresponds to the number of possible genotypes, 
each micro-state being a genotype, the macro-state being the actual dis-
tribution of individuals in different possible genotypes. Entropy will be 
the measure of this distribution in relation to the phase space.
Evolution is an entropic phenomenon: organisms occupy more and 
more microstates. In that case, how can there be more organization at 
the same time, i.e. a greater distance from randomness? The paradox 
is solved if we realize that evolution is a phenomenon far from equilib-
rium that is characterized by an increase in phase space that is faster 
than the realized increase in entropy: namely, there is a tendency for the 
realized variation to lag behind the maximum possible diversity. The 
realized entropy increases, but at a slower rate than the maximum pos-
sible entropy. Organization emerges from this rhythm gap, thus from 
historical temporality. It is mainly history that explains the coordination 
of the increase in complexity (entropy) and organization. Indeed, while 
natural selection eliminates some phenotypes and therefore the corre-
sponding genotypes, it is history above all that clarifies the gap between 
what is and what could have been: the main reason for this growing gap 
between the diversity of possible genotypes and the actual distribution 
of genotypes is that certain genotypic combinations are made impos-
sible by speciation, which has distributed the genetic information in 
different lines (the Darwinian principle of divergence). Once again it is 
very close to what can be read in Bergson when he writes that «in evolv-
ing in the direction of the vertebrates in general, of man and intellect in 
particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompat-
ible with this particular mode of organization» [Bergson 1907/1911, 49]. 
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Another reason (still historical) is the ontogenetic constraint that blocks 
the realization of certain genotypes, even though these unrealized gen-
otypes may represent accessible microstates. What Wiley and Brooks 
are highlighting is the explanatory role of history in understanding bio-
logical complexity. Evolution as a process creates its own causes and its 
own conditions: historicity creates the obstacles as well as the possibil-
ities of the evolutionary process. The specificity of biology is therefore 
not a metaphysical mystery, but a historical and thus undeterministic 
causality: in biology, history is not only a degradation of energy and a 
tendency to disorder, but the creation of new possibilities as well as new 
obstacles, starting from the development of the initial conditions.
That being said, how should this historical causality be understood? 
I propose the image of a durational and therefore creative spiral. In-
deed, the evolutionary process is close to a recursive causality, as de-
fined by Edgar Morin: a circular causality whose effects produce future 
causes and possibilities and therefore are necessary for the perpetuation 
of the loop (the product becomes a producer). But we must complete 
this recursive causality, because what Darwinism teaches us is that in 
evolution, there is no simple organization based on effects; there is what 
Bergson would describe as a backward harmony: the identity of a ge-
netic heritage, a coherence coming from common ancestors. In fact, sci-
entists have recently discovered that the development of organisms that 
are very different phylogenetically involved homologous genes or had 
used the same genetic circuits. This is the case of the Hox genes which 
are present in all bilaterally symmetrical animals and are responsible 
for the establishment of structures along the antero-posterior axis, in 
both vertebrates and insects (which have a homologous genetic com-
plex: Hom). If the homologous gene found in mice is inserted into a 
mutant fly, it works and fulfills the role of the regular fly gene. Another 
type of parallelism observed in organisms very distant from each other 
is explained by the recruitment of the same genetic circuits. This is the 
case of Pax-6, which is found in several phyla: cephalopods and hu-
mans, and has homologues in drosophila and fish. Its role is to control 
the action of other genes that are specific to different species and whose 
effect is to result in eyes also specific to those species. «Harmony is 
rather behind us [the unity of a genetic heritage] than before [the pheno-
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typic diversity]. [Unity comes from a vis a tergo: added from the French 
version, Bergson 1907/2007, 104, my translation] it is due to an identity 
of impulsion and not to a common aspiration» [Bergson 1907/1911, 51]. 
This implies that the unity we have spoken of is not only descriptive 
but driving. This is suggested by Gould’s hypothesis that homologous 
regulatory genes are likely to play a key role in achieving rapid evolu-
tionary change due to the constraint of a limited range of developmental 
pathways.
It is the inadequacy of the creative potential of the living and the 
constraints of its development that is the driving force behind the his-
torical process of evolution. This means that in a certain sense evolution 
shapes itself through its antagonisms as it produces its problems as well 
as its solutions. Bergson writes about human history: «action on the 
move creates its own route, creates to a very great extent the conditions 
under which it is to be fulfilled, and thus baffles all calculation» [Berg-
son 1932/1977, 296]. Something similar happens in biological evolution: 
biodiversity is built up from its history. The living is only rich in its 
future possibilities through its past history, as this history is both an 
obstacle to overcome and a reserve of novelties. Therefore, the duration 
of evolution is not only a succession but also a recapitulation, which al-
lows the story not to be repetitive but evolutionary. «The pendulum here 
is endowed with memory and is not the same when it swings back as on 
the outward swing, since it is then richer by all the intermediate experi-
ence. This is why the image of a spiral movement, which has sometimes 
been used, is perhaps more correct than that of the oscillations of a pen-
dulum» [ibid., 292]. Biodiversity is the offspring of history: the present 
cannot resemble the past in biology, because it is enriched by the entire 
movement that preceded it.
As we have said, this story is made up of maladjustments, evolu-
tionary absurdities, and conflicts between species, but it is precisely 
these dissonances that make biological evolution perpetually creative: 
it is not so much an ordered mechanism as a perpetual reorganization 
based on a constantly renewed disorder; Bergson speaks of «a reality 
which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself» [Bergson 
1907/1911, 248]. We have spoken of a spiral to describe the process of 
evolution, but more accurately, it would be a spiral drawn by an unbal-
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anced spinning top: the adaptation of organisms to their environment is 
spectacular because biological harmony is threatened by imbalance, be 
it antagonisms between species or changes in environmental conditions. 
«This harmony is far from being as perfect as it has been claimed to be. 
It admits of much discord, because each species [...] tends to use this 
energy in its own interest; in this consists adaptation» [ibid., 50]. Rather 
than understanding this organization as the product of the invisible en-
gineer of natural selection and resorting to finalism, Bergson proposes 
to grasp it through the ontological unity of the living, which is that of its 
history: antagonisms that can be transformed into self-organizing inter-
actions. «[Evolution] will have to make the best of these circumstances, 
neutralize their inconveniences and utilize their advantages – in short, 
respond to outer actions» [ibid., 58]. It is through the obstacles that the 
complexity of biodiversity, of living beings and of their environment is 
born – a complexity whose organization creates novelty. The history of 
life does not consist of a continuous optimization of adaptation but rath-
er of a series of unpredictable diversions. Evolution is organization of 
disorder, an organization perpetually contradicted, and therefore per-
petually creative. It is in and through imbalance that the organization 
emerges.
Evolution is the flourishing of unpredictable possibilities whose 
contradictions result in an unbalanced organization. The evolutionary 
process is that organization of diachronic and synchronic antagonisms 
whose complementarity and overcoming are a creative enrichment of 
new evolutionary potentialities. Therefore, the living is not a determin-
istic and ahistorical realm, but that does not make it either a Panglossian 
tale where fatality reigns, or an incoherent vaudeville. It is a history in 
the strong sense of the word: a story in the making and to be told.
5. Conclusion
This is why, according to us, evolution is less the unfolding of a mech-
anism than the history of living beings. It is a reality that is made by 
the history of living beings that create both the obstacles and the condi-
tions of possibility of overcoming this obstacle by the creativity of their 
interactions as well as their antagonisms. It is obstacles and evolutive 
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absurdities that generate coherence. The understanding we have pro-
posed of evolution as a creative spiral is certainly not a scientific mod-
el, but a philosophical conception that must be a call to think, just as 
Kant imagined an “endless finalism” in History as a heuristic horizon to 
guide both historians and men who make History. Beyond the tragedy 
of chance and the tragedy of fate is the possibility of a coherence that 
does not exclude surprises, because it emerges precisely from creative 
causation. The history of biodiversity is therefore neither the unfolding 
of a destiny nor a succession of absurd events; it is a time spiral: the 
organization emerges from the coordinated discordances of past histo-
ry. What does that mean for us? As Stephen J. Gould said, «We are all 
the offspring of history, and must establish our own paths in this most 
diverse and interesting of conceivable universes – one indifferent to our 
suffering, and therefore offering us maximum freedom to thrive, or fail, 
in our own chosen way» [Gould 1989, 323].
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Abstract
Neo-Darwinism, through the combination of natural selection and genetics, has 
made possible an explanation of adaptive phenomena that claims to be devoid of 
metaphysical presuppositions. What Bergson already deplored and what we explore 
in this paper is the implicit finalism of such evolutionary explanations, which turn 
living beings into closed and static systems rather than understanding biological evo-
lution as a process characterized by its interactions and temporal openness. Without 
denying the heuristic efficiency of the explanation resting upon natural selection, we 
analyze what it leaves out and what remains to be explored: the unpredictability of 
the evolutionary process. We will therefore study the role of contingency in evolu-
tion, as Stephen J. Gould proposed, but we will also consider the causality specific 
to the living world that makes it impossible to reduce it to a simple algorithm, as 
proposed by Daniel Dennett among others, since it is really a creative causation, or 
dialectical spiral.
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BEYOND THE ARCHÉ. ARISTOTLE, 
GOETHE, HEIDEGGER, SCHÜRMANN
When, in 2013, Andrea Pinotti and Salvatore Tedesco published the volume Estetica e Scienze della vita [Aesthetics and Life Sci-
ences], they contributed to revitalizing, within the Italian philosophical 
debate, the link that binds aesthetic reflection to some of the most de-
bated issues of contemporary theoretical biology. What is the central 
theme of this disciplinary intertwining? Why, in general, is it possible 
to imagine a connection between these two disciplines? At the heart of 
this project is the possibility of rethinking the concept of nature – and 
our relationship with it –, trying to measure in what way biological re-
flection on life may integrate useful categories elaborated by aesthetics. 
Intertwining aesthetic reflection and theoretical biology means attempt-
ing to think of “nature” beyond the project of its integral quantification, 
mathematization and computability, typical of modern and contempo-
rary sciences, but it is also a question of rejoining the phenomenological 
approach, through which it is possible to maintain the connection with 
the specific qualities of its phenomena. Only in this way can one attempt 
to understand nature “from within”, “desde dentro”, avoiding forcing the 
pragmatic and technologically oriented needs of our cognitive relation-
ship with nature, typical of this epistemic phase of the hard sciences.
However, the contribution of aesthetics should not be thought of 
as the bearer of a mere “contemplative” and “living” sense of natural 
“beauty” but must be thought of in the name of the dialectical rela-
tionship between “nature” and “art”, between physis and techne – ac-
cording to Goethe’s teaching –, and also as a trace of the metaphysical 
premises that gave rise to the possibility of that relationship. As Pinotti 
and Tedesco write, «Goethe was ready to see at work in the world of 
phenomena (which would then rigidly divide the sciences of nature and 
those of the spirit) a unitary game of forces» [Pinotti & Tedesco 2013, 
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9].1 Goethe becomes the indispensable author for this recognition, inso-
far as he has seen, in the world’s phenomena, a plan of creation, trans-
formation, translation, immanent in a “physis” conceived as totality, 
within which the difference between “natural” and “artistic”, between 
“biological” and “historical” dimensions, becomes problematic or, at 
least, no longer relevant, in order to think of the metamorphic genera-
tivity of Totality.
***
What, then, is morphology? How should it be thought of, with respect to 
this conceptual background?2 «Born in the biological field with Goethe’s 
studies on the metamorphosis of plants, morphology, more than a disci-
pline is a field of knowledge in which areas of study gravitate ranging 
from the morphogenesis of the cell to the evolution of living forms; 
from atomic forms visualization to the form of the elements, to the 
fields of forces, to the shape of galaxies and of the entire universe» [Di 
Napoli 2011, xiii].3 It is therefore the universe, Nature, Totality, physis – 
and not merely the form –, the true object of morphology. Morphology 
describes nature as form, as becoming of forms. Since physis, from a 
Goethian point of view, is a creating totality, quivering with life, inces-
santly crossed by processes of Bildung, Gestaltung, Umgestaltung, the 
theory of this physis, that is a Goethian physiká, will be a theory of how 
– and possibly why – this «unitary play of forces» produces forms. It 
is in this strong sense that Goethe’s morphological project must be un-
derstood. A poetically relevant example of this incessantly creating and 
1  «Goethe si disponeva a vedere all’opera nel mondo dei fenomeni (che si sarebbero 
poi rigidamente spartite le scienze della natura e quelle dello spirito) un gioco uni-
tario di forze».
2  For a general overview on the problem of form and morphology, see also Maz-
zocut-Mis [1995], Mazzocut-Mis [1997], Tedesco [2010] and Vercellone & Tedesco 
[2020].
3  «Nata in ambito biologico con gli studi di Goethe sulla metamorfosi delle piante, 
la morfologia più che una disciplina è un campo del sapere in cui gravitano ambiti di 
studio che vanno dalla morfogenesi della cellula all’evoluzione delle forme viventi; 
dalla visualizzazione della forma dell’atomo, alla forma degli elementi, ai campi di 
forze, alla forma delle galassie e dell’universo intero».
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transforming totality is represented by the poem Eins und Alles, where 
physis is crossed by an eternally operating “doing” (Tun), and this – in 
the strict sense – is “life”, Leben:
Und umzuschaffen das Geschaffne,
Damit sich’s nicht zum Starren waffne,
Wirkt ewiges, lebendiges Tun.
Und was nicht war, nun will es werden,
Zu reinen Sonnen, farbigen Erden,
In keinem Falle darf es ruhn.
 
Es soll sich regen, schaffend handeln,
Erst sich gestalten, dann verwandeln;
Nur scheinbar steht’s Momente still.
Das Ewige regt sich fort in allen:
Denn alles muß in Nichts zerfallen,
Wenn es im Sein beharren will.
[Goethe 2000a, 368, vv. 13-24]
Here nature has been thought of as a totality in an eternal creative motion, 
where what has a “figure” is nothing but the “moment” of an apparent 
stasis. An invisible and eternal arché (Das Ewige) exists – and express-
es itself – in all that exists. We do not understand much about Goethe’s 
morphological project, if we do not think about it in the context of this 
theory of wholeness. The form is not only valid as a metamorphic profile 
to be read within a simple biological transformation of the entity or of the 
species, but it must be understood as a moment of quiescence, a resting 
point, of a totality that incessantly reshapes itself. The secret of Goethian 
morphology is to pose the problem of the relationship between the form of 
the entity (the “foreground” form) and the total and eternal morphological 
matrix of Being (the “background” form). As Giuseppe Di Napoli writes 
in an exemplary way, «the form is what allows the distinction and there-
fore also the separation of being from nothing, from the isotropic back-
ground, from an extension of intangible space: it is the interface between 
being and the indistinct background of non-being» [Di Napoli 2011, 3].4 
4  «La forma è ciò che consente la distinzione e quindi anche la separazione dell’ente 
dal niente, dallo sfondo isotropo, da un’estensione di spazio intangibile: è l’interfac-
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In this sense, Goethean morphology should not be read as a mere de-
scriptive apparatus of the “nature” of form but as a theory of the genetic 
processes inscribed in the totality of physis, the formal “detachment” of 
the single entity from the continuity of an indistinct background. The 
«unitary play of forces» which are at work in the quivering totality of na-
ture’s life produces forms, but this production of forms coincides with the 
very life of the eternally creating Totality. Life produces form, and form 
produces life. As Di Napoli points out, «only what has a form lives. The 
form, therefore, is itself alive, as it is what allows life» [Di Napoli 2011, 
xvi].5 Therefore, it is starting from the forms that human intelligence can 
understand how, in general, “harmony” of forms, morphological connec-
tion and morphogenetic translation within nature is given. What is the 
fundamental place where the human being handles, understands, studies 
the form as such?
There is no doubt that for Goethe, and for the tradition that starts 
from his aesthetic teaching, this place is art, Kunst. Referring to Paul 
Klee, by the way a very attentive reader of Goethe’s writings, Di Na-
poli writes that «the artist, states Klee, must place himself in the point 
where things originate, where the genesis takes place as creation, where 
the whirling forces generate the original forms and primordial elements 
common to all beings, men, plants, minerals and all elements» [Di Na-
poli 2011, xvi].6 In a perfectly Aristotelian-Goethean spirit, according 
to Di Napoli, «the artist does not imitate the forms produced by nature 
but the genetic process of formation, the morphogenetic principle from 
which they descend; it does not imitate nature as created, but as na-
turans, as a process of creation» [Di Napoli 2011, xvi].7 The Goethean 
morphological tradition here illustrates how faithful it is to a certain Ar-
cia tra l’essere e l’indistinto sfondo del non-essere».
5  «Solo ciò che ha una forma vive. La forma, dunque, è essa stessa viva, in quanto è 
ciò che consente la vita».
6  «L’artista, dice Klee, deve porsi nel punto in cui hanno origine le cose, là dove ha 
luogo la genesi come creazione, dove le forze vorticose generano le forme originarie 
e primigenie comuni a tutti gli esseri, agli uomini, ai vegetali, ai minerali e a tutti 
gli elementi».
7  «L’artista non imita le forme prodotte dalla natura ma il processo genetico di for-
mazione, il principio morfogenetico da cui discendono; non imita la natura in quanto 
creato, ma in quanto naturans, in quanto processo di creazione».
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istotelian suggestion: physis – and the “form” of physis – can certainly 
have an ontological primacy, but art, technology, has a gnoseological 
primacy. It is Kunst that makes us draw on what Karl Blossfeldt (also 
carefully observed by the “Goethian” Walter Benjamin) would have 
called the Urformen der Kunst – which are nothing more than “close-
ups” of natural morphological details.8
***
It is therefore misleading to think of Goethian morphology as a mere 
theory of form, as a mere contribution to a doctrine of metamorphosis, 
or as an opportunity for an “aesthetical” re-formulation of biological 
topics. In Goethe, morphology is given, because the form, the morphé, 
functions as a conceptual medium between “nature” and “art”, between 
physis and téchne, and only in this connection can we understand what 
“life”, Leben, and form-of-life is.9 The dialectical correspondence be-
tween nature and artifice, between physis and téchne, between biolog-
ical life and form-of-life, between nature and art, represents one of the 
fundamental oppositions within our philosophical tradition. However, 
Goethe receives and transforms this “doctrine”, thinking of it as an in-
ternal correlative of the eternally working life of Totality. This ambiv-
alence is well described in the quatrain of one of his famous sonnets, 
with a vaguely autobiographical character:
Natur und Kunst, sie scheinen sich zu fliehen,
Und haben sich, eh’ man es denkt, gefunden;
Der Widerwille ist auch mir verschwunden,
Und beide scheinen gleich mich anzuziehen.
[Goethe 2000a, 245, vv. 1-4]
It is in this specific context that it is necessary to think about the mor-
phological link between nature and art. Goethean morphology, in the 
strict sense, is the metamorphic theory of this indistinct totality, where 
8  See K. Blossfeldt [1928]; W. Benjamin [1929/1972]. See also E. Haeckel [1904].
9  For the concept of “form-of-life”, see Agamben [1998]. For these themes, see also 
Agamben [2003].
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the very distinction between nature and art becomes problematic, to the 
point that it can be eventually suspended or erased. It is from this rela-
tionship that the metaphysical basis of morphology must be conceived, 
since form is the place where the connection between Natur and Kunst, 
between physis and téchne is “decided”, and where their indistinction 
is decided, by reason of a higher Wholeness, whose “life” and whose 
“forms” demand a higher “theory”. It is in this sense that morphology, 
by crossing the two domains transversally, is configured as the theo-
retical place where reflection on art and reflection on biology find their 
common ground.
***
Therefore, one of the conceptually most productive intersections be-
tween aesthetics and life sciences is that of form. Form is the place of 
Being, in which something acquires the eidetic clipping of its presence 
and its individuality. The form is therefore an “object” of aesthetics, 
because it is through the perception and understanding of what has form 
that the “beautiful connection” between the body and the psyche is re-
alized. Yet, form is also the place where the living is realized, and in 
the generative space of nature it becomes concretely present. It is to the 
morphé that the possibility for human intelligence to essentially know 
a “thing” is ascribed, and to understand the meaning of its genesis. 
Morphology, here, should be understood not only as a general theory 
of form but also, in a specifically Goethian sense, as a “knowledge” 
which, problematically suspending the difference between the realm of 
physis and that of téchne, opens up the possibility of the enigmatic in-
distinction between the two realms. The form-of-life and the form-of-
art are regional specifications of an absolute morphological knowledge, 
in which the very distinction between nature and art, between the bio-
logical form and the artistic form, between life and the technical object 
becomes elusive.
In this sense, it can be said that the entire Goethean morphology 
is deeply indebted to an Aristotelian background. The idea that nature 
is the “space” of the becoming of form, that a well-formed thing is the 
place where organic matter assumes the teleologically ordered perspec-
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tive of form, and that art represents a sort of “technical” fulfillment of 
nature are all ideas already traceable in Aristotelian physics. On closer 
inspection, Aristotelian physics represents neither a theory of matter 
(hylologia) nor an abstract theory of form (morphologia): it appears as a 
theory of the universal transformation, as a theory of the kinesis of Be-
ing, under an absolute metamorphic perspective, at the heart of which 
lies the problem of “justification” (lógon didónai) and of the “sense” of 
the transformation of every being. Goethe receives this idea, thinking of 
morphology not so much as a “static” theory of form, or as a “phenome-
nology” of natural forms – directly given to the eye of the observer – but 
rather as a theory of the genetic and formative process of all entities. 
It is therefore not a Bild theory but a Bildung theory, it is not a Gestalt 
theory but a Gestaltung theory.
The problem is therefore to think of the intrinsically formative and 
forming dynamics of nature and art, attempting to justify the absolute 
origin of form, and the teleological culmination that it represents for the 
entity. The problem that often haunts morphology is not being able to 
think originally about its connection with ontology and metaphysics. 
The problem is not to establish descriptively the morphological contour 
of the forms but rather to establish the “absolute cause” of their presence 
and configuration. The problem, both Aristotelian and Goethian, is es-
tablishing the kínesis of the form, its arché and its specific becoming. 
The ontological and metaphysical enigma of form is constituted by its 
very “presence”, by its very “realization”. The knowledge that meta-
morphosis needs is therefore an “archeology” of form. A question that 
runs through the entire history of Western philosophical civilization is 
whether there is a link, in general, between arché and morphé, how the 
form should be thought of as arché and the arché as form. What contin-
ues to create problems about form is the difficulty to see it simply from 
a scientific, descriptive, empirical, experimental point of view. Under 
this respect, scientific understanding of nature seems unable to justify 
the “absolute why” of the very presence of form and its realization. 
By slightly modifying the fundamental metaphysical question, one can 
ask: why is form given – in general? Why form – and not rather, the 
shapeless? What the science of life and the sciences of nature hardly 
manage to deal with is precisely the absolute point of onset of form: one 
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can describe the structure of a rose from a genetic and informational 
point of view, but no theory of matter seems to be able to explain why 
roses exist, and why roses have that shape and not another. Any purely 
deterministic-mechanistic, flat evolutionary or teleological-functional-
istic explanation runs the risk of not grasping the “free” character of 
the form, its “gift” character, the inexplicable dehiscence of the form in 
the heart of the entity.10 It is in this sense that the connection between 
morphology and metaphysics must be understood, triangulating it with 
the indispensable presence of a “pragmatics” and a “poietics” of form, 
that is the specific “form of doing” (poiesis, Tun) that art represents. 
What must be thought of in a theory of transformation, or in Goethian 
morphology, is the problem of establishing the “absolute beginning” of 
the form, or rather the absolute arché of its genesis.
Why, then, does morphology represent a fundamental knowledge 
for a “theory” of the entity and its transformative dynamics? The human 
being seems endowed with the strange ability to intuit the kinetic arché 
of being starting from its form, and therefore go back, with an imag-
inative effort, to the absolute origin of its transformation. The Aristote-
lian distinction between “nature” and “art” is based on the connection 
between arché, kinesis and morphé. But if the difference between phy-
sis and téchne is based on the concept of arché kinéseos, we must ask 
ourselves how well founded is the possibility of distinguishing the two 
domains, taking literally the Goethian hypothesis that this distinction is 
neither desirable nor possible.
***
Aristotle, in the book A of Physics reminds us that all entities are kinou-
mena, that is, entities crossed by a transformative principle. All entities 
are in transformation, and this transformation is kínesis, the true object 
of both Physics and Metaphysics. In a famous passage from Book B, 
Aristotle recalls that in the whole circle of beings, it is possible to group 
things into two realms: on one hand, the φύσει ὄντα, the entities which 
are determined by φύσις, which are such “by nature”, “by virtue of 
10  In this perspective see also Caillois [1960] and Leghissa [1998].
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φύσις”; on the other hand, the “artificial” entities, made “by art”, “ἀπὸ 
τέχνης”, products of human action, effects of ποίησις, “ποιούμενα”. At 
the beginning of Book B, Aristotle makes clear that «τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν 
ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι’ἄλλας αἰτίας», («of beings in general, some are “by 
nature”, others through other causes») [Arist., Ph., B, 1, 192b8]. Ac-
cording to Aristotle, the question of “technicality” or “artificiality” is to 
be considered immediately in connection with a theory of Nature (it is 
only with respect to a “natural” generation that one can speak of an “ar-
tificial” genesis/production). Physics, as the episteme that presides over 
the conceptualization of the production of Being as such, is at the same 
time Metaphysics. In his analysis of these Aristotelian topics, Heidegger 
points out that the physiká is the supreme thought of the Western world, 
«wherein Western historical humanity preserves the truth of its rela-
tions to beings as a whole and the truth about those beings themselves. 
In a quite essential sense, meta-physics is “physics”, i.e. knowledge of 
φύσις (ἐπιστήμη φυσική)» [Heidegger 1939/1998, 185].
How does one distinguish the products of nature from those of art? 
This is the decisive passage of the Aristotelian argument: «τούτων μὲν 
γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως» («each of them has in 
itself the arché of the kinesis») [Arist., Ph., B, 2, 192b13-14]. It is easy 
to understand that the essential determination of a natural entity must 
have within itself the principle, the command, of its own transformation, 
the origin and the code of its metamorphic development. An “original 
command” (arché) is embedded in the essence of the natural entity, a 
point of kinetic insurgency which presides over its “animation”. In this 
sense, Heidegger writes that «φύσις is the ἀρχή, it is the beginning and 
disposition of motility and stillness, and precisely of something ‘moved’ 
that has in itself this ἀρχή» [Heidegger 1939/1998, 191]. He goes on to 
underline that the «φύσις is ἀρχὴ κινήσεως – the provision that initi-
ates change, in the sense that everything that changes has this provision 
within it» [Heidegger 1939/1998, 192].
It can therefore be said that the distinction between physei onta and 
téchne onta rests on the recognition that the first have within themselves 
the principle, the code, the command, the incipit (all senses inscribed in 
the term arché) of their genetic, morphogenetic, metamorphic process; 
the second, on the other hand, have outside their essence the princi-
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ple, the code, the command, the incipit of their genetic, morphogenetic, 
metamorphic process. The distinction seems to be close to common 
sense. But how does human intelligence manage to guess if an entity 
possesses or does not possess within itself the principle, the morphoge-
netic and metamorphic command of its kinesis, of its transformation? 
The decisive answer is that that device is constituted by the form. It is 
through morphé that human psyche is able to retrace the genetic, kinetic 
and metamorphic principle of everything that exists. Not only is there a 
gnoseological connection between psyché and morphé, but this connec-
tion must also be related to the relationship between arché and kinesis. 
Psyché, morphé, kinesis, arché: the link between physics/metaphysics 
and morphology passes through these four terms. Oddly enough, hu-
man mind is able to discern the kinetic difference between physei onta 
and téchne onta by virtue of form. According to this determination, 
physis is nothing more than the place of an absolute genesis, the place 
where the purity of the arché is preserved. As Günter Figal writes in his 
fundamental text,
The originariness of life first becomes conspicuous in regard to 
movement. Although what is alive is also moved by something 
else, the essential thing is that it moves itself. This is reversible; 
what moves itself appears to be alive, say, the play of the clouds 
that reconfigures itself into ever new figures, the surge of the sea 
on the shore, the light on the surface of the water. But this live-
liness is borrowed; it remains hidden that the movement derives 
from something else. The moving force, for example, the wind 
that drives the clouds on and thereby forms them into figures, re-
cedes with the impression of liveliness. By contrast, something is 
genuinely alive when it actually moves on its own [von sich aus], 
from itself [von selbst]. For this “from itself” there is a Greek 
word: φύσις. One could translate the word with “nature” if the 
moment of significance that matters here were not precisely lost 
therein. φύσις indicates an occurrence; translated literally, φύσις 
is “growth.” Growth occurs always on its own, from itself. It is 
the essence of what one calls “natural” without hesitation. As 
this essence, it shows itself in natural things, and, conversely, it 
is the observation of natural things that discloses the essence that 
φύσις is [Figal 2010, 308].
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The great problem of Aristotelian metaphysics is therefore that of justi-
fying – giving reason – of this “changing” of being, of this transforma-
tion of being, in its totality. Form becomes the place where you decide 
on the “meaning” of universal kinesis and its beginning, its origin and 
its end. As Reiner Schürmann points out,
As we have seen, what strikes the mind in the Greek classical 
age is that there is becoming, and first of all a becoming of which 
man is the author and master. Both metaphysics and logic derive 
from the astonishment before what our hands can make out of 
some material. In Heidegger’s view the guiding meaning in Ar-
istotle’s concept of origin results neither from speculation about 
being nor from the logic of knowledge, but from the analysis of 
becoming that affects material things [Schürmann 1987, 99].
The kinesis of the entity, the need for changing inscribed in the enti-
ty, is empirically revealed by the observation of the entity’s metamor-
phic “behavior”. (Does the morphological conformation of the species 
“change”? It is on this point that ancient and modern physics/biology 
diverge). Yet, the problem of the arché of form, its point of onset, its 
“sense” and its “meaning” remain intact.
That the φύσει ὄντα have an “urge to change” in themselves does 
not mean that they are grasped in perpetual change. The change 
to which they have an inborn urge goes back to them, that is, 
they can be described as changes of this φύσει ὄν. The change 
has its origin in this φύσει ὄν and is also in its course its change. 
Aristotle intends this – as Plato also already does – with the word 
ἀρχή. ἀρχή is a beginning that remains essential for what begins 
in it; ἀρχή is a governing beginning that never remains behind, 
and, in this, is origin. For something that moves itself and chang-
es itself the beginning is originary, such that it is itself deter-
mined through originariness. φύσις is originariness; everything 
originary has the essence of φύσις. Change is always movement. 
As soon as something rests, it does not change but rather remains 
as it is. Yet, for φύσει ὄντα the “inborn” urge to change remains 
essential even when they are not in movement [Figal 2010, 309].
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What connection is there then between physis and arché? How is the 
idea that nature is always the place where the “absolute beginning” of 
every kinesis and every morphogenesis is decided? How should the ab-
solute beginning of form be thought, if form, physis and life, thought of 
at this metaphysical height, do they say “the same”? What exactly does 
it mean that, as Figal states, «φύσις is originariness»?
Insofar as φύσις is grasped as the determinative beginning of 
change, it has to do either with material or with form. The former 
is disregarded; φύσις is not the primary material which underlies 
everything that has the determinative beginning of movement 
and change. […] Something does not count as an artifact when 
it exists solely in possibility but rather only when it is present in 
completion (ἐντελέχεια), that is, in its form, and has the εἴδος, 
that is, the figure or the look, of what it is supposed to be. This is 
also how it is for what is composed by φύσις: Flesh or also bone 
does not have its φύσις before it has taken on its identifiable look 
that helps us determinatively say what flesh and bone is [Figal 
2010, 312].
Specifically,
[t]he idea outlined here can only serve to confirm Heidegger’s 
thesis, according to which Aristotle understands being as “being 
produced.” What is problematic about this understanding, how-
ever, may therefore be shown especially well with reference to it. 
It is by no means the case that the “on its own” is best disclosed 
on the basis of production. […] The first thing to stand out is that 
in the Aristotelian considerations, the talk is no longer of φύσις 
as of a beginning or origin inherent in a living being; φύσις is 
here no longer life that is perceptible as independent rest and 
movement, but, rather, an instance of production understood in 
analogy to craft work. The idea is one in orientation from the 
ability of living beings to propagate, which Aristotle then un-
derstands based on craftsmanly production. That this is not un-
problematic is revealed in the very talk of the “what is composed 
by φύσις” itself: A living being is not composed like a bedstead, 
but, rather, grows. Accordingly, understanding flesh and bone 
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in the sense of material is also not illuminating; the two are not 
present like tree trunks that may be cut and then, as wood, fash-
ioned into a bedstead [Figal 2010, 312].
Once again, the destiny of philosophy is at stake, regarding the question 
of arché, and its connection with the kinetic explanation of form and 
being. The kinetic distinction between physei onta and téchne onta is 
therefore entirely inscribed in the problem of arché. To distinguish a 
“living” physical-natural entity from an artificial/technical one, there 
is no other way than tracing the kinetic arché of its genesis. Arché is 
origin, beginning, command, code, point of onset. Physis, precisely be-
cause it is the place of absolute arché, is also an unavoidable origin, 
absolute archaism. Every natural, living, biological being is “archaic”, 
because it has the original genetic command of physis in it. Each physei 
on is archaic, insofar as it is anchored to the absolute generativity of 
physis. It has in itself the archaic principle of an absolute origin that is 
both ontogenetic and phylogenetic: morphé names exactly the point of 
indistinction between the two planes. The technical-artistic thing, on 
the other hand, is different from the physei on, because it camouflages, 
simulates, disguises the originality/originariness of its genesis. What, 
in this theoretical framework, does not seem possible to dispute is that 
physis is the realm of arché, of absolute originality and originariness. 
Where there is arché, where there is originariness, there is physis. Yet 
something is not convincing. Putting the question in these terms, the 
connection between physis, arché and morphé risks being only partially 
clarified. First of all: how should the term ἀρχή be thought of?
The word ἀρχή seems to have entered philosophical language 
only with Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle is the one who explicitly 
joins the more ancient sense of inception with that of domina-
tion. From the time of Homer, the common meaning of the verb 
ἀρχή had been “to lead,” “to come first,” “to open,” for instance, 
a battle or a discourse. In the epic tradition, ἀρχή designates 
what is at the beginning, either in an order of succession in time, 
like childhood, or in an order of constitutive elements, as flour 
is the basis of dough or as the organs are the elementary parts 
of the body. The other meaning, that of command, of power, of 
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domination, although absent from Homer, is found in Herodotus 
and Pindar. Aristotle also uses the word in this sense. But the Ar-
istotelian innovation consists in uniting the two senses, inception 
and domination, in the same abstract concept. Until the end of 
antiquity ἀρχή remains a technical term for designating the con-
stitutive, abstract, and irreducible elements in being, becoming, 
and knowing. The metaphysical concept of ἀρχή expresses that 
abstract structural element in entities which, in their analysis, is 
unhintergehbar, insurpassable. It is a concept thoroughly linked 
to the metaphysics of sensible substance and its “theory” [Schür-
mann 1987, 97].
Reiner Schürmann’s reception of these Aristotelian-Heideggerian 
themes opens up new perspectives. As is well known, Schürmann’s 
philosophical project is mainly aimed at continuing the deconstruction 
of metaphysics on the trail opened by Heidegger but going even further. 
It is no longer just a matter of rethinking the metaphysical lexicon and 
re-dyeing it to a more original lexicon but rather trying to challenge 
the very notion of originality/originariness, which for Schürmann is 
deeply linked to the conceptual value of “domination/power/command” 
inscribed in the term arché. According to the title of his masterpiece, 
Schürmann points out that it is a question of making the metaphys-
ical lexicon, already examined by Heidegger’s critical analysis, pass 
from “principles” to “anarchy”. The question of universal kinesis, of 
its arché, and of the connection it has with the conceptual constellation 
morphé/eidos/télos becomes problematic, insofar as, as recalled by Fi-
gal, the Aristotelian approach looks at morphogenesis, the point of ki-
netic insurgence of the entity, within the productive, poietic paradigm, 
typical of art/technology: «In Heidegger’s view, the guiding meaning in 
Aristotle’s concept of origin results neither from speculation about be-
ing nor from the logic of knowledge, but from the analysis of becoming 
that affects material things» [Schürmann 1987, 99]. Physis, therefore, 
produces the physei onta, exactly through a poietic scheme that is that 
of téchne, of “art”.11




According to Aristotle’s Physics, material things in becoming 
are of two species: those that bear the origin of their movement in 
themselves and those that are moved by another. The former are 
“natural” in the strict sense, the latter are man-made. But where 
does such a distinction come from? What is the disjunctive factor 
between “moved by themselves – moved by man”? The terti-
um comparationis is movement, change, as such. As such? Is it 
some ideal representation that has made the quest for origin into 
a quest for causes? Or is it rather one very precise experience, 
namely, that of the movement and change initiated by us, which 
switched classical thought onto the track of causal explanations? 
In that case, it is only because man first grasps himself as archi-
tect, as initiator of fabrication, that nature can in turn appear to 
him as moved by the mechanisms of cause and effect. Growth, 
too, “begins” and “makes”. Because the artisan experiences the 
origin of production as indigenous to himself, he finds another 
such origin in nature, concordant with although allogeneous to 
his own. The experience that guides the comprehension of origin 
as it is operative in the “philosophy of nature” is paradoxically 
the experience of fabricating tools and works of art, the experi-
ence of handiwork. In this way the Aristotelian tradition divides 
the totality of things into those moved by human hands and those 
moved by themselves [Schürmann 1987, 100-101].
But is this conceptual scheme always valid? The answer that Heidegger 
and Schürmann give to this question is negative. There is another way 
of thinking about the paradoxical “production” of the natural entity, of 
the living being, that is to listen, in the term physis, to its original “tim-
bre”, that of birth, growth, manifestation, appearing, arising, “oriri”. It 
is in this determination of physis (in which it is possible to hear the orig-
inal “pre-Socratic” vibration), that the problem of birth/growth acquires 
its most explanatory value. It is therefore a question of proceeding with 
a deconstruction of that first sense of physis:
The most viable way of conducting the deconstruction of Aris-
totle’s physics so as to return back beyond his concept of arché is 
to examine the scope of his “kinetic” understanding of nature. It 
does not appear to be coextensive with his concept of physis. A 
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residual factor remains once natural things are opposed to man-
made things, and once these two species are combined under the 
common genus “moved things”. The specific differences, “phys-
ical” and “technical” movement, do not exhaust the phenome-
na that Aristotle calls natural. What is that residual factor that 
makes physis in the strict sense – as complementary to techne 
– remain a derivative notion in Aristotle? He owes this residu-
al factor, Heidegger says, to his speaking Greek: in spite of the 
predominance of manipulable and manufactured objects in his 
understanding of being, he occasionally still takes physis in the 
sense of its verbal root as coming forth, presencing. In those cas-
es the fabricative viewpoint of “making present” recedes behind 
emergence into presence – behind the presencing of plants as 
well as of handiwork. In such texts the distinction between two 
types of arché disappears because the kinetic pre-understand-
ing of nature disappears. The word arché does not occur in the 
passages where physis recalls the verb phyein, “presencing” or 
“coming to presence” [Schürmann 1987, 101].
It is at this point that the decisive step is taken: physis, then, is by no 
means the place of a kinetic arché, because, conceived in this way, the 
latter becomes explicable only in contrast to the poietic process of the 
téchne onta. What needs to be deconstructed is the idea that nature 
has to do with “origin”, that physis constitutes the absolute plane of the 
arché. What we have to do is to deconstruct the conceptual connection 
between nature and originariness. What comes to mind here is the idea 
of an “an-archy” of nature, the possibility of a radical contestation of 
the idea that physis has, in general, to do with arché. The appearance 
of the entity cannot be described as a “being manufactured” by physis: 
that emergence from the «isotropic background of non-being» must be 
thought of as a mild appearance, a rising, a silent and mysterious dehis-
cence. A more essential determination of the genesis of the entity – and 
its form – therefore passes through the radical contestation that there is 
in physis any point of “dominance”, of principle, of command, of be-
ginning. From a morphological point of view, there are no beginnings 
in nature. The kinesis of Being, the installation of matter in the shape 




For the pre-Attic mode of thinking, it seems, the origin appeared 
as simple presencing, as coming to presence, and in that sense 
as an-archic. If “presencing,” “coming about,” “emerging” (gen-
esis) are the words that best describe the origin in its pre-meta-
physical sense, it can only elude all representations connected 
with the arché of things in motion. It is dislodged from the site 
of maneuverable objects. Regarding its two classical features, 
inception and domination, the first can be seen as an echo of 
presencing; but with Heidegger’s return to pre-classical think-
ing, the notion of domination loses its central place in philosophy 
[Schürmann 1987, 104].
What, then, is nature without command? What, then, is physis, deprived 
of its essential connection with arché? In short, how should the idea 
of an anarchic nature be understood? What then is the relevance of 
this theme for a metaphysical foundation of morphology? Morphology, 
we have said, is that discipline of form that can ignore the difference 
between nature and art, because it studies the pure articulation of the 
morphé, regardless of whether it is “embodied” in a natural entity or in 
an artistic/artificial one. This is where, in some way, the initial hypoth-
esis is verified. Morphology is a “science” that studies the form, regard-
less of the fundamental difference inscribed in the kinesis of the entity 
or abolishing the relevance of the distinction between physei onta and 
téchne onta. But this “abolition” is not a mere theoretical move: it is the 
new anarchic determination of physis that undermines the legitimacy 
of a natural discourse on arché. If physis is already “anarchic”, there-
fore not essentially graspable as a pure “archaic” matrix of universal 
becoming and transformation, morphology will no longer be just a mere 
theory of form, a mere phenomenology of forms and their metamorpho-
ses. Here, morphology is the supreme science, which captures the link 
between life and art through the cognitive crystal of form, regardless 
of the kinetic archeology of universal becoming. It is therefore clear-
er now, in what sense morphology, far from being a mere descriptive 
science of the formal configuration of entities, becomes the knowledge 
of absolute kinesis. However, in this sense, it becomes the science of 
an “anarchic” kinesis, of a kinesis no longer indebted – and eternally 
insolvent – to a “principle” that “commands” its genesis and its form. 
Beyond the arché
Pier Alberto Porceddu Cilione
124
Morphology is the science that gives reason to the pure configuration 
of everything that exists, to the phenomenal carving out of everything 
that is “detached” from the depths of the indistinct. Morphology is the 
science of a life crossed by the pure need for form. This need cannot be 
explained by any other “theory”, if not as an inexplicable dehiscence of 
form, as an infinite “artistic” gift that nature gives to itself.
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to rethink the indispensable connection between aesthetics 
and life sciences. According to a consolidated tradition, the fundamental point of 
intersection between the two disciplines is represented by the concept of form. It is 
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therefore to morphology that the task of thinking about the nature of form and the 
form of nature is ascribed. In this sense, Goethe and the debates on morphology 
arising from his texts represent an essential speculative starting point. However, the 
Goetheian teaching is, in this context, even more compelling, because morphology is 
already configured as a science of form that suspends the kinetic difference between 
natural and artificial beings, between nature and art/technique. If nature, physis, has 
still been thought of by Aristotle as the realm of arché, it will be a question of com-
prehend how, through the testimony of Heidegger and Schürmann, it is possible to 
metaphysically found morphology by understanding the essential “anarchic” charac-
ter of nature.







GOETHE – BENJAMIN – SPENGLER
Die Morphologie oder Metamorphose setzt sich aus Prozessen der Forschung, des Wissens und der künstlerischen ebenso wie der 
begrifflich-theoretischen Schöpfung auf der Grundlage einer Überset-
zungspraxis zusammen, welche ein Analogon zur Kantischen Defini-
tion des Genies darstellt: «angeborene Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch 
welche die Natur der Kunst die Regel gibt» [Kant 1998, Bd. 5: Kritik 
der Urteilskraft, 405-406]. Insbesondere die Goethesche Metamorpho-
se stellt in diesem Sinne eine Bewegung des unaufhörlichen sich Selbst-
übersetzens in anderes dar und diese Bewegung beruht auf der genialen 
Kraft der Natur bzw. der natürlichen Kraft des Genies. Seine Art der 
metamorphischen Übersetzung, die es in erster Linie mit Naturphäno-
menen zu tun hat, bewegt sich jedoch noch in einem im Wesentlichen 
homogenen Bereich und kann als mimetisch bezeichnet werden. Dies 
gilt auch für ihre Rolle in künstlerischen Schaffensprozessen, die sich in 
vielen Dingen analog zu denen der Naturphänomene verhalten, worauf 
ja auch schon Aristoteles hingewiesen hat [vgl. Aristoteles, Poetik, 4, 
1448b 4 f.].
Es wird jedoch komplizierter, wenn man versucht, die Morphologie 
als Forschungsverfahren in Felder zu übersetzen, die – vielleicht auch 
nur scheinbar – weiter entfernt liegen. Wiederum Aristoteles hat das 
Ethische und das Tragische in der Kunst einander gegenübergestellt; 
dies war möglich, weil in beiden Fällen das Zentrum des Problems 
durch Handlungen (energeia) dargestellt wird, die ethisch sein können, 
wenn sie sich aus dem Charakter des Individuums heraus ergeben und 
auf Glückseligkeit abzielen, oder tragisch, wenn externe Faktoren in-
volviert sind, die nicht in der Macht derer liegen, die handeln [vgl. Aris-
toteles, Die Nikomachische Ethik, I, 8, 1099a f.]. Die Grundlage hierfür 
bildet auch für Aristoteles jedoch die Natur und ihre Produktions- oder 
Schöpfungsweisen, denen gegenüber ethische und tragische Handlun-
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gen Analogien bilden bzw., wenn man es so ausdrücken möchte, Über-
setzungen oder Nachahmungen. Auch in diesem Fall handelt es sich um 
eine mimetische Operation.
Welche Züge jedoch nimmt diese Konstellation an, wenn die Hand-
lungen und die äußeren Faktoren allgemeiner werden und von der in-
dividuellen Ebene ethischer Personen oder tragischer Helden – obschon 
der substantiellen ethischen Werte, deren Träger sie Hegel zufolge je-
weils sind [vgl. Hegel 1985: Ästhetik, Bd. 2, 548] – übergegangen wird 
zur universellen der Geschichte? Es ist bekannt, dass Aristoteles zufolge 
die Poesie philosophischer sei als die Geschichtsschreibung, weil sie sich 
im Universellen und Potentiellen bewegt und die Dinge so darstellt wie 
sie hätten sein können und nicht, wie sie realiter sind [vgl. Aristoteles, 
Poetik, 9, 1451a36 – 1451b10]. Im Falle einer Übersetzung der Morpho-
logie und ihres Goetheschen Grundbegriffs des Urphänomens aus dem 
Bereich der Natur in den der Geschichte verwandeln jedoch die Bezie-
hungen ihren mimetischen Charakter in einen logischen und schließlich 
in begriffliche Verhältnisse, weil Geschichte, zumal die moderne und 
zeitgenössische, nicht analogisch oder mimetisch mehr erfahrbar ist, son-
dern einzig durch kategoriale Erkenntnis. Hierin liegt die Wahrheit des 
Hegelworts, demzufolge man heute keine Poesie mehr betreiben könne, 
da die moderne, bürgerliche Welt zu abstrakt sei; heutzutage bedarf es 
der dialektischen Logik, der «Anstrengung des Begriffs» [Hegel 1999, 
Bd. 2: Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, 41]. Hierin nun aber liegt eine 
große Gefahr, denn die Form der Analogie – welche der logische Begriff 
für mimetische Ähnlichkeit ist – wird verlassen und man betritt den Be-
reich der begrifflichen Logik und der Rationalität. Von der Metapher, die 
es uns Aristoteles zufolge ermöglicht, das Ähnliche im Unähnlichen zu 
entdecken [vgl. Aristoteles, Poetik, 21, 1457b 11 f.], wird übergegangen 
zum rein logischen Prinzip der Identität. In diesem Übergang geht das 
logische Denken über die Metapher hinaus; es bleibt ihrer nicht mehr ein-
gedenk, obschon eben sie Aristoteles zufolge weiterhin die grundlegende 
Möglichkeit einer jeden begrifflichen und verallgemeinernden Operation 
darstellt. Die schwere Artillerie des logischen Denkens besiegt mime-
tische, metaphorische und analogische Verfahrensweisen und lässt sie 
in Vergessenheit geraten; auf diese Weise löst ein solches Denken sich 
Schritt um Schritt von seinen eigenen Wurzeln und vergisst sie am Ende.
Geniale Übersetzungen
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In den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts verflocht sich der 
übersetzende und natürlich geniale Charakter von Goethes Morpholo-
gie mit zwei geschichtsphilosophischen Ansätzen, die beide beanspru-
chen, sich von ihm herzuleiten. Walter Benjamin übersetzt den Schlüs-
selbegriff der Goetheschen Morphologie – das Urphänomen – in einen 
der Grundbegriffe seiner Geschichtsphilosophie und seiner Ästhetik, 
und zwar den des Ursprungs, der später erneut übersetzt wird in den 
des dialektischen Bildes [vgl. Ophälders 2015, 54]. Oswald Spengler 
seinerseits lässt sich von der Goetheschen Naturphilosophie inspirieren 
und wendet diese dann auf die Geschichte an, wobei er die kulturellen 
Epochen als Pflanzen behandelt, die geboren werden, wachsen, reifen, 
verwelken und untergehen, wie am Ende auch das Abendland. Der Un-
terschied zwischen den beiden Ansätzen besteht allerdings darin, dass 
Benjamin – der nicht nur den Vorgaben Goethes, sondern auch denen 
Kants aus nächster Nähe folgt – mimetisch-analogisch übersetzt, wäh-
rend Spengler – mit allen Konsequenzen, die daraus entstehen – die 
bloße morphologische Methode in ihrer natürlichen Form begrifflich 
und logisch anwendet auf ein Objekt, das nicht mehr nur Natur ist. Auf 
diese Weise wird Geschichte als Naturphänomen behandelt. Ein Gegen-
stand, der immer auch das Ergebnis menschlicher Operationen und Ta-
ten ist, die vom Bewusstsein geleitet werden, und der eben deswegen 
nicht mehr nur von Naturnotwendigkeiten bestimmt wird, sondern, wie 
Hegel sagt, «Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit» ist [Hegel 1955: 
Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Bd. 1, 68], wird rück-
verwandelt in Natur.
Bezeichnenderweise tritt gerade Hegel, der dem Übersetzen im 
Gegensatz zu seinen romantischen Zeitgenossen scheinbar wenig Auf-
merksamkeit schenkt, auf einer tiefer liegenden Ebene – eben der der 
Formwerdung, die man ohne weiteres auch Morphogenese nennen 
könnte – als Übersetzungsgenie hervor. Von Aristoteles übernimmt er 
den Ansatz, alles auf seine Form (morphe) hin zu erforschen und in der 
Folge darauf zu sehen, wie diese jeweilige Form sich in immer wieder 
neue Formen übersetzt. Hierbei nimmt er das Lateinische trans-duce-
re, wie dies häufig bei ihm geschieht, beim Wort und führt die jewei-
ligen Formen oder Phänomene dialektisch durch, wie Beethoven dies 
musikalisch in seiner klassischen Periode auch tut. Die Zentrierung 
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des Denkens auf die Form und die gleichzeitige dialektische – wohl-
gemerkt nicht formal-logische – Begrifflichkeit stellen denn auch die 
Idee der Phänomenologie dar, eine nicht nur vernünftige oder systema-
tische Denkweise, sondern eine gleicherweise organische und vitale, 
welche den etymologischen Ursprung des Begriffs Theorie als Beob-
achtung und Kontemplation akzentuiert und sie als «reines Zusehen» 
[Hegel 1999, Bd. 2: Phänomenologie des Geistes, 59] charakterisiert, 
was der Goetheschen «zarten Empirie» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 12: Maxi-
men und Reflexionen, 435] äußerst nahekommt. Was erscheint, ist, was 
die jeweilige Form seiner Erscheinung darstellt, denn der sich bildende 
Geist ist auf jeder seiner Stufen immer nur das, dem er seiner jeweiligen 
Gestaltungskraft gemäß eine entsprechende phänomenische Form zu 
geben im Stande ist.
Goethes kurze Schrift Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen [Goethe 
2000, Bd. 13, 64 f.] enthält eine klare und umfassende Darstellung der 
morphologischen Methode, die er für seine Erforschung der Natur ent-
wickelt. Durch seine Untersuchungen will Goethe die Urphänomene 
bzw. jene Phänomene entdecken, die es – obwohl sie eine durch die Sinne 
wahrnehmbare phänomenische Erscheinung sind – ermöglichen, einen 
Blick auf die ursprüngliche Form zu werfen, aus der alle existierenden 
Formen herstammen. Hinsichtlich der Botanik bezeichnet Goethe die-
ses Urphänomen zunächst durch den Begriff der Urpflanze. Es soll sich 
hierbei nicht um eine platonische Idee handeln, die als Phänomen oder 
eidolon erscheint, jedoch als Idee niemals wirklich erfahrbar ist. Goethe 
ist in der Tat davon überzeugt, dass eine solche Urpflanze in der Natur 
existiert, d.h. dass ihre Form in den Naturphänomenen sinnlich erfahren 
werden könne. Er ist davon sogar so sehr überzeugt, dass er glaubt, sie 
auf seiner Reise nach Italien in den Botanischen Gärten von Padua und 
Palermo erblickt zu haben [vgl. Goethe 2000, Bd. 3: Geschichte meiner 
botanischen Studien, 164; vgl. ebenfalls Barbetta 2000, 286].
Zurück in Weimar trifft er sich mit Schiller, dem er von seinen For-
schungen und Entdeckungen erzählt, und dieser antwortet ihm sehr 
kantisch, dass das, wonach er suche und was er meine gesehen zu ha-
ben, nicht in der Natur zu finden sei, weil es sich im kantischen Sinne 
um eine übersinnliche Idee handele. Nicht ohne einen gewissen unwir-
schen Ton antwortet Goethe ihm, dass er sehr erfreut darüber sei, eine 
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Idee im Kopf zu haben und sie gleichzeitig überall in der Natur sinnlich 
wahrnehmen zu können [vgl. Goethe 2000, Bd. 10: Glückliches Ereig-
nis, 538 f.]. Schillers Kritik jedoch bleibt nicht ohne Folgen: Goethes 
morphologische Grundkonzeption bleibt erhalten, aber in der Termino-
logie der endgültigen Fassung der Metamorphose der Pflanzen wandelt 
sich etwas. In der Tat erscheint der Begriff Urpflanze nicht mehr, den 
er durch den des Blatts ersetzt. Goethe lehnt denn auch die Idee ab, 
dass hinter den sichtbaren Phänomenen noch etwas anderes stecke, ein 
Wesen oder eine Idee, die niemals durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung 
erfahren werden könne. Was die Botanik betrifft, lautet allerdings die 
Grundannahme jetzt: Alles ist Blatt.1
Der Urpflanze gegenüber, die Kant zufolge ein Noumenon ist, stellt 
das Blatt ein Phänomen dar; das Blatt dehnt sich aus und zieht sich zu-
sammen, wodurch es den jeweiligen Erscheinungen eine Form (morphe) 
verleiht, die jedes Mal eine andere (meta) ist, einem hypothetischen Ori-
ginalblatt jedoch durchweg ähnelt. Dieses Blatt bzw. diese Urpflanze 
kann nicht direkt sinnlich wahrgenommen werden und doch ist sie in 
jeder botanischen Erscheinung erkennbar; sie stellt das Ähnliche im Un-
ähnlichen dar und begründet eine analogisch-mimetische, anschauliche 
Denkweise, welche in der Form der jeweiligen Erscheinungen begründet 
ist. Jeder einzelne Teil einer jeden Pflanze stellt ein Beispiel dar, eine 
analoge und intuitive Variation eines Modells, das als solches nicht er-
scheint, tatsächlich jedoch in allem vorhanden ist, was zu sehen ist.
Hierbei ist es interessant zu beobachten, dass Kant auf fast diesel-
be Weise das ästhetische bzw. das Geschmacksurteil definiert, welches 
ein reflektierendes ist: «Vom Schönen [...] denkt man sich, daß es eine 
notwendige Beziehung auf das Wohlgefallen habe. Diese Notwendig-
keit nun ist von besonderer Art: [...] sie kann als Notwendigkeit, die 
in einem ästhetischen Urteile gedacht wird, nur exemplarisch genannt 
werden, d.i. eine Notwendigkeit der Beistimmung aller zu einem Urteil, 
was wie Beispiel einer allgemeinen Regel, die man nicht angeben kann, 
1  In einem gewissen Sinne kommt Goethe, wenn auch in sehr viel ausdifferenzierter 
Form, auf eine seiner Grundideen zurück, die er im April 1787 während seiner Ita-
lienischen Reise in seinem Tagebuch notierte: «Hypothese: alles ist Blatt. Und durch 
diese Einfachheit wird die grösste Mannigfaltigkeit möglich» [Goethe 1987, II. Ab-
teilung, Bd. 7, 282; vgl. Goethe 2000, Bd. 13, 576].
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angesehen wird» [Kant 1998, Bd. 5: Kritik der Urteilskraft, 319-320]. 
Auch das Schöne, und das genial Schöne zumal, wird bekanntlich als 
Erscheinung bezeichnet, deren Regel nicht gegeben werden kann [vgl. 
Kant 1998, Bd. 5: Kritik der Urteilskraft, 310 f. und 406].
Das Urphänomen ist Goethe zufolge das, was für das Genie in 
seiner Kantischen Definition diese unbestimmte Regel der Natur ist. 
Wie findet nun allerdings die geniale Tat bzw. die Übersetzung dieser 
Regel, die von der Naturphilosophie oder Morphologie entdeckt wur-
de, in Kunst und Kunstphilosophie statt? Wie kann das von Goethe 
entdeckte Naturgesetz der Kunst die Regel geben? Und wie könnte in 
Folge dieser mimetischen Übersetzung eine solche Naturgesetzlichkeit 
eventuell in eine logisch-begriffliche Methode übersetzt werden, welche 
auch ab straktere Phänomene, wie das der Geschichte in Angriff neh-
men könnte? In diesem Zusammenhang lohnt es sich, einen Auszug aus 
dem Kapitel «Dunkle Galerie» des 2. Teils von Faust zu lesen [Goethe 
2000, Bd. 3, 191-193, vv. 6212-6289]. Mephistopheles schickt Faust in 
das Reich der Mütter, um die Vorbilder oder Modelle aller Schönheit 
bzw. deren Urphänomene von der Antike in die Moderne zu übertragen 
bzw. zu übersetzen, und zwar Helena und Paris.
MEPHISTOPHELES. Ungern entdeck ich höheres Geheimnis. –
Göttinnen thronen hehr in Einsamkeit,
Um sie kein Ort, noch weniger eine Zeit;
Von ihnen sprechen ist Verlegenheit.
Die Mütter sind es!
[…]
MEPHISTOPHELES. Versinke denn! 
Ich könnt auch sagen: steige!
̓s ist einerlei. Entfliehe dem Entstandnen
In der Gebilde losgebundne Reiche!
[…]
MEPHISTOPHELES. […] Bei seinem 
Schein wirst du die Mütter sehn:
Die einen sitzen, andre stehn und gehn,
Wie’s eben kommt. Gestaltung, Umgestaltung
Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung
Umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur [...]
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Die Mutter, das natürliche schöpferische Prinzip menschlichen Lebens 
und immer auch die individuelle Mutter eines jeden einzelnen, wird 
hier zum universellen schöpferischen Prinzip natürlichen Lebens, nicht 
unähnlich der Weise, in der Goethe das Urphänomen auffasst. Aller-
dings ist die «Dunkle Galerie» nicht auf dem kreativen Prinzip einer 
Mutter allein aufgebaut, sondern auf dem einer Vielzahl von Müttern, 
und dies verschiebt die Akzente und ändert die Bedeutungen, auch 
wenn zunächst sowohl der Grund wie auch die Richtung dieses Wan-
dels verborgen bleiben.
Schon aus einer rein technisch-sprachlichen Sicht heraus ist jedoch 
bemerkenswert, dass Goethe hier wie die Natur handelt, d.h. er wendet 
das natürlich-ökonomisches Prinzip des kleinstmöglichen Energieauf-
wands an. Mit einem äußerst winzigen Eingriff – nämlich durch die 
alleinige Hinzusetzung des Umlauts – verwandelt er den üblichen Sin-
gular «die Mutter» in den geheimnisvollen und rätselhaften Plural «die 
Mütter». Der sprachlich-poetische Eingriff, die minimale Übersetzung 
eines Singulars in einen Plural ist umso außergewöhnlicher und genia-
ler, als es Goethe gelingt, mit dieser winzigen Intervention die maxima-
le Wirkung zu erzielen. Im Deutschen bleibt nämlich nicht allein das 
Substantiv im Singular und im Plural nahezu identisch, sondern auch 
der weibliche Singular- und der Pluralartikel bleiben sich gleich. Goethe 
muss daher nur den Umlaut hinzusetzen, d.h. das «u» in «ü» umwan-
deln, und die Operation ist abgeschlossen; in der deutschen Sprache ist 
dies die sachteste Form von metamorphischer Wandlung, doch im Falle 
der Mütter ist ihre Wirkung die größte und Fausts Reaktion hierauf 
spiegelt dies denn auch vollständig wider. In dem Mann Faust weckt 
die bloße Aussprache des Wortes «Mütter» nicht nur Schrecken und am 
Ende Begeisterung, sondern ebenfalls das wohlbekannte Staunen bzw. 
das Schaudern, womit Goethe das griechische thaumazein übersetzt, 
das in der Konfrontation mit Rätseln und Geheimnissen entsteht und 
das Vorbote vollkommen neuer Erfahrungen ist: «Doch im Erstarren 
such ich nicht mein Heil, | Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes 
Teil» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 3: Faust II, 193].
Ein Zeichen aus der gewohnheitsmäßigen Welt natürlicher Erfah-
rungsweisen wird verfremdet und öffnet den metaphorischen Raum für 
neue Bedeutungen: Die mit der natürlichen Schöpfung verbundene an-
Markus Ophälders
134
schauliche Bedeutungssphäre wird gerettet, doch wird sie überlagert 
von der Sphäre künstlerischer und symbolischer Bedeutungen. In der 
Tat sind die Mütter nicht wie jede natürliche Mutter von ihren eige-
nen Kreaturen umgeben, sondern von den Bildern aller Kreatur, von 
Bildern des Lebens und nicht von wirklichen Lebewesen. In derselben 
Weise behauptet Kant, dass die Kunst keine schönen Dinge schaffe, 
sondern schöne Vorstellungen von Dingen [vgl. Kant 1998, Bd. 5: Kri-
tik der Urteilskraft, 410], eben Bilder aller Kreaturen. Darüber hinaus 
sind die Mütter immer in Bewegung, in ständiger Gestaltung und Um-
gestaltung, in einer unaufhörlichen Metamorphose des ewigen Sinnes: 
Sie sind weder der Zeit noch dem Raum unterworfen, sie sind überall 
und nirgends, genau wie das Blatt, die Urpflanze der Metamorphose 
der Pflanzen. Um Faust die Richtung zu weisen, sagt Mephistopheles 
ihm denn auch, dass er ebenso hinabfahren wie auch aufsteigen könne, 
es sei einerlei: Es gibt keinen auserwählten Ort für das Wesen; hinter 
dem Phänomen ist nichts Weiteres verborgen. In dem Phänomen, so-
wohl dem natürlichen als auch dem künstlerischen, ist alles zu finden 
und deshalb ist in der Welt die Idee zu finden und in der Idee als Phä-
nomen die Welt.
Mit wenigen Attributen, wie es das Naturgesetz des kleinstmögli-
chen Energieaufwands vorsieht, charakterisiert Goethe die Mütter nicht 
nur als Urphänomene, sondern auch als einsame Göttinnen, ähnlich 
den neun Musen, und findet so eine Synthese – um nicht zu sagen eine 
Übersetzung – nicht nur zwischen der Naturphilosophie und der Kunst-
philosophie, sondern auch zwischen Antike und Moderne, wie es am 
Ende der Tragödie in der «Klassischen Walpurgisnacht» in großem Stil 
in Szene gesetzt wird. Was in der Natur die Urphänomene sind, wird in 
der Kunst von den Müttern dargestellt. Diese Beziehung ist jedoch alles 
andere als linear; das Geniehafte besteht in der Form der Übersetzung 
der Naturregel in die Kunstregel und nicht, wie es in den Naturwissen-
schaften der Fall ist, in der einfachen Anwendung eines Naturgesetzes 
auf bestimmte Phänomene. In der Tat ist das Übersetzen denn auch 
niemals eine lineare Operation, sondern beinhaltet immer auch Ver-
schiebungen, Interpretationen, subjektive Eingriffe und manchmal so-
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gar Verrat.2 Im Gegensatz zur simplen Übertragung oder Anwendung 
derselben Regel von der natürlichen auf die künstlerische Sphäre geht 
es vielmehr um Übersetzung und um die Schaffung einer Analogie. Die 
Regel des Naturwissenschaftlers ist denn auch immer eine bestimmte 
und für die Phänomene, auf welche sie angewendet wird, bestimmen-
de; die des Künstlers ist unbestimmt. Ein weiterer Unterschied ist, mit 
Proust zu sprechen, der, «daß bei dem Naturwissenschaftler die Arbeit 
des Verstandes vorausgeht, bei dem Schriftsteller aber folgt» [Proust 
2002, 278]. Der Künstler arbeitet nicht auf eine ähnliche Weise wie der 
Wissenschaftler, weil er dieselbe Regel anwendet, sondern insofern er 
zwischen seiner eigenen Kreativität und den Materialien und Formen, 
mit denen er verfährt, ähnliche – aber nicht gleiche – Beziehungen her-
stellt, welche denen zwischen der Regel und den Phänomenen in der 
Natur gleichen. Es gibt denn auch keine Analogien zwischen Dingen, 
sondern nur zwischen Beziehungen, weil wir die Dinge nicht an sich 
erkennen können, sondern nur unsere Beziehungen zu ihnen oder ihre 
Beziehungen untereinander; auch hier jedoch wiederum einzig durch 
unsere Vermittlung hindurch.
Auch in der Kunst also gibt es für Goethe Archetypen und Model-
le, denen die Werke «ähneln» müssen. Bezugspunkt seiner Theorie ist 
denn auch nicht die Idee der Kunst, die sich auf die Form konzentriert, 
sondern das Ideal, das vom Inhalt abhängt. So wie die Mütter von den 
Bildern aller Kreatur umgeben sind, stellt auch das Ideal der Kunst die 
Einheit einer begrenzten Vielfalt reiner Inhalte dar, die letztendlich mit 
den neun Musen vergleichbar ist. Für Goethe ist Kunst nicht selbst die 
Schöpferin ihrer Archetypen oder Modelle; in der Tat gehen ihr diese 
Archetypen nämlich voraus, denn sie stammen aus jener Sphäre, in der 
Kunst eben Natur ist. In diesem Sinne untersucht Goethe die Natur, er 
will ihre Idee erfassen, um sie dann in Kunst umzusetzen. Als Musen 
schaffen die Mütter von daher lebendige Bilder natürlicher Geschöpfe, 
aber sie selbst sind geistige Kreaturen, Erzeugnisse von Übersetzung 
und Reflexion und allein auf diese Weise Symbole, Allegorien und Me-
taphern künstlerischer Kreativität.
2  Vgl. im Italienischen tradurre (übersetzen, von lat. trans und ducere, im engeren 




Nicht im ewigen Werden, in der schöpferischen Bewegung im 
Formmedium liegt nach Goethes Auffassung der Urquell der 
Kunst. Die Kunst selbst schafft nicht ihre Urbilder – diese be-
ruhen vor allem geschaffenen Werk in derjenigen Sphäre der 
Kunst, wo diese nicht Schöpfung, sondern Natur ist. Die Idee der 
Natur zu erfassen und sie damit tauglich zum Urbild der Kunst 
(zum reinen Inhalt) zu machen, das war im letzten Grund Goe-
thes Bemühen in der Ermittlung der Urphänomene [Benjamin 
1980, Bd. I.1: Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Ro-
mantik, 112].
Für Goethe bleibt dieses Ideal einer ursprünglichen Kreativität der 
Natur jedoch getrennt von den Phänomenen, die es erzeugt; die Ur-
bilder bleiben einerseits isoliert voneinander und andererseits gibt es 
keinen direkten Übergang zwischen dem Natürlichen und dem Ideal 
der Kunst. Jedes Kunstwerk ist Darstellung einer Übersetzung des na-
türlichen Inhalts eines Archetyps und keines kommuniziert mit den an-
deren, da die Werke, wie die Mütter, hehr in Einsamkeit thronen; den 
Archetypen (Urbildern) können sie einzig gleichen und das einzelne 
Werk bleibt getrennt vom Ideal der Kunst als solchem, welches eben in 
seinem Ursprung Natur ist. Die Analogien zu Spenglers Morphologie 
sind offensichtlich, obwohl ein Unterschied bestehen bleibt: Goethe zu-
folge kommt in der künstlerischen Form ein Ideal zum Ausdruck, das 
jeder künstlerischen Erschaffung vorhergeht und dem die Werke jedes 
Mal eine andere Darstellung verleihen, die niemals das gesamte Ideal 
darstellt, ihm jedoch ähnelt, da das einzelne Werk notwendigerweise 
von den Sinnen wahrgenommen werden muss. Spengler seinerseits je-
doch vertilgt alles Ideale und verfolgt einzig das, was er für den tatsäch-
lichen Ablauf der Geschichte hält und den er dahingehend interpretiert, 
dass er auf Untergang hin angelegt ist.
Wenn Kunst – und mit ihr zusammen Kultur als solche – durch 
einen Prozess der Übersetzung entsteht,3 der von den natürlichen Ur-
3  Es ist in diesem Bezug notwendig hinzuweisen darauf, dass der Terminus Kultur 
sich herleitet aus dem der Agrikultur und dass zudem der der Version, welcher nicht 
allein Interpretation, sondern weiter gefasst eben auch Übersetzung bedeutet, ab-
stammt vom lat. vertere (drehen, wenden, verändern), welches auch benutzt wurde 
für: Erde aufwerfen bzw. umpflügen, d.h. Tätigkeiten oder Rituale, die in der Antike 
Geniale Übersetzungen
137
phänomenen seinen Ausgang nimmt, dann ist die Übersetzungspraxis 
auch Grundlage der Kulturgeschichte. Gerade weil das Ideal der Kunst 
qua Natur nie vollkommen übersetzt werden kann in Kunst und Kul-
tur, ist immer wieder von neuem diese Übersetzungspraxis vonnöten. 
Allgemeiner gesagt ist für Goethe das Übersetzen gleichbedeutend 
mit der Metamorphose von einer Kultur in eine andere, und eben dies 
schließt Spengler allerdings aus. In diesem Bezug kommt erneut das 
ganze Gewicht dessen zum Tragen, was es mit dem Übersetzen auf sich 
hat. Der Übersetzer Benjamin hat denn auch in dieser für alle kultur-
bildende Arbeit grundlegenden Tätigkeit das Wesen von Erfahrung ge-
sehen. Das innerste Prinzip in Goethes West-östlichem Divan ist denn 
auch – wie bekannt – eine solche Verständigung zwischen Kulturen, 
eine Verständigung, deren Hauptbestandteile Mitteilung, Übersetzung, 
Interpretation und Aufnahme von fremdem Kulturgut sind. Übersetzen 
bedeutet nämlich Gestalten, Umgestalten, Analogien schaffen, Ähnli-
ches in Unähnlichem erscheinen zu lassen und nicht zuletzt lebt sie von 
einem Impuls zur Rettung. Für Benjamin ist es sogar einzig und allein 
die Übersetzbarkeit von poetischen Texten, die ihr Überleben garan-
tieren können. Unübersetzbare Ausdrucksformen sind schon tot, bevor 
sie wirklich beginnen zu sprechen; gleiches mag von den Kulturen gel-
ten. Eine Übersetzung, die Einrichtung eines Museums, aber eben auch 
Geschichtsschreibung sind immer eine Verwandlung und Übersetzung 
von Vergangenem in Gegenwärtiges und das bestimmt die jeweilige 
gegenwärtige Form, welche das Vergangene annimmt. Dabei wandelt 
sich nicht allein die Form des Vergangenen, sondern gleichfalls wird 
dadurch auch die Gegenwart verwandelt. Diese vergangene Form ist 
somit nicht nur im analogen, von Spengler deutlich gesehenen Sinne 
«gleichzeitig», sie ist ebenso wohl und als durchgeführte Übersetzung 
auch dialektisch durchkonstruiert und bedarf aufgrund ihrer Substanz, 
die im Werden liegt, immer wieder von neuem der Wiederholung, wel-
che allerdings – wie in der Musik, die nichts Identisches kennt und die 
im Medium der Übersetzung lebt wie keine andere Kunst – variieren-
de Entwicklung ist, ein vielschichtiges dialektisches Spiel zwischen 
Gedächtnis und Vergessen, Kreation und Destruktion, deren Erschei-
auch bei der Städtegründung eingesetzt wurden [vgl. Rykwert 1976].
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nungsformen echohaftes Widerhallen, Verklingen und in verwandelter 
Form Wiedererklingen sind.
Was nun Spenglers Auffassung von Untergang betrifft, so sterben 
auch Kulturen und Zivilisationen, wie die Pflanzen, erst dann, wenn 
sie die Kraft zur Wandlung und Übersetzung und Anverwandlung ver-
lieren. Goethe hat dies anhand der Sprachen einmal folgendermaßen 
formuliert: «Die Gewalt einer Sprache ist nicht, daß sie das Fremde 
abweist, sondern daß sie es verschlingt» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 12: Maxi-
men und Reflexionen, 508]. Das wohl bekannteste Gedicht aus dem Di-
van, die Selige Sehnsucht bringt den Trieb des Rettens folgendermaßen 
auf den Punkt: «Stirb und werde» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 2: Westöstlicher 
Divan, 19], also nicht: Stirb und gehe unter, wie Spengler formulieren 
würde. Auch bei Goethe ist zwar ein apokalyptischer Nebenton ver-
nehmbar, den Francesco De Sanctis, dessen Ohr für Goethe stets offen 
gewesen ist, mit folgenden Worten zum Ausdruck bringt: «Chi non ha 
la forza di uccidere la realtà, non ha la forza di crearla»4 [De Sanctis 
1996, 160]. Neue Form und tote Form greifen ständig ineinander, wenn 
es um geistige, produktive Arbeit geht. Das rezipiert Hegel in seinem 
Begriff der Aufhebung, der ja nicht nur eine Erhebung darstellt und 
ein Außerkraftsetzen, sondern ebenso ein Konservieren des Aufgeho-
benen, des Toten, dem man ins Angesicht geschaut hat, um sich selbst 
in der absoluten Zerrissenheit – ähnlich, aber auch wiederum durch die 
gemachte Erfahrung anders – wiederzuerkennen [vgl. Hegel 1999, Bd. 
2: Phänomenologie des Geistes, 27]. Ein Selbiges findet sich ebenso bei 
Goethe, wenn er im Divan von der «Nachbildung» spricht, die gerade 
in Bezug auf die kulturelle Operation, die er mit dem Divan durch-
führen will, als eine Metamorphose der Übersetzungspraxis bezeichnet 
werden kann, welche den Untergang mit einem Neubeginn verbindet. 
Apokalypse als Metamorphose und dialektischer Umschlag durch den 
Untergang hindurch, der immer auch Aufgang anderswo bedeutet [vgl. 
Jünger 1980-1983, Bd. 8: Adnoten zum Arbeiter, 321]: «Selbst der Geist 
erscheint sich nicht erfreulich, | Wenn er nicht, auf neue Form bedacht, 
| Jener toten Form ein Ende macht» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 2: Westöstlicher 
Divan, 24]. Übersetzungen jedoch retten keineswegs nur Texte, sondern 




durch sie hindurch vielmehr noch ganze Kulturen vor dem Untergang 
ihrer Sprachen und Ausdrucksformen; Goethe verweist diesbezüglich 
auf Voßens Homerübertragung; man könnte auch auf Hölderlins Über-
setzungen Pindars oder Sophokles̕ verweisen. In diesen Übersetzun-
gen geht es nicht um die Vermittlung oder Kommunikation von Kultur, 
welche in ihrer Originalsprache unzugänglich bliebe, es geht um ihr 
Überleben, welches natürlich auch reflexiv ein sich Überleben ist, ein 
Überleben, das gleichzeitig ihr Fortleben, mehr jedoch noch ihr Auf-
leben bedeutet [vgl. Goethe 2000, Bd. 2: Westöstlicher Divan, 126-28; 
Benjamin 1980, Bd. IV.1: Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers, 9 f.].
Spenglers Begriff des Untergangs jedoch klammert eben gerade die 
Momente der Vermittlung und Übersetzung, ja selbst die Metamorpho-
se aus. Ihm zufolge ist die Darstellungsweise seiner Geschichtsphiloso-
phie weitgehend die von Goethes künstlerischer Vorgehensweise, doch 
ist der Inhalt kein Ideal, denn er besteht aus den bloßen historischen Tat-
sachen, so wie sie sich wirklich scheinen zugetragen zu haben. Histori-
sche Formen sind für Spengler eben keine bewussten Konstruktionen, 
sondern Formen natürlichen Lebens, und als solche gilt für sie der Vers: 
«geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt» [Goethe 2000, Bd. 1: Die 
weltanschaulichen Gedichte, 359], womit Goethe in dem berühmten 
Gedicht Urworte-orphisch den aristotelische Begriff der entelecheia 
übersetzt. Dieser Vers schließt die mit Daimon betitelte Strophe und be-
zieht sich in der Tat auf die Existenz eines natürlichen Lebens, von dem 
Goethe jedoch das geschichtliche radikal unterscheidet. Die Strophe, 
welche auf die dem Schicksal gewidmete folgt und welche die ganze 
Dichtung abschließt, trägt denn auch den bezeichnenden Titel Elpis, 
Hoffnung. Diese Strophe widersetzt sich unmittelbar der vorangegan-
genen und öffnet metaphorisch die Pforte der Freiheit in der antiken 
Mauer des natürlichen Schicksals, wobei sie die Grenze, welche Natur 
und Geschichte trennt, überschreitet. Dies tut sie dialektisch, indem die 
Grenze nicht einfach eliminiert, sondern in einem quasi Hegelschen 
Sinn aufgehoben wird und das bedeutet, dass sie zwar überwunden, 
aber immer auch in gewandelter Form, d.h. als in der Erfahrung sedi-
mentiertes Moment beibehalten wird. Das Schicksal, so die Dichtung, 
hat einzig die alte Dauer eines Felsens, des untersten Teiles der natür-
lichen Hierarchie; das neue Wesen indessen bewegt – leicht und regellos 
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– sich schnell und gewandt: «Ein Flügelschlag – und hinter uns Äonen!» 
[Goethe 2000, Bd. 1, 360]. Zwischen Schicksal, einem von Spenglers 
Schlüsselbegriffen, und Hoffnung, mit der das Gedicht endet, gibt es für 
Goethe keine Übereinstimmung, im Gegenteil: Ihre Beziehung ist die 
dialektische, in der der Naturnotwendigkeit die menschliche Freiheit 
entgegengesetzt ist.
Wenn in Spenglers Geschichtsphilosophie die Tatsachen den Inhalt 
darstellen, dann ist die morphologische Methode mit ihren Begriffen 
von Seele, Symbol, Mythos, Schicksal, Stil, Kultur und Zivilisation ihre 
Form. Der Inhalt besteht daher aus Geschichte und die Form aus Natur. 
Aus dem natürlichen Bereich übersetzt Goethe die Morphologie in eine 
künstlerische Vorgehensweise und als höchster Ausdruck entstehen 
hieraus die faustischen Mütter. Der Unterschied zwischen Goethe und 
Spengler ist jedoch nicht allein der unterschiedliche Bereich, in dem die 
Morphologie zur Anwendung gebracht wird, die Kunst für den einen, 
die Geschichte für den anderen; die beiden Autoren unterscheiden sich 
auch in der Art, in der sie sie auf die jeweiligen Bereiche übertragen: 
Goethe übersetzt, Spengler wendet an. Je mehr letzterer versucht, durch 
den Gegensatz zwischen Gewordensein und Werden [Spengler 1983, 
127] die Methode vom Natürlichen auf das Geschichtliche zu übertra-
gen, desto mehr schlagen die Eigenschaften des einen dialektisch um 
in die des anderen und das historische und tatsächliche Werden ver-
wandelt sich als reines Werden ohne Vergangenheit und Zukunft in 
eine metaphysische Kategorie und das macht seine Methode rigide [vgl. 
Merlio 2009, 56]. Er sieht nicht mehr die Wandlungen, sondern nur 
noch das Identische in jeder neuen Erscheinung, jede Bewegung wird 
zu «ewige[r] Ruh in Gott dem Herrn», wie im wiederum Goetheschen 
Incipit zum Untergang des Abendlandes geschrieben steht. In seinen 
über tausend Seiten unterbricht die Kategorie des Werdens ihre eigene 
Bewegung und kristallisiert sich zu einem großartigen Bild heraus, wel-
ches dem ähnelt, was Hegel als Erscheinung definiert: «das Entstehen 
und Vergehen, das selbst nicht entsteht und vergeht, sondern an sich 
ist» [Hegel 1999, Bd. 2: Phänomenologie des Geistes, 35]. Der Mangel 
an Vermittlung – Hegels Begriff für Übersetzung, Verwandlung, Ver-
änderung und Metamorphose – in Spenglers Operation führt dazu, dass 
sein Bild der Weltgeschichte seine ästhetisch-scheinhaften und meta-
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physischen Merkmale annimmt, wobei die Merkmale der Methode, wie 
Wittgenstein behauptet, charakteristisch werden für das Objekt und das 
bedeutet: für die Geschichte, welche eben hierdurch wieder in Natur-
haftes zurückfällt.
Auch Walter Benjamin übersetzt die Goethesche Morphologie vom 
Natürlichen ins Historische und begründet so seinen Begriff von Ge-
schichte, welche durch ihre Tatsachen hindurch auf empirische Weise 
etwas Ideales verwirklicht. In diesem Sinne versteht Benjamin das Ideal 
bzw. die Ideen als faustische Mütter. In seiner Übersetzung berücksich-
tigt er die Vielfalt der Ideen und den einzigartigen, monadologischen 
Charakter jedes einzelnen Phänomens gegenüber dem totalisierenden 
Gestus, der in allem, was wird, nichts anderes sieht als die ewige Wie-
derkehr des Gleichen. Die Ideen sind also mehrere, wenn auch nur von 
begrenzter Anzahl, und durch ihre übersetzerische, metamorphische 
Wechselwirkung mit den historischen Materialien erzeugen sie em-
pirische Konstellationen, durch die sie sukzessiv ihre einzelnen Teile 
bis zu einer möglichst vollständigen Verwirklichung realisieren. Diese 
Konstellation wird von Benjamin auch als «Ursprung» oder «dialek-
tisches Bild» definiert, d.h. als Begriffe, welche eben gerade das Ur-
phänomen aus der natürlichen in die geschichtliche Sphäre übersetzen 
[vgl. Benjamin 1980, Bd. V.1: Das Passagen-Werk, 592]. In diesem Pro-
zess ist es wichtig zu unterstreichen, dass die empirische Konstellation 
sich nicht nur als Analogie einer früheren Konstellation verwirklicht, 
welche ihr im Spenglerschen Sinne «gleichzeitig» wäre, sondern auch 
auf dialektische Weise. Die beiden Konstellationen sind sich ähnlich, 
sie sind jedoch nicht identisch, da sie kontinuierlichen Umgestaltungen 
unterliegen.
In der Tat ist für Benjamin die Erfahrung mit Geschichte niemals nur 
analog, noch läuft sie auf die bloße Rationalisierung der Vergangenheit 
hinaus, um die Gegenwart zu rechtfertigen, wie es an bestimmten Stellen 
Hegel tut. Benjamin weiß, dass Geschichte im Ausgang von der Gegen-
wart geschrieben wird und dass das entstehende Bild nicht nur eine Wie-
dererkennung in einem vergangenen Zeitalter darstellt, sondern auch eine 
Operation der Dialektik im Stillstand: Auf der einen Seite wird das Bild 
des geschichtlichen Augenblicks festgehalten und der Prozess momentan 
unterbrochen, auf der anderen ist dieses Bild jedoch voller dialektischer 
Markus Ophälders
142
Energie, welche die Stasis erneut in Bewegung bringt.
Der Ursprung steht im Fluß des Werdens als Strudel und reißt in 
seine Rhythmik das Entstehungsmaterial hinein. Im nackten of-
fenkundigen Bestand des Faktischen gibt das Ursprüngliche sich 
niemals zu erkennen, und einzig einer Doppeleinsicht steht seine 
Rhythmik offen. Sie will als Restauration, als Wiederherstellung 
einerseits, als eben darin Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes an-
dererseits erkannt sein [Benjamin 1980, Bd. I.1: Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels, 226].
Auf diese Weise entsteht eine Wechselwirkung zwischen Bewegung 
und Stasis, Dialektik und Analogie, Geschichte und Natur, Logik und 
Mythos, die in der Lage ist, eine ganze Epoche in einem Bild zusam-
menzufassen und gleichermaßen eine gesamte Epoche ausgehend von 
einem einzigen Bild zu entfalten, welches auf diese Weise einige der 
Eigenschaften des Urphänomens aufnimmt [Vgl. Benjamin 1980, Bd. 
I.2: Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 702-3]. Ebenfalls rezipiert Benja-
min ein weiteres wichtiges Moment der Goetheschen Morphologie: die 
zarte Empirie, welche sich zutiefst dem eigenen Objekt anverwandelt 
und auf diese Weise im eigentlichen Sinne zur Theorie wird. Es handelt 
sich um eine Art Empathie, die im Einzelnen und Besonderen das We-
sen des Ganzen zu erkennen in der Lage ist.
Erst der erlösten Menschheit, schreibt Benjamin in der dritten 
These zum Begriff der Geschichte, stünde die gesamte Geschichte wie 
in einem großen Fresko zur Verfügung [Vgl. Benjamin 1980, Bd. I.2: 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 694]. Spenglers Geschichtsphiloso-
phie versucht, dieses Fresko zu malen, doch malt sie es nicht für eine 
erlöste Menschheit, sondern für eine zum Tode verurteilte Zivilisation. 
Aus diesem Grund kann sie einzig die Ruhe hinter jeder Bewegung 
sehen, anstatt gleicherweise die immense dialektische Energie in jedem 
Bild von Stasis, Ruhe und Tod zu erblicken und wäre es selbst das Bild 
Gottes, von dem wiederum Goethe nicht zögerte zu behaupten: nemo 
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Abstract
Morphology and metamorphosis are analyzed as ways of genial translations. In the 
case of Goethe as a translation of natural rules into artistical rules (Faust), in that of 
Spengler and Benjamin as that of natural morphology into proceedings of philosophy 
of history. Metamorphosis and translation are ways of mediation between different 
fields of scientific and cultural activities. Moreover, they represent a mimetic and 
intuitive way of dealing with problems which does not transcend into mere logical 
thought. This part is treated also in reference to Aristotle and Hegel. At the end the 
approaches of Benjamin and Spengler are briefly criticized and compared in ref-
erence to their Goethean origin and to the difference between their outcome and 
solutions.
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BEYOND THE EIDETICS OF LIVING BEINGS: 
CONTINGENCY, PLASTICITY, INDIVIDUALITY
Table of Contents: 1. The question of plastic form and its episte-
mological significance; 2. Metaphysics, phenomenology, biology in di-
alogue; 3. Life-world: Blumenberg’s revisited phenomenology in dia-
logue with Goethe’s morphology.
1. The question of plastic form and its epistemological significance
In Knowledge of Life George Canguilhem writes that «[i]t is quite difficult for the philosopher to try his hand at biological philosophy 
without running the risk of compromising the biologists he uses or cites» 
[Canguilhem 1952/2008, 59]. At the same time, as if he would like to 
respond to the objection that «[a] biology utilized by a philosopher» is 
«a philosophical biology, and therefore a fanciful one», he asks: «Yet 
would it nevertheless be possible, without rendering biology suspect, 
to ask of it an occasion, if not permission, to rethink or rectify funda-
mental philosophical concepts, such as that of life? Can one reproach 
the philosopher who has taken up the study of biology for choosing, 
among the teachings he has received, the one that has best enlarged and 
organized his thought?» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, 59]. It seems to be 
a rhetorical question which nevertheless exonerates the philosopher as 
innocent declaring the need of a kind of a metabiological approach in 
the biological problems which can be performed by the philosopher who 
assumes the task of the inquiry of living reality. In my opinion, such a 
kind of metabiological duty is achievable through a fruitful dialogue 
of metaphysics, phenomenology and morphology, inasmuch as each of 
these disciplines aims at the investigation of life. Establishing such a 
dialogue I will try here to give preferences to those positions which de-
fend the role of contingency. Therefore, I will follow the principle that 
saving (living) phenomena means saving their contingency and, hence, 
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their plasticity and their individuality.1 From this point of view my at-
tempt will focus on two questions which are strictly connected.
The first one concerns the notion of form as plastic. The second one 
regards the epistemological significance of the question of plastic form.
As concerns the first question, I would like to analyse the question 
of the form as plastic from an ontological point of view using Franz 
Brentano’s reading of the Aristotelian concept of eidos. In his com-
mentary of the Aristotelian ontology Brentano clearly points out that 
Aristotle’s eidos is never a rigid entity, but a “plastic receptor”, bound to 
matter and distinguished – especially in living beings – by a metamor-
phic quality. It means that a living being is able to change, to develop – 
including the self-erasure processes –, if we would try to read the notion 
of steresis in the terms of dynamics of the so-called idia, defined by 
Brentano as unknown individual differences. It is the deep synergy be-
tween the notion of individual substance (tode ti) and that of form which 
allows Aristotle to elaborate a conception of living beings as absolutely 
moving, in fieri, according to his epigenetic ontogenesis emerging from 
his biological works. Such a doctrine receives still today the attention of 
authoritative biologists. For instance Ernst Mayr recognizes that «[a]fter 
all, Aristotle’s eidos had many of the properties we now ascribe to the 
genetic program» [Mayr 2004, 54],2 where the central point is that the 
genetic program shows us how a teleonomic processuality character-
izes living beings, inasmuch they are never given or entirely realized 
from their beginning as already fully accomplished entities.3 In this 
sense, I would like to take into consideration the ontological question of 
plastic form referring to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Hans 
Blumenberg’s critique of it, mostly as concerns the limits of Husserl’s 
impressive research on the so called eidetische Variation. I will try to 
1  The concept of sozein should actually be discussed asking what saving a phenom-
enon means and what a phenomenon has to be kept in safe from.
2  In this context Mayr also refers to Jacob’s and Delbrück’s works [cf. Jacob 1970; 
Delbrück 1971] according to which the Aristotelian notion of eidos presents charac-
ters which are today recognized to be proper of the genetic program.
3  The kind of metaphysics which I let interact with the ontology of living being as 
emerging from the biological inquiry is far from the paradigm of a rigid preformed 
identity, even if Aristotle’s position is marked by a teleology that today’s biology 
instead abandons.
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understand the problem of eidetic variation looking at some theses of 
biology considered as morphology, namely as investigation of the form 
of living forms.
The second question, which is related to the first one, concerns the 
epistemological significance of the question of plastic form. Indeed, the 
assumption of a “mobile” ontological paradigm of the form implies the 
gnoseological question of the limits of an eidetic investigation, which 
are also the limits of the concept and of the representation as ways in 
which we try to grasp a form as a phenomenon that gives itself to us. 
The crucial gnoseological problem is transcendental since it is the ques-
tion of the conditions of possibility of the intelligibility of the form. 
I would say that such a question is definable as a problem of critical 
epistemology – as Jacques Monod would suggest [cf. Monod 1970/1972, 
37] – or as a real obstacle épistémologique, according to Gaston Ba-
chelard’s view.4 The question of the formal condition of intelligibility 
of the form as plastic is not so obvious for philosophy in times of new 
realism and actually it is already a fundamental question of the meta-
physical tradition with its conception of form as the intelligible par ex-
cellence, as the ground founding the epistemic model of knowledge as 
scire per causas. For metaphysics this implies an ontological primacy 
of necessity over contingency, namely over that which has the nature of 
plasticity as concerns both the ontological level and the notional one. In 
short, if we would like to talk about living forms essentially subjected 
to a continuous morphogenesis never definitely accomplished, then the 
question – both for the philosopher and for the life scientist – is the 
following one: what are the conditions of possibility of the knowledge 
concerning life? We are always in front of the sceptical doubt which 
insists on the fact that our knowledge is doomed to failure since an a 
4  Bachelard’s epistemological obstacle does not mean the presence of «external ob-
stacles, such as the complexity and transience of phenomena, or […] the weakness 
of the senses or of the human mind» [Bachelard 1938/2002, 24]. It consists rather 
in «sluggishness and disturbances» which appear «at the very heart of the act of 
cognition, by some kind of functional necessity» [Bachelard 1938/2002, 24]. In my 
opinion they are depending on the way of speaking through absolute metaphors (in 
Blumenberg’s sense) which characterizes the scientific knowledge and those ontolo-
gical operations which also life sciences perform.
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priori knowledge, which is able to “anticipate” (through concepts, rep-
resentations, deductions) that varied world of changing forms in which 
life consists, is impossible. Hence, the only heuristic possibilities are a 
posteriori descriptions which always remain limited and incomplete. In 
other words, our knowledge can only be a descriptive taxonomy which 
fails to account for the variation of the form according to the idea of 
knowledge as a kind of a valid knowing since it is able not only to 
declare that there are phenomena and how they are but especially why 
they are in that way.
The “why question” is still open in the field of biology since the most 
part of the genetic, phenotypic and epigenetic mutations have a casual 
character. It means that by their nature they escape the rational claim to 
identify a first principle or cause which explains why things are neces-
sarily going or have gone in a certain way. The point is not that things do 
not necessarily go in a certain way in the sphere of living beings, but that 
it can simply happen that things have gone in a certain direction rather 
than in another one. In The Epigenetics Revolution Nessa Carey refers 
to Audrey Hepburn’s health influenced by the malnutrition which she 
suffered as a child during the Dutch famine. Carey explains that
[d]ifferentiated cells remember what cell types they are, even af-
ter the signal that told them to become kidney cells or skin cells 
has long since vanished. […] Imprinted genes get switched off at 
certain stages in development, and stay off throughout the rest of 
life. Indeed, epigenetic modifications are the only known mech-
anism for maintaining cells in a particular state for exceptionally 
long periods of time [Carey 2012, 236].
Then, what is the epistemological problem? Accentuating the character 
of dependence between individuals (subsumed under the universal gen-
eralities of kinds and species to which they belong) and their specific 
classes of belonging – according to a model that life sciences import 
from the classical Aristotelian metaphysics – implies that the individ-
ual forms are “watered down”, even if we would like to look at the 
concrete reality which shows itself to our senses and gives itself to our 
heuristic reflection. The experience shows us that our knowledge of the 
individuals is not something wrong since it allows us to “get our hands” 
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(with all the problems that this obviously entails) on the world of the 
living, achieving the expected results. It is enough to consider the work 
regarding the genetic code which, properly deciphered, gives us back 
the confirmation of an invariability in the life-world, almost surpris-
ing in spite of the infinite individualities, each of them irreducible as 
concerns its own genetic makeup. The fact is that the effectiveness of 
our forecasts leads us to rely on our knowledge, but such a fact must be 
justified and understood as an epistemological question which implies 
an ontological question in itself. The epistemological question refers 
back to the ontological one, which I would formulate in these terms: if 
an intelligibility of form is possible for us, what space does contingency 
occupy in reality, what role does it play in determining the individual 
being of each living, what does it actually add in more, what does it 
entail? Is it truly conceivable as that which distinguishes itself from the 
essential core – and hence as something inessential in the determination 
of an individual – according to the Scholastic ontological distinction be-
tween substantia and accidentia by which the Aristotelian much more 
complex and problematic position is summarized? At this point, I would 
like to face the questions from the point of view that is most congenial 
to me, namely that of the metaphysical tradition with the help of Franz 
Brentano’s ontological perspective.
2. Metaphysics, phenomenology, biology in dialogue
A good starting point may be a question that Brentano poses in his com-
mentary on Aristotelian ontology, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung 
des Seienden nach Aristoteles.
In the second chapter Brentano reads the question of the accidental 
being – one of the senses of being according to Aristotle [cf. Metaph., E, 
2, 1026a34] – and he wonders in what way the project of a general on-
tology as investigation of the being qua being is possible in front of the 
explicit Aristotelian indication that there is no science of the contingent 
since it is not possible to identify a necessary cause of it5 – for Aris-
5  The cause of the accidental is an accident itself [cf. Metaph., E, 2, 1027a8] and 
hence a science of the accident is impossible [cf. Metaph., E, 2, 1026b4 and 1027a19-
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totle a condition that defines the knowledge specifically as episteme. 
Brentano treats the question sagaciously and his proposal essentially 
anticipates Husserl’s phenomenological solution of the problem of the 
eidetische Variation. During his analysis of the matter Brentano writes:
But did we not just follow Aristotle in determining the peculiar-
ities of the on kata symbebekos, and have we not thus subjected 
it to scientific scrutiny? True enough, but one must make careful 
distinctions. The concept of the on kata symbebekos is not kata 
symbebekos relative to that to which it is attributed, just as the 
concept of an individual is not itself an individual. Though it is 
not possible to have a science of individuals, yet the concept of 
the individual and its relation to species, etc., can be scientif-
ically discussed. An individual in general can be divided into 
individual substance and individual accident. In the same way 
the impossibility of scientific scrutiny of things which are kata 
symbebekos does not vitiate the possibility of scrutinizing sci-
entifically what kata symbebekos einai is [Brentano 1862/1975, 
11-12].
We can find a confirmation for the fact that for Brentano it is possible to 
bypass the ban imposed by Aristotle, as we read in the just mentioned 
passage, in a very perspicuous notation where Brentano affirms that the 
ontological relationship – the «close affinity» [Brentano 1862/1975, 7] – 
between independent being and accidental being follows the same close 
relationship between kind and difference in the definition, even if acci-
dental being does not constitute the specific difference that is anyway a 
determination inscribed in «the essence of the other [scil. of the kind]» 
[Brentano 1862/1975, 7]. And about accidental being he adds: «But cas-
es where it serves in a definition in the place of the unknown difference 
are not particularly rare, and it is often of service when we try to find 
the latter. The proprium (idion) of the Topics is in this way united with a 
being [Wesen]» [Brentano 1862/1975, 7-8]. In other words, the individu-
26] since the object of a science is a necessary reality, a reality which is always or 
for the most part, while the accident is never that. This epistemological criterion 
implies that we can have an empirical experience of the accident but not an epistemic 
knowledge.
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ality of each individual person worsens, compacts, thickens in the prop-
er features or ontological traits that are often completely accidental, in 
the sense that they do not change the intimate nature (essence, Wesen) of 
the individual if they change and nevertheless they show the difference 
– which Brentano defines as unknown – existing between individuals 
belonging to the same kind and the same species. This classic position 
of traditional ontology actually seems to be aware of the ontological 
force of accident despite the chablon according to which metaphysics 
would be essentialist at the expense of the contingent nature of reality. 
With the appropriate differences such a position can also be considered 
a good philosophical transcription of what biology teach us about the 
evolutionary processes that lead to final results arising from «an inter-
action of numerous incidental factors» [Mayr 2004, 33]. In this way, 
Mayr clearly affirms that «[c]hance with respect to functional and adap-
tive outcome is rampant in the production of variation» [Mayr 2004, 
33]. Perhaps it is not so interesting, given that we consider evolution on 
a population and non-individual level. But on an individual level the 
things are not very different since «[d]uring meiosis, in the reduction 
division it [scil. chance] governs both crossing-over and the movement 
of chromosomes» [Mayr 2004, 33], namely those processes which in the 
sexual reproduction of the living preside over the emerging of different 
individuals of the same species, different from their parents and differ-
ent from each other, even if they are born of the same parents.
Returning to Brentano’s analysis, he specifies that in order to under-
stand how things concerning an individual substance are we need the 
specific difference – namely the species that articulates the belonging 
of that individual substance to a kind – as well as an even more precise 
degree of distinction, although changeable, plastic, iridescent, depend-
ing on the givenness of unnecessary conditions of being, as concerns 
the individuation of the traits of the species, but unique and individually 
embodied so that each individual is distinguished from others of the 
same species. These traits are not the result of a need that presides over 
the ontogenesis of the individual, even if they are undoubtedly bound to 
the genetic belonging of a specimen to one species and not to another.
We can describe this fact ontologically in the following way: be-
ing a philosopher does not belong to the eidos of Socrates as a human 
Rosa Maria Lupo
152
being, but being a philosopher is a trait in Socrates that however dis-
tinguishes him essentially. To anyone who asked what “Socrates” is, 
without knowing that Socrates is the proper name of a human being, 
we could legitimately respond: “Socrates is a philosopher!”, bypassing 
the need to specify that Socrates is a human being. This is because 
the determination of being a philosopher is inscribed as an ontological 
possibility in the human being Socrates and Socrates is just a human 
being and not a horse, who does not have the faculty of philosophizing 
by nature. Such an example gives a vivid image of what for its part the 
morphology of the living beings shows us. As a matter of fact, we here 
move in the sphere of phenotypic plasticity. In their essay Phenotypic 
plasticity in development and evolution: facts and concepts [2010] Fu-
sco and Minelli present the state of affairs to us. The idea of a complete-
ly passive condition of living forms as exposed to evolutionary forces 
must be balanced not only with the self-organizing ability of the living 
being, but also with its disposition as a system able to self-regulate and 
to keep homeostasis unchanged as well as with its ability to heal alter-
ations (e.g., epigenetics) which it may encounter in relation to a certain 
environmental relationship. Such an activity of the living being occurs 
also at a phenotypic level: the phenotypic evolution depends on the phe-
notypic variation and in multicellular organisms the phenotypic varia-
tion is to be read as «variation in developmental trajectories throughout 
the ontogeny» [Fusco & Minelli 2010, 547]. Hence, «[a]n individual 
organism’s trajectory is the result of a unique interaction between its 
genome(s), the temporal sequence of external environments to which it 
is exposed during its life and random events at the level of molecular 
interactions in its tissues» [Fusco & Minelli 2010, 547]. It means: ran-
domness does not play a merely accessory role in the determination of 
the living being. On the contrary, it is an essential component of the 
constitution of the living being according to its plastic development. 
This thesis of the biological inquiry concerning the morphological, 
physiological and behavioural plasticity of living being does not clash 
against the ontology of the singular identity pursued by philosophy with 
its tools.
The ontological perspective emerging from Brentano’s position 
allows us to underline the sense of a modus essendi of the living be-
Beyond the Eidetics of Living Beings
153
ing, namely its irreducible plasticity lying at the core of its essence. Its 
plasticity constitutes the irrepressible element of determination, whose 
loss would imply the loss of the individual as determined singularity. 
Nevertheless, such a plasticity does not throw away the aspect of invar-
iance in variation and of unity in the diversity. Such an aspect opens to 
the epistemological possibility of an intelligibility of form as plastic. 
On the one hand, a putting in brackets of the contingent is problematic 
since the contingent binds the form of being of the living form. On the 
other hand, the presence of the contingency as a reason that supports the 
plasticity of the living does not however prevent us from observing the 
form of the living being as the ability to be “stable” and “mobile” at the 
same time. At this point we are entangled in Brentano’s epistemological 
question which he resolves by following that path which also Husserl 
will follow in dealing with the question of eidetic variation.
According to Brentano we could never have an episteme in the 
manner of a science that articulates its content in an aprioristic theory, 
namely before any empirical experience of the individual contingent, if 
it is of the individual contingent that we would like to have a science. 
Thus, Brentano respects Aristotle’s dictate. However, this limitation 
binding us to the contingent experience hic et nunc does not prevent 
us from knowing formaliter what the contingent is and, hence, from 
recognizing that we are in the presence of a particular case of contin-
gency when we are faced with single cases of it. The identification of 
the formal determinations or reasons of what the contingent is does not 
represent an operation in our knowledge that violates the Aristotelian 
principle of the impossibility of a science of the accidental since we will 
only describe the characteristics which formally, namely in a pure way 
and a priori, contingency has and which distinguish it from the neces-
sary. It does not mean determining a first cause, because such an act 
of knowledge requires that we look each time at the concrete existence 
of the contingent hic et nunc. In other words: this way of proceeding 
means the possibility of an eidetics of the contingent as such and not a 
specific doctrine of the accidentals as they give themselves in the world. 
Brentano seems to be satisfied with this solution which after all follows 
the canon of the traditional metaphysica generalis that is a general, for-
mal ontology. If it is possible to identify the defining characteristics of 
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the ontological modus of the accidental, this latter can be regarded as 
the object of an epistemic knowledge in the same way as the substance 
itself or its principles (archai) and elements (stoicheia), identified by 
Aristotle in matter, form and privation as regards the kind of the sensi-
tive substances (aisthetai ousiai) [cf. Metaph., Λ, chapters 2-4].6
In front of the same question that in phenomenology is known as 
the problem of the eidetic variation Husserl’s position is even more rad-
ical, as we can see in one of the most complex volumes of Husserliana, 
namely Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Varia-
tion [cf. Husserl 2012]. As the title of the volume suggests, for Husserl 
the eidetic variation is not to be understood as an ontological fact, but 
for phenomenology it is rather a method of knowledge of the phenom-
ena in the sense that the phenomenologist recognizes that each type 
(Typus) is a variation of an eidos, but at the same time it is the indi-
vidual concretion of the pure eidos which notoriously is an unreal and 
ideal (given) phenomenon for Husserl who therefore defines himself as 
a Platonist.7 The articulation of the eidos in types has to do with the fact 
that each eidos manifests itself in the mundane sphere through adum-
brations. The Abschattungen – that we can also think of as the pheno-
type of the phenomenon (eidos) as given in flesh and blood – make the 
ideal purity of the eidos “dirty”. They do not pertain to the regime of 
the necessity of the eidos. On the contrary, they are given possibly only 
thanks to the relevance of each of them to the categorical level through 
which each type is articulated. For instance, the fact that a table has 
spatial dimensions has to do with the fact that the category of spatiality 
6  It is interesting that the criterion of variation in a permanent identity is present also 
in Aristotle as concerns the question of the principles of the individual substances. 
Indeed, he recognizes that on the one hand the principles are different for the dif-
ferent substances, but on the other hand they are universal and identical for all sub-
stances in an analogical way (kat’analoghian) [cf. Metaph., Λ, 4, 1070a31-33].
7  Cf. Husserl 1913/1983, 40-42. According to the distinction between «object» and 
«something real», an eidos (or idea) can be defined as an (ideal and hence unreal) ob-
ject and it is «an atemporal being». Such a distinction implies for Husserl an «abyss» 
between consciousness, and therefore, its eidetic object and reality: «Here, an adum-
brated being, not capable of ever becoming given absolutely, merely accidental and 
relative; there, a necessary and absolute being, essentially incapable of becoming 
given by virtue of adumbration and appearance» [Husserl 1913/1983, 111].
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concerns the material existence of the table, but not its existence idea-
liter as an essence that inhabits a material. In a sense, the adumbrations 
are determinations which do not articulate the eidetic categories. They 
are only typological determinations, and for this reason they can, ac-
cording to Husserl, easily be left out and put out through the epochè so 
that each type can be reduced to the eidos under which it is to subsume. 
Then, the effective reality does not seem to have any real power of de-
termination of the content of the eidos, whose formal determination 
derives from the work of the transcendental eidetic reduction through 
which it becomes an immanent object of a consciousness as given to 
consciousness. Indeed, eidos in Husserl’s phenomenology represents an 
absolute purification from the contingency depending very closely on 
the way in which the transcendental reduction constitutes every giv-
en phenomenon as intentioned by a conscience. The eidos appears and 
has a phenomenal status only if it enters the sphere of a consciousness. 
The entire ontology which Husserl builds in the first book of Ideas and 
which he presents as the general ontology at the base of the different re-
gional eidetics grounding the various corresponding empirical sciences 
[cf. Husserl 1913/1983] makes sense only if the eidos is grasped by the 
subject’s gaze.8
Certainly, Husserl is convinced that what is identical (the eidos) in 
different types is a universal which is responsible for the principle of uni-
ty of all single phenomena that otherwise would only be scattered among 
their shadows. The types, according to a Hegelian terminology that Hus-
serl uses, are “moments” of the eidetic general being in the sense of an 
identity that is shared between the various single concrete moments [cf. 
Husserl 2012, 14], defined by Husserl as die strenge Identität des Allge-
meinen. The fact that the eidos is a correlate given of consciousness does 
8  I have not here the possibility to discuss whether the position which poses the ego 
as condition of possibility of the phenomenality of phenomena and therefore of the ei-
dos should be defended or not according to the counter-positions that seek to free the 
phenomena from the transcendental subjectivity, as for instance Jean-Luc Marion’s 
phenomenology of donation proposes [cf. Marion 1989; 1997; 2001; 2005]. However, 
there is no doubt that the question of the ontogenesis of a phenomenon seems to con-
cern exclusively its relationship with an intentional subject and not the problem of its 
own constitution by itself.
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not mean that it has not an ontological consistency, even if it is an in-
corporeal object. It is a given that fills the eidetic intuition or that which 
Husserl also calls the “ideation as act of grasping the essence” («Ideation 
als Wesen erfassender Akt») [cf. Husserl 2012, 29]. The givenness of the 
essence is attested through or in the specific act of the ideation, but for 
Husserl there are various degrees of evidence. The apodictic evidence, 
in which an essence is fully manifest in its indubitable truth, is almost 
a sort of borderline case. However, the eidos is always that to which the 
types refer in approximation. Husserl calls this approximation variation: 
«In der Variation habe ich Selbiges, das seine wechselnden Varianten 
hat. [...] In der Veränderung habe ich ein Individuelles, das durch eine 
Zeitdauer hindurch fortdauert und in verschiedenen Phasen dieser Dau-
er wechselnde Zustände hat, es ist in jedem Moment dasselbe, aber in 
jedem Moment anders» [Husserl 2012, 219].
What is unsatisfactory in such a dialectic of sameness and change? 
The problem is not that it seems to violate the principle of non-contra-
diction, but that it assumes two ontological levels: one is that of an invar-
iance and the other is that of a changeability of traits that have then nec-
essarily to be assumed as unstable and transient traits and therefore as 
discardable in the act of ideation. This is precisely the result of a method 
by which reality is read and interpreted. On the one hand, Husserl’s phe-
nomenology recognizes the importance of an effective reality, namely 
the contingency determining the variations. On the other hand, this var-
iation is irrelevant for the purpose of grasping the essence, the eidos as 
the invariable in the variation. In this sense, such a phenomenological 
position can be considered as essentialist and every kind of essentialism 
is notoriously viewed with very little sympathy. Nevertheless, not every 
phenomenologist is an essentialist, which can be exemplified with Hans 
Blumenberg who outspokenly criticizes Husserl’s position.
3. Life-world: Blumenberg’s revisited phenomenology in dialogue  
with Goethe’s morphology
In the essay Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der Phäno-
menologie in Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben Blumenberg gives us an 
extraordinarily lucid analysis concerning life-world. His departing point is 
Beyond the Eidetics of Living Beings
157
the following fact: «Alles, was in der Lebenswelt wirklich ist, spielt in das 
Leben hinein, wird genutzt und verbraucht, gesucht und geflohen, aber 
es bleibt in seiner Kontingenz verdeckt, d.h. nicht als auch-anders-sein-
könnend empfunden» [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 23]. Hence, a philo sophy 
that wants to be faithful to life-world needs to open up the accidental ele-
ment characterizing life. Blumenberg’s critique of Husserl’s Wesenslehre 
concerns quite evidently its reduction of the Lebenswelt in its “potential-
ity to be something other” to an “object distinguished through ideality” 
(«durch Idealität ausgezeichneter Gegenstand») [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 
25]. Indeed, in this way Husserl proposes a limit-concept of life-world 
(Grenzbegriff der Lebenwelt) which is themed as a well determined in-
variable object inasmuch as it is regarded by the “phenomenological eye” 
only as an eidos at the expense of its ontological wealth, which is instead 
contingent and multiform. Hence, Blumenberg is very explicit in declar-
ing the loss in the Wesenslehre and in the method of the eidetic reduction 
which “gains” a limit-representation (Grenz vorstellung) of life-world as 
an ahistorical (geschichtslos) reality: «[D]ie Ungebundenheit der eide-
tischen Variation [wird] zurückgeführt auf die Methodik der Beschrei-
bung» [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 25]. In other words: the various and un-
predictable content of life-world is assumed as a noetic object of possible 
cogitationes described purely and a priori according to the method of the 
eidetic description. The consequence is then the loss of the concrete hu-
man being (der konkrete Mensch) in its infinite and open morphogenesis 
of its Self, always susceptible to metamorphosis, since such an eidetic 
doctrine chains the human being to a static and rigid figure, namely to an 
invariable eidetic representation.9
9  Cusinato highlights the problematic nature of an eidetics of the living being, whose 
«identity cannot be thought as substance which remains always the same» [Cusinato 
2018, 33; all the quotations from this work are my own translation]. The science, which 
has an eidetic constitution as epistemic knowledge, has the limit of «focusing attention 
on the general, the repeatable, the reversible, excluding the singular, the unpredictable, 
the irreversible» [Cusinato 2018, 33]. On the one hand, Cusinato shows the “positivity” 
of Husserl’s eidetic variation since it is a restriction for the variation which is not posed 
by the subject, but which is «given objectively by the phenomenon itself» [Cusinato 
2018, 122]. In that sense, such a constraint constitutes the essence of the real, concrete 
phenomenon. On the other hand, Cusinato points out that the living being, and special-
ly the person, is the transgression of the variation since it is an «open destination […] 
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The most relevant problem, however, is that Husserl’s eidetic varia-
tion considers contingency only in relation to the need for the position of 
a given eidos. In this way contingency does not count as an ontological 
manner of phenomena free from any eidetic determining pre-givenness 
(Vorgegebenheit). Despite the aim of revealing life-world in its irreduc-
ibility to the order of the necessary, Husserl presents the Lebenswelt 
as the object of a theoretical description which implies the epochè of 
contingency that is precisely the trait of the unpredictable variability 
in life-world impossible to be deleted according to Blumenberg. Since 
for him a radical phenomenology should lead to a Forcierung der Kon-
tingenz [cf. Blumenberg 1981/2012, 48] he promotes a revision of the 
Husserlian concept of life-world which would be a betrayal of the spirit 
of phenomenology as openness to the phenomena as such inasmuch as 
Husserl’s concept of life-world is the result of the methodical instrument 
of reduction which seeks the “unbreakable sameness in the otherness” 
of the general essence,10 namely the invariable form of each phenome-
non (including world and life) purified from any accidental character.
Blumenberg’s revision seems to be much more generous to the con-
crete, effective life-word than Husserl’s methodological path, but it pos-
es us again in front of the question of the conditions of possibility of a 
knowledge of life that could be able in some way to mend the tear with 
the reality that the essential eidetic nature of the scientific model of 
knowledge produces. In a sense, the epistemic knowledge of life cannot 
renounce its eidetic structure since that element of invariance, of stabil-
ity, is proper of reality that is not limited to being a confused self-con-
non-deductible from an already accomplished eidos» [Cusinato 2018, 124]: «It is possi-
ble to develop the concept of identity by resorting to Husserl’s eidetic variation. In this 
case, identity becomes a material constraint for the possibilities of variation of the Self. 
Nevertheless, a personal singularity is just that which can overcome such constraints 
by a self-transcending. In this way it can express its own physiognomy» [Cusinato 
2018, 12]. From an epistemological point of view such an ontological condition means 
that our knowledge of life has to consider the variation as free from ontological, strictly 
determined rules. In his critique of a pure eidetics of life Blumenberg underlines the 
impossibility of previsions concerning the variation because of the contingent charac-
ter of the variation itself and the role of the chance in it.
10  Blumenberg’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology outlines Husserl as an 
essentialist thinker.
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tradictory chaos. Every phenomenon shows itself in its essence. This 
main thesis in phenomenology determines its eidetic approach to the 
phenomenal world. Nevertheless, at the same time, in order to be on the 
side of life-world, our knowledge must take into account that variable 
rhythm which is proper to the life and which emerges from the nature 
of living beings, as Blumenberg points out. We can for instance refer to 
those processes of speciation which represent an ontological dynamic 
of development in the life-world between permanence and uniqueness. 
Such processes give us a vital and moving image of living reality which 
structurally is always open to a constant novelty as well discussed by 
Sean B. Carroll, who summarizes such a matter of fact with the fol-
lowing motto: «Existing genes and structures provide the means for 
innovation» [Carroll 2005, 288]. In other words: in force of their nature 
– which is the element of invariance – living beings are structurally 
forms of givenness ontologically new, unexpected and unpredictable.
What we are facing here is a delicate balance analysed by Monod 
in his famous book Chance and Necessity – a work which is today 
outdated as regards some assertions, but not as regards the ontological 
paradigm proposed by him. According to it living reality gives itself 
between the existence of structures endowed with the “property of in-
variance” and the “occurrence of perturbations” in these structures [cf. 
Monod 1970/1972, 29]. Certainly, our point of view about life and living 
beings is today quite different from the claim underlined by Monod in 
the seventies: «We would like to think ourselves necessary, inevitable, 
ordained from all eternity. All religions, nearly all philosophies, and 
even a part of science testify to the unwearying, heroic effort of man-
kind desperately denying its own contingency» [Monod 1970/1972, 44]. 
Instead, today the prevalent perspective is opposite, if we consider the 
“principle of weakness” lying at the base of the different disciplines. 
For instance, theology has become weak in order to save human con-
tingency and finiteness; philosophy centralizes the role of contingency 
and otherness as well as the plastic nature of life;11 the life sciences have 
11  The notion of plasticity plays a fundamental role in the book by Catherine Ma-
labou with the paradigmatic title Ontologie de l’accident. Essai sur la plasticité 




since long abandoned “orthogenetic” visions and liberated the evolu-
tional processes from the teleologic criterion by pointing out the pres-
ence of an irregular zig-zag movement in living beings. Manfred Eigen 
and Ruthild Winkler highlight this in a volume with an emblematic 
title: Das Spiel. They warn us that the game is a «Naturphänomen, das 
in seiner Dichotomie von Zufall und Notwendigkeit allem Geschehen 
zugrunde liegt» [Eigen & Winkler 1975, 11]. There is a clear Goethean 
morphologic perspective that lies at the core of this ontological vision 
of natural life between necessity and contingency. As is well known, 
Goethe considers metamorphosis as a “venerable” but at the same time 
“dangerous gift” («höchst ehrwürdige, aber zugleich höchst gefärhliche 
Gabe» [Goethe 2000, 35])12 since it is tension, “game” between two 
forces, namely the vis centrifuga and the vis centripeta, the “subver-
sive” one which destroys the form (and hence the knowledge) and the 
“conservative” one which is like a tenacious resistance that on the con-
trary preserves the form. Such an image of metamorphosis as a dialectic 
between the tension towards destruction and dispersion and the tenden-
cy to persistence can be described referring to Eigen’s and Winkler’s 
analysis of the form of living beings:
Das Erscheinungsbild der Wirklichkeit ist stark strukturiert. 
Konservative Kraftwirkungen frieren den Zufall ein und schaf-
fen beständige Formen und Muster. Dynamische Ordnungszu-
stände entstehen aus der zeitlichen Synchronisation physikali-
scher und chemischer Prozesse unter ständiger Dissipation von 
Energie. Die Ordnung des Lebens baut auf dem „konservati-
ven“ wie auch auf dem „dissipativen“ Prinzip auf. Die Gestalt 
der Lebewesen, die Gestalthaftigkeit der Ideen, sie beide haben 
ihren Ursprung im Wechselspiel von Zufall und Gesetz [Eigen 
& Winkler 1975, 87].
12  Cf. Goethe 1988, 43: «The idea of metamorphosis deserves great reverence, but it 
is also a most dangerous gift from above. It leads to formlessness; it destroys know-
ledge, dissolves it. It is like the vis centrifuga, and would be lost in the infinite if it 
had no counterweight; here I mean the drive for specific character, the stubborn per-
sistence of things which have finally attained reality. This is a vis centripeta which 
remains basically untouched by any external factor».
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At this point, how can we read life-world in front of the aporia of the 
intelligibility of an order which escapes an aprioristic eidetics since it is 
essentially determined in a part by chance, but which cannot be reduced 
only at the level of an empirical variable because of the presence of a 
certain permanent necessity? The question of the legibility of the world 
is expressly posed by Blumenberg who asks whether «phenomena can 
“be read”, reality can be spelled as if it were exposed in an open book, 
whose characters await only to be deciphered» [Bodei 1984, ix].13
We could proceed in this way, if living reality were marked only by 
the order of necessary rules and by the trait of generality. But we are 
discussing on forms of life that are structurally marked by their own ac-
cidental singularity. Blumenberg offers us a Theorie der Unbegrifflich-
keit which has its strong point in a “weak” idea of concept. Exactly this 
is the fertile and epistemologically fruitful aspect of his thought which 
allows a use of metaphors in front of a reality which eludes every rigid 
conceptual determination. Blumenberg explains that a concept must be 
undetermined enough to grasp the concrete with its novelty in compar-
ison to that which is already met and experienced.14
It is a significant change in the idea that concepts are able to catch 
reality according to a vision which believes that concepts are ways to fix 
things against their dispersion and their escaping from our gaze. Blu-
menberg, however, is aware that the concept is the result of an actio per 
distans, inasmuch as it is operative in the distance from its object as a 
kind of its replacement. By its nature as a substitute – which reminds 
of Heidegger’s meaning of phenomenon as Erscheinung in the sense of 
das Meldende [cf. Heidegger 1927/1993, 29-30]15 – a concept is as an im-
13  All the quotations from Bodei’s essay are my own translation.
14  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 11-12: «Der Begriff muß genügend Unbestimmtheit be-
sitzen, um solche herankommenden Erfahrungen noch so erfassen zu können, daß 
entsprechend zweckmäßige Einstellungen auf sie auch dann bezogen werden kön-
nen, wenn im Detail in der vollen Konkretion Abweichungen von vergangenen Er-
fahrungen bestehen».
15  According to Heidegger, phenomenon as Erscheinung means that the thing (the 
proper phenomenon in strict, “original” meaning) never shows itself by itself, but 
through something other which makes it known («The expression “appearance” itself 
in turn can have a double meaning. First, appearing in the sense of making itself 
known as something that does not show itself and, second, in the sense of what does 
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age or a representation, actually «das Instrument […] der entspannten 
Vergegenwärtigung des Nicht-Anwesenden» [Blumenberg 2007, 27]. In 
this way, as a substitute open to the novelty of reality the concept is above 
all «das Instrument einer Anwartschaft auf neue Gegenwärtigkeit, neue 
Anschauung» [Blumenberg 2007, 27]. In short: without concepts we can-
not observe anything, neither in the first nor in the second moment (name-
ly in the time of the experience and in that of reflection) since the concept 
performs the same phenomenological function that Heidegger attributes 
to the logos as deloun.16 The concept is a kind of manifestation. But it is a 
manifestation of manifestation, given the phenomenic character of reality. 
It means that the possibility for a concept to reveal reality lies in a prior 
availability of the latter to be a phenomenon, to gives itself to us in a man-
ifestation. Because of this primitive openness of reality to us the concept 
can be a sort of facilitation for the «Verfügbarkeit des Gegenstandes […] 
abrufbar zu machen» [Blumenberg 2007, 28].
This phenomenological thesis corresponds to Goethe’s trust under-
lying the morphological project and in a way still grounding life sci ences 
today. It is a trust not in the cognitive human possibilities, but rather 
in the phenomenic ones of natural life. Blumenberg is careful to refer 
back to Goethe’s words in the Ergänzungen zur Farbenlehre – (a phe-
nomenon means: «in seiner ganzen Einfalt erscheinen, seine Herkunft 
aussprechen und auf die Folgerung hindeuten») which he comments 
in this way: «The Goethean pragmatics of knowledge is determined by 
the belief that man does not force his way into nature as an intruder but 
always already enjoys the richest communion with truth from the midst 
of nature and by virtue of its favor» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 29].
the making itself known – what in its self-showing indicates something that does not 
show itself» [Heidegger 1927/1996, 26]). In this way the concept Erscheinung marks 
the presence of an absence and the necessity of a substitute for the phenomenality. In 
a way, Blumenberg’s metaphorology depends on a similar dialectic of presence and 
absence in phenomenality, as I will try to show.
16  Cf. Heidegger 1927/1996, 28: «Rather, logos as speech really means dēloun, to 
make manifest “what is being talked about” in speech. Aristotle explicates this 
function of speech more precisely as apophainesthai. Logos lets something be seen 
(phainesthai), namely what is being talked about, and indeed for the speaker (who 
serves as the medium) or for those who speak with each other. Speech “lets us see,” 
from itself, apo…, what is being talked about».
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Hence, the notion of concept as deloun gives us a fertile heuris-
tic possibility, inasmuch as we recognize that concepts “constitute ob-
jects”17 and are “representation of representation” («Vorstellung der 
Vorstellung»),18 i.e., reduplications that reveal a transcendental opening 
of subjectivity to reality – of course, with all the problems that the open-
ness of the knowing subject to the world as its object of knowledge im-
plies. However, the thesis relevant for us is the fact that the presence of 
concepts – as Blumenberg suggests us – marks the absence of phenome-
na19 and this is a stalemate for us since it is the fundamental question on 
the validity of our knowledge. Such a question is typical of each theory 
that comes after the mere empirical experience of phenomena. In order 
to get around it Blumenberg offers us an epistemologically important 
use of metaphor. Since the metaphor «nutzt […] eine Stelle schwacher 
Determination aus» [Blumenberg 2007, 61], it dribbles the restrictions 
of too strong determinations such as the concept of an essence as a 
marker of a closed and immobile identity.20
Indeed, Blumenberg is convinced that the metaphorical way can 
be helpful for establishing «a more friendly and trusting relationship» 
with nature [Bodei 1984, xix]. In this manner it would be possible for 
us to «discover a hidden and forgotten wealth of meanings» and create 
«a new way of relating to the world» [Bodei 1984, xix]. From this point 
of view, then, our language as well as our concepts, our images and our 
representations are not merely a means between us and the phenomena. 
They have rather a heuristic function in continuity with the human, 
17  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 40: «Begriffe beruhen nicht nur auf Gegenständen, sondern 
Begriffe konstituieren auch Gegenstände».
18  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 40. If a phenomenon shows itself through a representation, 
then a concept is a representation of a representation according to the logic that a 
concept is itself an object of representation.
19  Actually, it is so also for Husserl, who considers that the object in the eidetic intu-
ition is given as if it would be present in flesh and blood, even if it is not materially 
in this way. That is not only since it is impossible for a material phenomenon to be 
literally contained by the “space” of the consciousness in its extension, but rather 
since the power of the concept is to “recall in presence” a phenomenon which is not 
hic et nunc in front of us.
20  I do not completely agree with Blumenberg on this aspect since in my opinion a lot 
depends on the content that the concept brings in itself.
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albeit in a sense impossible, desire that the world can reveal itself in 
the exact predictability of its phenomena, giving itself generously and 
gratuitously in the complex of its meaning as «a totality of nature, life 
and history»:
Der Wunsch, die Welt möge sich in der anderen Weise als der der 
bloßen Wahrnehmung und sogar der exakten Vorhersagbarkeit 
ihrer Erscheinungen zugänglich erweisen: im Aggregatzustand 
der ‚Lesbarkeit‘ als ein Ganzes von Natur, Leben und Geschich-
te sinnspendend sich erschließen, ist gewiß kein naturwüchsiges 
Bedürfnis, wie es das der Magie ist, über unbeherrschte Gewal-
ten Macht zu gewinnen. Dennoch gehört dieser Wunsch zum 
Inbegriff des Sinnverlangens an die Realität, gerichtet auf ihre 
vollkommenste und nicht mehr gewaltsame Verfügbarkeit [Blu-
menberg 1983, 10].
Our desire is nothing more than our request to reality to which we ask 
not only to become visible to us, but to give us its sense according to 
that kind of principle which Erich Rothacker defined as Satz der Be-
deutsamkeit and which Blumenberg takes up as the matrix of our desire 
through which we establish our relationship with phenomena. There is 
again something of Goethe’s logic in this hermeneutic phenomenology: 
nature, defined by Goethe as a lebendiges Buch, may still not be under-
stood (unverstanden), but it is not incomprehensible (unverständlich).21 
It means that the order of significance is not merely phenomenal in the 
sense of a relationship of a simple mirroring of the phenomena in our 
theories. Rather it is a much more problematic relationship. The prob-
lem is not that things do not manifest themselves, or that they do it only 
partially. For Goethe, who often seems to be a hard, more Husserlian 
phenomenologist than Husserl himself, saying that a thing does not in-
dicate what it is, is affirming that it is not what it is.22 Nevertheless, is 
the opposite possible?
21  Cf. Goethe’s verses in the poetic letter Mein altes Evangelium to Johann Heinrich 
Merck, later published with the title Sendschrieben: «Sieh / so ist die Nature in Buch 
lebendig, / Unverstanden doch nicht unverständlich» [Goethe 1950, 393].
22  Cf. Goethe 1952, 629: «[E]ine Sache zeige nicht an, was sie sei, heißt ebensoviel 
als sagen, sie sei nicht, was sie sei».
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Actually, phenomenology teaches us that der Schein is also a case 
of phenomenality, but the transit from the being (essence) of the phe-
nomenon to its appearing is interrupted by a sort of manifestation that 
turns our gaze away from the truth of the phenomenon. However, with-
out opening these specifically phenomenological questions, it is impor-
tant to underline that according to Blumenberg the metaphor is not a 
dissolution of the limits of our sensible and empirical perception of the 
givenness of natural phenomena, but rather it is the “device” for a kind 
of self-recovery for our language (and hence for our rational commit-
ment) whose scarcity and weakness we do constantly experience. Over-
coming the ancient, blind, epistemological trust in the «perfect con-
gruence of logos and cosmos» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 2] since «for 
antiquity, the logos was fundamentally adequate to the totality of what 
exits» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 2], we discover indeed that the poverty 
in our relationship with the phenomena is the poverty of our language 
emerging from the way in which the language forms itself before a re-
ality whose givenness is chaotic and irreducible to static models: «Die 
Armut unseres Wirklichkeitsbezuges (inmitten des Reichtums unserer 
Möglichkeitsbeziehung) ist nicht erst eine Armut der Erkenntnis, der 
Wahrheit, der Theorie, sondern schon eine solche der Sprache, die 
sich innerhalb des lebensweltlichen Horizontes der nichtmodalisierten 
Gegebenheit ausbildet» [Blumenberg 2007, 88]. Our use of metaphors 
is not a mere arbitrary game, but rather a kind of cure, a remedy that 
allows us to meet reality, also in its dispersion and its disappearance. 
In epistemological terms, the use of “metaphorical devices” is precious 
because of its power of safeguarding the contingency. In this sense, 
the metaphorical method seems to be an alternative to the eidetic one 
which purifies reality from its dirty matter through the transcendental 
reduction. The fact is that our scientific theories, hence also the biolog-
ical ones, resort to the device of absolute metaphors, that is, of those 
metaphors that «prove resistant to terminological claims and cannot be 
dissolved into conceptuality» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 5].23 Obviously, 
metaphors neither express a complete, strict truth nor offer definitive 
answers, but they help us to inhabit the “texture” of reality as a totality 
23  Eigen’s and Winkler’s game as well as the idea of a cyphered reality or of a codex 
of life are examples of absolute metaphors.
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which as such is never «nonexperienceable, nonapprehensible» [Blu-
menberg 1960/2010, 14].
It is evident that here we are in front of the bottleneck between the 
option for what Canguilhem defines «a crystalline (i.e., transparent and 
inert) intellectualism» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xvii] – which is for in-
stance the method of an unmitigated eidetics – and the abandonment to 
the blind mistrust that there is no constant in life-world since contingen-
cy is a strange, dark and inaccessible entity which guides life as it pleas-
es. Nevertheless, when Canguilhem warns us that «[l]ife is formation 
of forms, knowledge is the analysis of in-formed matter» [Canguilhem 
1952/2008, xix], he perhaps offers us the hope of reconciling the needs 
of a knowledge that feeds on the aprioristic claims of a transcendental 
perspective and those of all scholars who point out that without expe-
rience we have nowhere to go. Knowledge as the analysis of in-formed 
matter means that we must not dismember life-world in rigid conceptu-
al forms. Rather, our duty is an inquiry able to look at living in-formed 
matters as «totalities whose sense resides in their tendency to realize 
themselves as such in the course of their confrontation with their mi-
lieu» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xix]. According to this methodological 
principle Canguilhem can therefore affirm that living forms «can be 
grasped in a vision, never by a division» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xix], 
namely not through a rigid determination of their definitory content, 
which does not consider all variability of their existence hic et nunc 
proper of each living form in its milieu, historicity, etc. In phenomeno-
logical terms, it means the necessity to face every singular living form 
in its individuality according to the different ways through which each 
form shows itself by itself in its being a form of counter-intentionali-
ty. All that implies consequently that the rational commitment in our 
knowledge of living reality has to respect life as an original phenom-
enon that as such always precedes the knowledge about it that we can 
elaborate. Recognizing the dependence of the living being on some-
thing other than its own essence (like contingency and variable alterity) 
is a decisive step in order to understand how living beings are a complex 
relational plot, which can be neither simply reduced to the model of a 
pure subjectivity nor hypostatized in the ontological one of an immobile 
substance whose components must be studied. In other words: each liv-
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ing form cannot be described as the mere sum of its parts. In this sense, 
Canguilhem’s observation about the nature of the organisms used for 
medical or biomedical research is very precious: «Within a given living 
species, the principal methodological difficulty concerns finding indi-
vidual representatives capable of sustaining tests of addition, subtrac-
tion, or measured variation of a phenomenon’s supposed components, 
tests instituted in order to compare an intentionally modified organism 
to a control organism, that is, an organism left to its spontaneous biolog-
ical fate» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, 12-13].
Such a state of affairs would have an absolute ontological legitima-
cy, namely even outside the rooms of a laboratory, if the living forms 
were closed, monadic systems, but, as we said, the complexity of the 
living being makes it an open system, that is, an organism – as Mayr 
would affirm – «constituted in such a way that additional information 
can be incorporated during a lifetime, acquired through learning, con-
ditioning, or other experiences» [Mayr 2004, 54]. Among these “other” 
experiences I consider also the continuous ones of birth of the Self and 
of its metamorphosis, according to the plastic character of the living 
being. Still, Canguilhem is very careful to note that often the object of 
our knowledge is not exactly what it is as a given in nature. Taking the 
example of the science of crystals, he emphasizes that crystals undoubt-
edly present themselves as a given object:
Ainsi l’objet cristal a, relativement à la science qui le prend 
pour objet d’un savoir à obtenir, une indépendance à l’égard du 
discours, ce qui fait que l’on dit l’objet naturel. Cet objet naturel, 
hors de tout discours tenu sur lui, n’est pas, bien entendu, 
l’objet scientifique. La nature n’est pas d’elle-même découpée et 
répartie en objets et en phénomènes scientifique. C’est la science 
qui consti tue son objet à partir du moment où elle a inventé 
une méthode pour former, par des propositions capables d’être 
composées intégralement, une théorie contrôlée par le souci de 
la prendre en faute [Canguilhem 1968, 16-17].
Such a remark is crucial. The object of life sciences is not the pure vital 
in itself or life as such, physei, as Aristotle would say. Elsewhere, Can-
guilhem affirms that in biology now «[l]a vie est étudiée au plus près 
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de la non-vie, à l’état maximum de dénuement de ses attributs tradi-
tionnels» [Canguilhem 1977, 115]. There is, therefore, an inevitable and 
perhaps even in some cases aporetic discrepancy and fracture between 
what is for us and what is by nature and there is no doubt that living 
phenomena actually risk to be not protected and saved at all by the rav-
enousness of our cognitive desire, of our absolute claim to truth. Never-
theless, in my opinion, there is no way to absolutely avoid this danger, if 
not precisely by providing control tools for the totalizing and dictatorial 
power of the eidetics as a strong, constitutive and fruitful structure of 
epistemic knowledge. It is the intellectual honesty that Bachelard calls 
l’engagement rationaliste [cf. Bachelard 1972] in which, perhaps, the 
very role of philosophy is played according to its critical nature in its 
dialogue with the eidetics of life. As Canguilhem humorously affirms, 
«la fonction propre de la philosophie est de compliquer l’existence de 
l’homme, y compris l’existence de l’historien des sciences» [Canguil-
hem 1977, 139] and, I would add, of the life scientist.
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Abstract
Saving living phenomena means saving their contingency, their plasticity, their indi-
viduality. A fruitful dialogue between metaphysics, phenomenology and morphology 
can be of help to investigate the ontological question of form, giving us the possibility 
to investigate the question of form and its epistemological significance providing a 
revision of that eidetic approach which instead is in danger of losing the sense of the 
continuous plastic morphogenesis of living beings.
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META-IDENTITÄT / UNSTABLE IDENTITIES: 
TOWARDS A PLASTIC MORPHOLOGY
In the course of his investigation into the conditions of “making lit-erature” in our time, in a confrontation that from time to time he 
turned to the alchemical principle of mutatio mutationis which cross-
es the pages of Elias Canetti [Sebald 1972, 280], to the shamanism of 
Herbert Achternbusch [Sebald 1983], to the animal tales of Kafka and 
to the «Attempt at a metamorphosis» [Sebald 1986, 195] which finds 
expression in them, and also to the totemic mimesis that characterize the 
psychopathological poetry of Ernst Herbeck [Sebald 1992/2006a], Se-
bald has repeatedly and circumstantially referred to Rudolf Bilz’s psy-
chological theories and paleoanthropological studies [1940; 1962/1981; 
1967; 1971/1973; 1971/1974].
Sebald’s morphological gaze intends to develop literary images al-
most in a “stratigraphic” sense or as an «interlinear version» [Sebald 
1986, 197],1 recognizing in the sequence of evanescent forms, refrac-
tory to any taxonomy [Sebald 1996/2006b, 185], which characterize the 
writing of our time, a profoundly ambivalent sign, symptom on the one 
hand of the progressive loss and deprivation suffered by life, anticipa-
tion on the other hand of the possible overcoming of that same event of 
defeats.
This is a metamorphic principle exemplary at work, according to 
Sebald, in Kafka’s animal tales, in which the progressive installation of 
the human or mechanical element in the animal life mobilize and make 
the boundary between the forms evanescent, revealing the whole histo-
ry of living forms such as the attempt «to counteract the fundamental 
tendency towards entropy by implementing more and more elaborate 
systems» [Sebald 1986, 198], and thus relativizing the human position 
1  All the quotations in this paper, except those from Sebald 1990 and Malabou 
2009/2012, are my translation.
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and its supposed privilege (in this light the Report to an Academy ap-
pears as «commentary on the precarious situation of humans as it ap-
pears from a physiologically different state» [Sebald 1986, 196]).
But there is perhaps more, and it is precisely the dynamic matrix 
of that “plastic morphology” that I would like to try to develop in these 
notes. In fact, the reader of Kafka’s tales cannot escape, first of all, that 
the sequence of events narrated corresponds to the intrinsically para-
doxical articulation of an attempt at liberation traced back to its own 
physiological and sensorimotor foundations: «By following the dog on 
his excursions, we, the readers, begin to understand that his erratic ac-
tions – and analogously our need to act, which obviously can never be 
appeased – correspond less to a metaphysical need than to constituting 
an attempt to get out of the physical jail of our kind» [Sebald 1986, 195].
On the other hand, it will be observed that this effort to break free 
is morphologically configured as «attempted metamorphosis initiated 
with the decision to self-destruction» [Sebald 1986, 195], where evi-
dently for Kafka and Sebald the element of the “decision” counts not 
so much as the expression of some intentionality but rather insofar as it 
itself provides the initial motor impact of the morphological event.
The destruction of the «psychological and physiological require-
ments of his own existence» [Sebald 1986, 195] thus becomes the par-
adoxical prerequisite for the investigations conducted by the animal 
that has “disengaged” from its biological species, but at the same time 
becomes («because of its specific constitution» [Sebald 1986, 194]) the 
condition of Kafka’s narration, and the premise for the reception by the 
reader, called precisely to continue, so to speak, the same operation of 
plastic dissolution of his own identity as the deepest and most ambivalent 
point of a «natural history experiment» [Sebald 1986, 195] whose saving 
power is manifested only in destruction [Masini 1984/2010, 161-170].
In articulating together this morphological dynamic and this “nat-
ural history experiment”, we said, Sebald refers to the thought of the 
paleoanthropologist and psychopathologist Rudolf Bilz and to the re-
flection he developed over the course of several decades on identity, 
hominisation, metamorphosis.
Profoundly and durably influenced by the biotheoretic thought of 
Jakob von Uexküll and direct pupil of Viktor von Weizsäcker in Hei-
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delberg in the late 1920s [Peters 2003, 33], in that constitutive phase 
of anthropological medicine which constituted a moment of profound 
interaction between biological knowledge and Freudian psychoanalysis, 
Rudolf Bilz understands the formation of human identity as a conflict-
ual place in which the tensions that cross the relationship between the 
organism and its vital environment come to manifest, in which the se-
miotics of organic symptoms finds expression in a real scenic semantics 
[Bilz 1940, 37-42]. In short, there is a profound interaction, a funda-
mental homology of function, between the conflicts that pass through 
the personality and determine its constitution and the relational game 
that is established towards the outside. The body is the site of this battle.
Rudolf Bilz titled Pars pro toto in 1940 the most mature result of his 
research, in which precisely a “synecdoche” relationship is established 
on the level of psychophysical unity between organic functions and the 
configuration of affections in the human soul. The place where these 
dynamics unfold is what Bilz [1940, 58] calls the «scenarium vitale» of 
the human being. In this perspective, the crisis, the forced restructuring 
which the inner and relational universe of the living being undergoes 
in disease, becomes a fundamental methodological interpretative key.
The scene of crisis and change, what Viktor von Weizsäcker 
[1926/1987a, 25] called «a kind of methodical primal scene», now takes 
the place where previously there was trust in the transcendental unity 
of an “I” that could be at the basis of a subject’s very relationship with a 
world, confidence in the description of a system of logical and “erkennt-
nistheoretisch” assumptions that preside over human knowledge and 
action, and together with this theoretical attitude even the possibility of 
defining safely a genealogy, an organic genesis of subjectivity.
Approaching a Stufenlehre, a theory of the degrees of psychic life 
that – in a very significant way – finds its explicit grafting point in 
Freud’s psychoanalysis, Weizsäcker [1926/1987b, 73] proposes to begin 
the analysis first by considering the vital constraints (vitale Bindungen) 
of the person; this is where Weizsäcker’s reinterpretation of the drive 
(Triebe) analysis proposed by Freud is rooted. It is an analysis that, in 
Weizsäcker’s work, is primarily concerned with a decisive methodo-
logical and topological aspect, constituted by the reversal of the tradi-
tional “hierarchy” between drives and contents of consciousness: It is 
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«the drive that gives certain contents to consciousness, and the sense 
of consciousness becomes comprehensible through the drive» [Weizsä-
cker 1926/1987b, 73]. What emerges unequivocally through this rever-
sal is a double assumption: on the one hand «the discovery [...] that even 
our consciousness is not autonomous, it is not “mistress in her house”» 
[Weizsäcker 1926/1987b, 77], and as a consequence of this on the other 
hand – and this above all characterizes Freud’s Weizsäckerian recov-
ery – the shift of emphasis towards the Bindungen, the “constraints”, 
we could say “being bound” of the living being to others living beings 
and the environment. In the following, not surprisingly, Weizsäcker will 
describe the dynamics of this level speaking of a «symbiotic existential 
layer» [Weizsäcker 1926/1987b, 88].
Plasticity of drives and constraints of the living being refer to each 
other. Phenomenologically understood in its relational and therefore 
inevitably dynamic and plastic essence, the bond between the human 
beings, even before being defined in the context of some gnoseology or 
epistemology, is an emotional-expressive bond [Jacobi 2014].
The centrality of the body traversed by the conflict pushes us to 
redefine identity in a dialogical and metamorphic sense, in its becom-
ing other and being open to the other. For Weizsäcker, it is precisely the 
“biographical method” of medical anthropology that guides us towards 
the image of a multiple identity; for Bilz [1940, 252] our own body is the 
place of a “Meta-Identität”, plural and metamorphic, in which conflict 
and crisis designate the deep caesura that passes through the human 
being, constituting his particular resource.
In contrast to the determinism of the sense physiology and of the 
nineteenth-century psychophysical approach, in Weizsäcker’s vision the 
plasticity of organic nature finds expression in its ability to substitute 
functions lost as a result of trauma and disease, restoring and reconfig-
uring the unity of the living being through a functional change (Funk-
tionswandel) that Weizsäcker conceives as a principle of interpretation 
of biological events in their qualitative connotation and in their devel-
opment in spatial and temporal relationships and which affects both the 
sensory functions and those properties of the nervous system that his 
neurological research leads him to highlight [summarized Weizsäcker 
1940/1997].
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In Bilz’s [1940] psychopathological perspective, the restructuring 
of the sensory functions and of the spatial-sensory order that they pre-
side is associated not only with the plasticity of the Affekte, that is to say 
instincts and drives, and, in short, of the entire human affective world, 
but also implies an homologous metamorphic propensity for the recip-
rocal and motivated replacement of formal configurations (Gestaltwan-
del), as precisely what is given to study through the figures that present 
themselves on the scene that occurs in obsessive-compulsive neurosis.
Bilz [1940, 253-258; also Bilz 1971/1973, 1971/1974; see Peters 
2003, 86-88] will propose to study these functional and formal connec-
tions starting from the phenomenological consideration of their senso-
rimotor aspect, calling them Identische Exekutive. Bilz theorises the ex-
istence of biologische Radikale, that is, of innate dispositions to certain 
“biologically relevant” experiences, actions and reactions, which in the 
course of human evolution, precisely by virtue of the biomorphological 
disposition to functional change, would have given rise to behaviour-
al modules that can be activated for the resolution of problems, which 
would gradually be managed on a conscious level. Thus develops an 
inner spiritual world in which Identische Exekutive – I would translate 
“identical executive models” – act according to a level that is structur-
ally homologous to the biologically founded “urszenisch” vital one. Be-
tween the different levels there is an «execution-mimic identity» [Bilz 
1940, 253]. These are therefore levels characterized by the repetition 
of their ancestral foundation and yet endowed with a plastic ability to 
transform and build an autonomous inner world.
Meta-identity is therefore the relational lived body, the way in which 
it experiences an intimately multiple vital scenario in ever-changing 
imag inative forms and functional investments.
Bilz’s paleoanthropological research [1971/1973; 1971/1974] will 
only project this spatialisation of somato-psychic dynamics into an evo-
lutionary scenario, identifying for that “original scene” and “scenic se-
mantics” a sort of founding event, an “ancestral evolutionary scenario” 
for the construction of compensatory mythologems.
In my view, neither the theoretical stability of Bilz’s operation nor the 
legitimacy of this sort of narrative retranslation of the methodical space of 
the crisis and functional change described by Weizsäcker is here the main 
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point of the matter; we are more interested in examining its dynamics on 
a purely morphological level, that is, rather on the methodical level of the 
description of the plural identity than on the genetic one of a paleo-history.
Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, the human being is for 
Bilz [1971/1974, 278] the result of a «disaster of unimaginable scale»; 
having lost the original predetermined harmony proper to its ancestors, 
the human being seeks a compensatory path in the creation of “mythol-
ogemes” capable of founding new conditions of harmonization. Having 
lost harmony with reality, having lost coherence with the environment/
Umwelt that characterizes animal life (the lesson of the already men-
tioned Uexküll is very strong here), the human being reinvents himself 
as a “poet (Dichter)”, or more exactly «forger of subject-centric fantas-
tic associations» [Bilz 1971/1974, 278].
Mythologemes are nothing more than these “narrations”, these ver-
bal configurations aimed at “crystallizing” in reality as compensatory 
orders resulting from a centering on subjectivity that emerges in a strik-
ing way in the conditions of delirium typical of psychopathologies, but 
which actually make body with the identitary or meta-identitary organ-
ization of the human being as such.
Corriger la fortune, Bilz will say with a famous figure of Lessing 
(Minna von Barnhelm, IV, 2); the human being is a cheater (Falschspie-
ler), a delusional animal that definitively lost the original health of the 
animal builds a fictional universe of meanings in which the same emo-
tional misery of the human being finds expression, compensation and 
nourishment at the same time. It is decisive that in this way the human 
being is able to represent himself a perfection whose degrees far exceed 
what we are given to experience: «there is a trend in us towards the 
over-optimal» [Bilz 1971/1974, 280].
In this sense, the articulation of a system of mythologemes is a sort 
of adaptive response of our complex emotional balance to a situation 
that presents itself without viable exit routes (Ausweglosigkeit). It is a 
profoundly ambivalent adaptive response, because precisely those fig-
ures who are thus called to guarantee human life exposed to the greatest 
risk in a substitute way nail it on the other hand to the system of mean-
ings thus produced: «if the subject dies in a situation of hopelessness, it 
dies from the meaning (an der Bedeutung)» [Bilz 1967, 244].
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Here is the twofold nature of mythopoietic constructions, moreover 
captured with extraordinary precision by Franz Kafka [1920] in a pas-
sage which will be remembered by Hans Blumenberg [1979, 9]: «They 
[the Greeks] could not think the decisive divine far enough away from 
them, the whole world of the gods was only a means to keep the decisive 
thing away from the earthly body, to have air to the human breath».
Recognizing in this situation one of the characteristic moments of 
the process of becoming human, Bilz has devoted the greatest care to 
investigate this situation of “Hopelessness” both in its sensorimotor 
components and in its psychopathological manifestations.
Still here, and eminently, the interpretative model proposed by Bilz 
refers to the theoretical coordinates that we have tried to delineate, and 
therefore to a biological-relational interpretation of the sense-motor 
spectrum of the human being, deeply influenced by the lessons of Uex-
küll and Weizsäcker and, coherently with the latter, it pays particular 
attention to the plural dynamics that traverse organic forms and their 
functional systems.
If in fact from a physiological point of view fear (Angst) is always an 
emergency reaction characterized by the release of high levels of adren-
aline, Bilz says here referring to the fundamental researches of Walter 
B. Cannon [1915], the coordination between the same physiological re-
action and motor expressions can occur in different ways, in relation to 
the different meanings that the biological subject experientially binds 
to it: «Experience, connected with a subjective “interpretation”, that is 
with a “meaning” [Bedeutung], decides which motor expression is man-
ifested in the given situation» [Bilz 1967, 244]. It is hardly necessary 
to observe that here the concept of “Bedeutung” is explicitly assumed 
in the sense of Uexküll [1940], therefore as a relational investment be-
tween an organism and a specific element of its environment.
Physiological stimulation, relational meaning and motor response 
are therefore in a complex and mobile interaction; the peculiarity of the 
human situation lies precisely in a specialization towards the extreme. 
Precisely this makes the human being, as Hans Blumenberg [2006, 
565] will observe, «an extreme fear being», and precisely because «he 
“specializes” in ways out of extreme situations, the threshold of ab-
solute “hopelessness” is extremely high for him». Hence the complex 
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sequence of Kafka’s Hungerkünstler, and those who populate modern 
literature from Adalbert Stifter to Thomas Bernhard, the subject of Se-
bald’s investigations.
Bilz [1940, 214] would say that the absence of escape routes, crucial 
therefore in constituting the sensorimotor scheme and the imagination 
of the human being, is crucial in the creation of this double “feeling” 
(«hautästhetisch und seelisch», Bilz [1940, 214]). The ancestral scene 
of finding himself in the savannah landscape is crucial for Bilz, where 
the escape route towards the top, towards the top of the trees, prac-
ticed by the phylogenetic ancestors of man, is no longer available. Bilz 
[1971/1974, 291] defines exactly this as the «paleoanthropological resp. 
pitheanthropological disaster». Abandoned the apesian paradise of the 
primeval forest, the human being is constituted in experimenting «the 
existence in the treelessness» [Bilz 1971/1974, 291].
The impossibility of an upward escape route forces the human being 
to search for it in a hallucinatory way in the creation of mythologemes, 
which guarantee in the elaboration of a linguistic-narrative order that 
stability and duration that does not find correspondence in experience.
Of particular relevance, both in Bilz’s perspective and in the recov-
ery that Sebald will make of it, is the fact that such a security strategy is 
sought through the elaboration of an order of becoming and of the dis-
course that goes hand in hand with the domestication of animals: «aki-
nesis in the sense of a disciplined persistence on site» [Bilz 1967, 246].
At the same time, the space of this mythopoietic event tells us of a 
radical human exposure to the contingency of experience, such a radi-
cal exposure that it is not content to reside hallucinatory in itself, but to 
open itself precisely to human meta-identity, to the duplicity of feeling 
and to the bond of the living beings, and therefore to that form of the 
understanding of the interconnection between things that says their dis-
tance and thus “measures” their unrepeatable uniqueness.
The human meta-identity is then the dialogic and metamorphic 
space of construction of an identity in the crisis, which does not take 
refuge in its hallucinatory denial.
The animal tales of Kafka, indeed in the words of Sebald [1986] the 
Evolutionsgeschichten of Kafka, show us all the fragility of “becoming 
a human being”, and precisely for this reason, rather than offering us 
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refuge in an illusory revocation of the mythopoietic processes, or in 
their progressive rationalistic overcoming, they point towards an inex-
haustible horizon of research, on the basis of the postulate «that we still 
have to search for solutions where there doesn’t seem to be any [...]. Not 
the possibility, the impossibility is the primary quality of our existence» 
[Sebald 1986, 199].
Thrown «into the labyrinth of our treeless hopelessness» [Bilz 
1971/1974, 291], the human being builds his way through the labyrinth. 
In a note that unfortunately did not find an adequate theoretical devel-
opment, Bilz mentions Karoli Kerényi’s Labyrinth-Studien [1950]. The 
labyrinth is the figure of incessant research in circumambulatio, an in-
cessant elaboration that gradually settles into formal configurations and 
ever new motor propensities.
At least two of these figures appear for our purposes with particular 
heuristic relief.
I refer first of all to the dance-labyrinth, to the figure in which the 
dancers, connected to each other with a rope, are dragged together into 
the geranos, the “dance of the cranes” according to the strange name 
with which this practice has spread. «All the labyrinth research», notes 
Kerényi [1950, 37], «had to get started on the dance». The rope leads 
the dancers first inside and then again outside: «The direction remains 
the same: at the center of the spiral, the dancer turns back continuing a 
movement that from the beginning revolved around an invisible center. 
From that moment, however, the direction was no longer that of death, 
but that of birth […]; dance presents prison, but also liberation, alludes 
to death, but also together to life-beyond-death» [Kerényi 1950, 39-40].
Kerényi [1950, 40] reports the opinions of those philologists accord-
ing to which the strange reference to the dance of cranes has a metaphor-
ical value and a late and secondary origin, but observes: «However, let us 
think for a moment more on the theme of the rope. Its use seemed justified 
by the difficulty of executing the labyrinth figure; but isn’t it true that 
even the most complex of dance figures are all the easier the greater the 
freedom of movement of the dancers? A dance of birds presupposes the 
possibility of freely hovering in the air». Here is the central joint.
Kerényi [1950, 41] therefore refers to a psychopathological experi-
ence of a patient who presented a case of sleepwalking with ambulatory 
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automation, in a situation of lucid memory. The circumambulatio led 
the patient to experience a phenomenon of “levitation”: «Those who ex-
perience it feel the impulse to rise from the ground, almost as if a strong 
wind hit it; it is necessary to stand firm and somehow anchor to the 
ground [...]. The patient was not absolutely crazy; she did not get lost, 
she did not “lose the thread”, and throughout the process she acted in a 
state of double conscience. In order not to fly away and not lose contact 
with this world, she clung now to the fence of the garden, now to a holly 
hedge». And so, Kerényi wonders to conclude: «Didn’t the rope held by 
the dancers from Delos and southern Italy respond to the same purpose? 
Or instead did it react to the two needs, that of executing the figure with 
precision and at the same time keeping firm? Did the geranos dancers 
also experience free flight in such a violent way that they were forced 
to hold each other’s hand in order to remain anchored to reality? The 
intensity of their experience should not be underestimated».
But still the experience linked to that sensation of levitation is con-
nected to the production of another figure, on which Kerényi [1950, 42] 
still draws attention: «At the end of this circumambulatio she found a 
giant ammonite in the grass, and she was incredibly attracted and fas-
cinated by it. She remained motionless to look at her, as if enchanted, 
without being able to take her eyes off; she had the distinct feeling that 
that object was exactly what she had “sought”. In ammonites one en-
counters the pure form of the spiral: the original form of the labyrinth».
Geranos and ammonite. In short, in the metamorphic event a meth-
od of research makes its way, in the use of the labyrinth finds expression 
a method of the homological relationship of forms and functions.
Yet the figure of levitation, the eminently Sebaldian and Naboko-
vian feeling of seeing the world through the eye of the crane [Sebald 
1996/2006b, 188], tells us something about which the representative cir-
cle of the labyrinth designated by Kerényi reveals an internal limit that 
refers to an investigation supplement.
There is, so to speak, an external limit with respect to the represent-
ative circle of the labyrinth, the geranos dance and levitation, and this 
is precisely what Kerényi indicates in his study: to immerse oneself in 
the dark caves of death and fly away in life – as takes place in the choir 
of the women of the Hippolytus of Euripides, and above all as seen in 
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the leap of Sappho from the cliff of Lefkada depicted in the under-
ground Basilica di Porta Maggiore in Rome, to whose mysterious 
meaning Kerényi [1950, 45] refers.
At the same time, however, the practice of dance with the rope and the 
sleepwalking experience of the patient identify, so to speak, an internal 
limit of the representative circle, in accordance with that observation 
that in the experience of levitation lived in the practice of circumam-
bulatio it is necessary to hold firmly anchored to the ground. This is 
precisely how the “two needs” of which Kerényi speaks [1950, 42] find 
expression and representation, that is the need «of executing the figure 
with precision and [that] of keeping oneself at the same time», thus lift-
ing and anchoring in free flight to reality, precisely that serious burden 
of earthly weight, that radical contingency of the human being thrown 
into the absence of escape routes.
In the light of what we are seeing, the strategy of Herbert Achtern-
busch’s shamanism reconstructed by Sebald appears to have an almost 
disarming linearity: «Herbert Achternbusch has actually only ever told 
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one story in all of his books and films» [Sebald 1983, 75]; that is, it is 
the story of the ritual repetition of the experience of dying [Sebald 1983, 
76], which the shaman goes through in a sort of autistic monologue 
[Sebald 1990, 180], from time to time identifying himself with human 
and animal ancestors. But here, «transformation into a dead ancestor 
can also represent an escape from one’s own existence [...]. Taking on 
the shape of the ancestors also represents a magical ritual of self-pro-
tection» [Sebald 1990, 181]; countless myths, Sebald adds, tell of the 
transformation as a way to escape those who hunt us: «Achternbusch’s 
unstable identities reflect this strategy [...]. With every metamorphosis 
one starts a new life; it is incredibly easy, in this state of mind, to open 
up escape routes via flights of the imagination».
Therefore, faced with Bilz’s diagnosis on “becoming human”, the 
real blaze in which the morphological event is consumed in unstable 
identities represents the expression of a radical mistrust in the path of 
progress undertaken by humanity: «the fear that we are moving further 
and further in the wrong direction and soon will no longer be able to 
find the traces of our own experience» [Sebald 1990, 177]. Almost in 
an “obsessive-compulsive” liquidation of the vital scenarium of the bio-
graphical methodology of Weizsäcker and Bilz, Achternbusch’s answer 
«is to invest all the fragments of his past that he can still get hold of with 
an excess of symbolic meaning – like totem pieces, they must testify to 
his desire not to lose anything».
Achternbusch’s shamanic “response” to this primordial experience 
(cyclic transformations, anticipation and ritual repetition of the experi-
ence of death, animal metamorphosis and exploration of living forms 
and their events) thus becomes an example of the imaginative circle of 
an “aesthetics of resistance” made precisely by profoundly dual met-
amorphoses, abysmal anticipations, unexpected experiences of levita-
tion, unhinging of narrative and linguistic links, in a constant process 
of disarticulation and rearticulation of the poetic language, according to 
what, moreover, Rudolf Bilz [1940, 252] theorized as the unstoppable 
exercise of a bricolage of thought.
No transition leads from the cyclical transformations and animal 
metamorphoses of Achternbusch to the Versuch der Metamorphose of 
the Forschungen eines Hundes, which Sebald [1986] tells us about in 
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the last of his essays on Kafka. The cyclical nature and the detailed 
possibility of a return are excluded here: the metamorphic experiment 
(Versuch) is introduced by self-destruction, by the conscious elimina-
tion of the psychological and physiological assumptions of animal exist-
ence. In this sense, it is an experiment in the natural history of form, an 
experiment of plastic destruction of form conceived at the same time as 
escape from the bodily prison of the species and irruption in a context 
«in which a life already condemned might still be able to continue» 
[Sebald 1986, 195].
Never perhaps Sebald’s and Kafka’s perspective of research has 
shown itself as pure, never perhaps the reflection on the contingency of 
the human being exposed in his Ausweglosigkeit has been pushed until 
it reveals itself, as here, in its substance of investigation into the form of 
human life in our time.
To conceive such a radical exposure to the factual nature of life, to its 
unpredictable contingency, and at the same time to outline a morphology 
of this contingent becoming, it would perhaps be necessary, as Catherine 
Malabou suggests [2009/2012, 17], «to think a mutation that engages both 
form and being, a new form that is literally a form of being».
A radical metamorphosis, Malabou continues, is conceivable as 
«the fabrication of a new person, a novel form of life, without anything 
in common with a preceding form». As Sebald [1986, 200] concludes: 
«What remains after this withdrawal treatment is the sheer restlessness 
of thinking, as is demonstrated in the art practiced by Kafka».
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Abstract
The essay aims to investigate some developments in W.G. Sebald’s poetics, explain-
ing the foundations of a morphology starting from the relationship with the theories 
of Viktor von Weizsäcker and Rudolf Bilz. The anthropological model elaborated by 
Rudolf Bilz, between the study of the origin of mythologemes and the investigation 
of unstable identities, allows us to investigate the presence in Sebald’s work of some 
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decisive authors of modernity. In this way the proposal of a plastic morphology is 
outlined in its relationships with an unstable and multiple concept of identity, and 
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IDENTITY, FREEDOM, EMERGENCE. 
A REFLECTION ON THE MEANING OF ACTION.
Table of Contents: 1. On natural evolutionary history; 2. On cultural 
and civil history; 3. On personal history.
In Notebooks for an ethics, Jean-Paul Sartre confronts an apparent aporia in human action through history [Sartre 1992, 27-28, 46-47]. 
If history is guided by an immanent impulse, by a pre-defined address 
(a binding ‘teleology’, for instance), then human action and its choices 
do not seem to be in a position to represent anything meaningful, since 
their contribution is illusory. They never change anything essential in 
my life and are immaterial as to the course that history is going to take. 
If, on the opposite, we assume that each human being is wholly free, 
perfectly independent from his/her past and from any meaning con-
veyed by history, then again human action seems to be meaningless and 
immaterial. It is meaningless because there is nothing that can really 
guide it. It is immaterial because the others’ actions that will follow 
ours, being wholly independent of what preceded them, will not be tied 
to anything that we may have done before.
Such aporetic situation depends on conditions that seem quite fa-
vourable to confer meaning to action, that is, the availability of onto-
logical freedom. In fact, if we were living in a Laplacian deterministic 
universe, it would be a fortiori impossible to talk of the meaning of 
choices and actions. The picture that Sartre presents is such that the 
very conditions required in order for actions to be meaningful turn all 
actions into meaninglessness.
In the following, we will try to give an answer to this aporetic pic-
ture, by staging the general outline of how an act can be both free and 
meaningful in a historical dimension.
All human action is meant to produce a change. It may be a change 
that restores known balances, as in the circularity of the fulfilment of 
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bodily needs (hunger and satiation, for instance). Or we can have to do 
with changes that address unknown outcomes, as in the desire to over-
come a condition of unease, while ignoring what exactly could satisfy 
such unease. The argument that we want to briefly develop sketches the 
profile of the transformational logic inherent in human action as such, 
that is, the way in which actions position themselves in a historical pro-
cess, both by affecting it and being affected by it.
The general form of a developing action is an articulate temporal 
unfoldment, animated by preferences and ends: it is something that has 
the primal appearance of a story. The ‘atoms’ of our stories are ‘ac-
tion units’, that is, diachronic units endowed with a minimal sense, like 
grasping an object or making a step. The meaning of such units is on 
display by watching at the horizon where they find their relevant com-
pletion. A step is part of doing the grocery shopping, a grasp is part of 
taking products from the shelves, both are part of the plan of my day 
and in the last instance of my life. The meaning of each action unit is 
made intelligible by its position in a ‘story’.
If we look at the comprehensive horizon where our actions take 
place, we can distinguish three horizons, three fundamental levels of 
telling a ‘story’. We have the story of our personal life, and specifi-
cally of our ontogenetic and individual development. Then we have 
the story provided by civil and cultural history, the Hegelian Welt-
geschichte, in which the former level is embedded. And finally, at the 
most comprehensive level, we find the natural evolutionary history, 
within which the species homo sapiens and its political and cultural 
history find their room.
Those levels (personal, cultural, biological) can be conceived as 
convergent and cooperating in each individual action and in its trans-
formational process. What characterizes a ‘story’, in contrast with mere 
mechanical courses, is the implicit reference to preferential and selec-
tive orders. In fact, in a mechanical course, devoid of reference to living 
consciousness, there is not even a clear reason for granting a substantial 
asymmetry between past and future, since there is properly no present 
at all. Present is only what is present to somebody, to a consciousness, a 
subject, a living being that exercises its preferences. There is no chance 
to define ‘presence’ without reference to a living consciousness.
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When we tell a story, even the ‘big story’ of natural biological histo-
ry, we implicitly refer to telic orders, that is to orders, which are ‘orient-
ed towards’, without having necessarily any representational awareness 
of specific ends. According to this telic attitude, something makes a 
difference for somebody, for a consciousness or a plurality of conscious 
individuals. Here ‘action’ is tantamount to current consciousness that 
prefers and postpones by means of bodily motions. Now, we are going 
to sketch out a general framework of how meaningful action can devel-
op, starting with the most comprehensive dimension and proceeding 
down to the personal sphere.
1. On natural evolutionary history
Nowadays the natural history of the living is described in evolutionary 
terms, according to a well-known Darwinian model, which can be es-
sentially summarised through two passages: a) different living forms 
– different phenotypes – are generated from genotypes emerged from 
casual genetic variation; b) natural selection operating on phenotypes 
changes their rate of reproduction, thus affecting future genotypes.
This process is often conceptualized in a misleading way, as if it 
showed that natural selection explained phenotypic traits, that is, as if 
it explained the nature of living properties. This vision depends on an 
erroneous adaptationist interpretation of the evolutionary course.
According to an adaptationist reading, a reference to greater adap-
tive power is sufficient reason to provide causal explanations of all the 
phenotypic traits that we meet in nature. Yet, as S. J. Gould has effec-
tively argued [Gould & Lewontin 1979], adaptationism makes claims 
that are inadequately justified. Such claims are conceptually mistaken 
precisely insofar as they assume to explain the essence of biological 
properties by resorting to the adaptation mechanism and therefore to 
natural selection. But in fact natural selection creates nothing, since it 
operates as a kind of veto or censorship towards the powers already pre-
disposed by genetic variation, that is, by life in its spontaneous forma-
tion. Selection always plays with cards that are provided by the powers 
inherent in living matter. This is evident if we notice that natural selec-
tion always already presupposes a genotype and the relevant phenotype 
Identity, Freedom, Emergence
191
on which to operate: selection works on life, it does not constitute life.1
In this respect, it may be useful to think of the whole content of 
our biological faculties from a point of view that overturns the usual 
perspective. Each faculty of ours, each phenotypic trait with its capa-
bilities, depends on a genetic configuration that was not shaped by nat-
ural selection: we just inherited them from our parents. But this can 
be said also for the biological faculties of our parents, which simply 
inherited them from theirs, without natural selection having anything 
to say. And this is true by going backwards for each generation. Every 
present living being – each one of us – is simply the last instantiation 
of a successful chain of genetic variations (and their coupling), from a 
hypothetical originary single-celled eukaryote till now. On the content 
of this chain natural selection had nothing to say, since its authority 
has been exercised just on the ones that have been taken off the board. 
All characters that define what we are derive without exception directly 
from spontaneous developments of life.
What evolutionary theory tells us is that selection worked by chang-
ing the probability that some genotypes combined, insofar as it erased 
a vast number of possibilities from the scene; and this defines the adap-
tive character of this or that phenotypic trait. However, what each living 
being can do is exclusively determined by an endogenous process of 
living matter (and, we could say, of matter as such).
From this point of view, we can see that each description of biologi-
cal evolution could be properly conceived as an evolution within matter, 
whose properties gradually emerge. This perspective may sound eccen-
tric or metaphysical, but in fact is just the simplest way to describe from 
a philosophical point of view what evolutionary biology expresses in its 
prevalent doctrine.
Here it is important to grasp correctly the meaning of the term 
“emerge”. Biological properties emerge neither in the sense that they 
1  In “The free floating rationales of evolution”, Daniel Dennett [2012] formulates a 
hypothesis concerning a possible extension of the mechanism of natural selection 
to the emergence of life, starting from self-replicating chemical cycles. Yet, this hy-
pothesis can be shown to be untenable, because it is lacking in a crucial requirement 
of evolutionary process: there is no reason why successfully self-replicating chemical 
cycles should spread their traits by increasing in number [cf. Zhok 2017, 201-203].
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are created ex nihilo nor in the sense of being independent from the 
qualities of the material substrate in which they inhere. Each emergent 
property represents a potentiality of acting and producing effects, and 
such a property primarily depends on the configuration of the parts of 
the agent (i.e., the living). Secondarily, the properties manifest them-
selves at the meeting point between the configuration of the living and 
the beings to which it relates (the surrounding world, the Um-welt). A 
property is attributed to a being only when both a certain configuration 
of its parts and a certain surrounding world are given.
What defines the emerging character of these properties is that they 
manifest themselves in settled relational forms: in specific environmen-
tal relations and in specific internal relations of their parts (configu-
ration). Properties appear therefore as emergent because they are not 
reducible to the properties displayed by simpler configurations or in 
different environmental relations.2
In this sense, the properties of matter are properly always ‘emergent’, 
insofar as before empirically discovering what potentialities a material 
configuration features in certain relations with the environment, they 
cannot be anticipated. They cannot be inferred from what has appeared 
in different configurations and in different relations. Therefore, we can-
not deduce the properties of the wholes from the properties of the parts.
In this sense the properties of the living are emergent, that is new 
and irreducible to those of the non-living; and similarly the properties 
of consciousness are emergent in relation to the biological ones, with-
out it implying anything ‘irrational’ in natural processes. To regard the 
simpler configurations as a normative canon for the more complex con-
figurations is just a metaphysical prejudice, which originates in meth-
odological instances devoid of ontological significance. Attempts of 
conceptual reduction of complex to simplex have been, and still are, a 
powerful methodological instance, effective as theoretical instrument, 
and therefore massively adopted by modern science. However, nothing 
in our experience justifies its translation into an ontological statement.
Therefore, the only way in which the nature of a property can be 
grasped is by looking at how its implications unfold; the only way to un-




derstand the properties of a phenotypic trait, of a genotype, of a species, 
is to explore what it is currently able to do, and not to investigate (or 
conjecture about) its antecedents. Knowledge of the antecedents can be 
useful to anticipate the essence of a configuration only if we have made 
previous experience of regular connections between those antecedents 
and some consequences. But this is necessarily a posteriori knowledge, 
which depends on the specific traits of natural configurations and their 
irreducible properties.
The new qualities emerge from the stage defined by old qualities 
in a specific sense: not in the sense that the old causes the new, but in 
the sense that the old creates the space of possibilities where the new 
can take place. This is well represented by the evolutionary dynamics 
of exaptation, as it was developed by S. J. Gould [Gould & Vrba 1982].
In each moment a phenotypic trait can have a well-defined function, 
or it may have none, while being ‘collateral’ to another functional trait, 
or it may be an originary morphological trait (part of the organism’s 
Bauplan), or, finally, it can be an atavism, that is, a residual of past 
functions currently devoid of any function. Whatever the reason for its 
current existence in an organism, be it functional or not, in any case it 
is its future use that is going to define its biological meaning. And such 
use may have nothing to do with the reasons that had possibly deter-
mined its existence in a certain present (provided that reasons there 
were). This argument can be applied to each moment of intermediate 
development in the life of a species (and, of course, also to the first in-
stance of organic life as such.)
The logic that emerges from these remarks on the nature of acts that 
take place in a historical course (here an evolutionary one) is the follow-
ing: the past, as it is expressed in each present, does not determine the 
future. It expresses itself by defining spaces of possibility where some 
options are open, other ones are closed, some are likely, other less likely. 
The borderline case is the one where the present shuts down all future 
possibilities (biologically: extinction). In all remaining cases we have a 
modulation of future possibilities, a modulation which in natural histo-
ry, once we exclude divine interventions and Lamarckian mechanisms 
from the explanatory options, is a causal modulation.
This process should be understood as a course of events where each 
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act of the living intervenes on a flux of possibilities by modifying their 
probability. The essential form of the process is such that the identity of 
an individual and its species, in a certain moment, has only possible em-
pirical causes to exist, but the causes that explain its existence are not 
tantamount to the reasons able to explain its essence. Such an essence, 
which amounts to the capacities, powers, faculties of the living, is not 
knowable on the basis of their (real or conjectural) causal history, but 
only by examining what can be brought to light by it (the unfoldment 
of its implications).
This conceptual framework could be defined ‘existentialist’, in a 
specific acceptation, insofar as here existence precedes essence, insofar 
as the ‘that’ precedes and grounds the ‘how’.
The interpretations of evolution in adaptationist terms conceal this 
fundamental character: before each phenotypic trait, before each fac-
ulty or power, they pre-set the same explanatory clause, such that each 
trait of the living expresses in the last instance its utility for survival. 
This reading produces a dramatic impoverishment of our reality, as it 
manifests itself. Saying in the face of our enjoyment of Mahler’s sym-
phonies, or Horace’s Carmina, that the faculties, capabilities and pro-
pensities that are thereby expressed are just expressions of functions apt 
to enhance our survival creates a barrier to grasp any relevant meaning. 
Such a meaning does not manifest itself by knowing the past of those 
faculties but by acquaintance with the present and future play of its 
manifestations.
The process that links together past and future on the stage of evo-
lutionary history is conceivable as a process of progressive possibiliza-
tions, which take place within previous spaces of possibility. Biological-
ly, the crucial act, the possibilizing action par excellence, is the mating 
act, with the relevant crossing over and the possible spontaneous varia-
tions. It is this act that defines the present, around which past and future 
gravitate. It does so, in the wake of the inherited genotype and its poten-
tialities, and by generating a new horizon of possibilities downstream.
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2. On cultural and civil history
Let us try now to move to the stage of human history, which always 
presupposes the outcomes of natural history and is grafted into it.
The biological characteristics of human species are such that their 
forms of interaction with the environment and with members of its own 
kind are massively influenced by what is learned from one’s cultural 
surrounding. For each specimen of homo sapiens the culture where one 
is born and grown is something given, something devoid of reasons 
and further justifications. In this sense, one’s own cultural background 
manifests itself in a way that is analogous to the relation that the geno-
type has towards the specimen itself. Here, the horizon of what is val-
uable or not is defined by what one is and cannot find any justification 
outside of its species-specific determinations. For a specimen of homo 
sapiens empathy is a valuable feature, characterizing and functional, 
but of course it would make no sense to judge empathy as something 
intrinsically ‘good’, or ‘bad’, for instance in the existence of a lichen, or 
a scorpion.
Let us call the cultural chunks that rule over social action – like 
customs, institutions, collective habits – ‘éthos units’.3 When éthos units 
emerge, they have potentialities that are not knowable a priori. Special-
ized scholars (anthropologists, sociologists, etc.) may sometimes take 
advantage of settled experiences in order to foresee how a social group 
can change by adopting a specific éthos unit. This knowledge, however, 
is not already available when these units come first to light: their poten-
tiality must be explored through historical praxis.
Here cultural evolution shows interesting analogies with biological 
evolution. In historical course, each novel éthos unit is the analogon of 
a new genetic configuration. As genetic configurations, also rules and 
collective behaviours are born for reasons that are mostly unknown and 
not further justifiable. The éthos units are put to the test historically, and 
they spread if they allow the relevant groups to work and thrive. This is 
3  The Greek term éthos (ἦθος), which originally meant a place where to live, over 
time has taken the meaning of shared ‘disposition’, ‘character’, ‘temperament’, and 
in the last instance ‘code of collective behaviour’. It is in this last acceptation, which 
has been absorbed by Hegel’s ‘objective spirit’, that we are going to use here the term.
Andrea Zhok
196
a model of social ordering that is suggested by Friedrich von Hayek in 
the first part of Law, Legislation and Liberty [Hayek 1998, 35-55].
The éthos units that turn out to be functional, and that allow the 
social reproduction of the group, define an ‘ethical’ standard, that is, 
a configuration of legitimate customary behaviours, which are prima 
facie proposed as models to be followed. The ordering promoted by the 
éthos units can freely change and diversify, with the only mandatory 
limit that it must not conflict with ‘species-specific virtues’, that is, with 
essential biological traits. There is no absolute standard of goodness or 
badness for a custom, insofar as it does not clash against the instances 
promoted by the evolutionary history of the species that adopts the cus-
tom (i.e., the human species).
Here there are two main differences between the genetic and the cul-
tural configuration: the first one concerns their temporal extension, the 
second one concerns what we call possibilization, or possibilizing action.
As to the first point, social rules, customs and cultural trends unfold 
over shorter times than phenotypic traits. Thus, communitarian order-
ings combining education and coercion in sight of intersubjective coor-
dination are as old as the first human communities. Laws able to keep 
together social groups that do not directly know each other have devel-
oped roughly five thousand years ago. Modes of production relying on 
monetary coordination of individual initiatives are social orderings that 
have been tested just for the last couple of centuries. The more an èthos 
unit has taken roots over time, the stronger its justification in continuing 
to exist the way it does.
The potentialities of any social ordering manifest themselves in its 
concrete unfoldment, without being analysable ‘in vitro’. Each cultur-
al and social ordering that exists and works for many generations has 
some good reasons to exist as it does. Effective demands of change are 
not just fantasized alternatives but attempts to overcome dysfunctions 
immanent in the current historical development. Such development is 
always hinging on a surrounding world, grafted into a territorial and 
anthropological site, and the demands for change cannot be sensibly 
judged without an acquaintance with that context. From this point of 
view, changes are justified when they try to overcome dysfunctions in-
herent in the existing collective éthos.
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On the contrary, believing to be able to export forms of life, social 
rules, institutional orderings from one context to another, while over-
looking the historical path and the territorial context of a culture, rep-
resents always a form of violence (sometimes mere inappropriateness, 
sometimes dramatic abuse).
At this level, a ‘possibilizing action’ can be grasped at best in acts 
like the definition of legislative and institutional orders, which explicitly 
create the framework for a re-orientation of future practices. However, 
there exists also a cultural micro-creativity which is capillary, diffuse 
and continuous and which immanently introduces – and modifies – col-
lective habits, social practices, tacit norms. Whatever the dimension of 
the possibilizing action that we want to represent, the essential point 
is that also here we find the same elementary logic. Current acts are 
not caused but are made possible by previous cultural (and biological) 
orders. In their turn, current acts can modify the cultural orders and, if 
they do it, they do it by opening new possibilities and blocking alterna-
tive options.
Mostly such possibilizing acts are not in the condition to foresee 
precisely what possibilities are going to be opened downstream. This 
is certainly true for all individual micro-contributions immanent in the 
history of a community, as well as for artistic and literary contributions. 
Acts that imply macroscopic normative changes (for instance, big insti-
tutional changes) seem to represent an exception, since they are precise-
ly produced in order to inform future behaviours. But, even here, the 
reliability with which an anticipation is possible depends exclusively on 
previous experience in similar circumstances.
3. On personal history
If we come to the third level of analysis, the one of ordinary individual 
action, to begin with, we find ourselves entrusted to settled biological 
and cultural layers, which prepare the space of possibility within which 
our individual action takes place. With regard to these spaces of possi-
bility every act of ours operates in its turn as a possibilization: it is con-
ditioned by the previous spaces of possibility and it generates new ones.
In the first context (1), individual action turned from possible to real 
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in the dimension of the species. In the second context (2) it did so on the 
stage of a social group tied together by a line of cultural development. 
Here, in the third case, we have to do with individual agents where 
a pre-set sphere of possibilizations turns into reality primarily for the 
agent itself, which preserves its identity over time. Individual agents 
decide within a framework of intelligible consensus, which is defined 
by the community they belong to, which is commonality of biological 
species and cultural tradition.
Everything that counts as a reason for acting has always a super-
individual status, since a reason is ideally intelligible for an indefinite 
plurality of (alter) egos. Actions that do not appeal to superindividual 
reasons are idiosyncratic events, like an action prompted by a momen-
tary and extemporaneous impulse. They are events that could be unin-
telligible even for the agent itself in the future. Therefore, they are also 
impervious to being followed. Biological and cultural presuppositions 
are not efficient causes: they are platforms of possibilities from which a 
new possibilization emerges with any new action. Every single action 
has therefore a possibilizing character, creative of new possibilities, pri-
marily for the course of life of the agent itself. Over the course of our 
life each action of ours takes charge of the possibilities that biology, 
culture and one’s own previous choices have predisposed, and on this 
basis it generates new spaces of possibility. This clearly happens during 
the ontogenetic development, where each achievement represents the 
premise for further achievements. The infant’s motility introduces her 
to the first forms of locomotion, and then of ambulation, and further of 
running, jumping, etc. Early intersubjective interaction prepares lan-
guage learning, on which reading and writing will grow, and from then 
on, the subject will be able to access the whole of written culture. And 
the same motion will unfold for the adult person as well: each act will 
take on previously predisposed possibilities and in their wake new ones 
are going to be produced. No action determines the future; what an 
action can do is to re-orient the space of possibilities where events and 
future choices (one’s own and the other’s one) will be able to position 
themselves.
Each act creates new conditions where some options diminish in 
probability, and possibly disappear, while other ones increase in prob-
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ability. A self-conscious agent expresses itself as a possibilizing event. 
It differs from possibilizing events of higher level, like the evolution of 
the species, insofar as the self-conscious agent can anticipate – to some 
extent – how the available space of possibilities will look like after per-
forming the current action. This rational anticipation can prompt it to 
orient its own action otherwise and represents the primary feature of 
what we call rational guidance of the action.
***
Now we can try to draw some basic conclusions concerning the ‘logic of 
action’ and its ways of transforming reality. Let us follow the temporal 
tripartition of past, present and future, which correspond here respec-
tively to historical inheritance in a broad sense, to the present identity 
of the agent and to its future-oriented freedom.
Every action produces change in the status quo. With regard to the 
inherited space of our possibilities, our position as agents comes always 
fatally late. It is an ontological lateness, in the sense that the present 
position of the agent is in principle unable to revoke the conditions that 
posit it as agent. This means that the biological and cultural configu-
ration, which we here and now are (our identity), cannot be reviewed 
and grasped, as it were, by rewinding the tape of our past history. In 
a course of events where novelty emerges in forms irreducible to what 
precedes it, the essence of what we are is posited by the past, but it is 
properly understandable only through the future, in what we are able 
to bring to light. The causal chain of past events that posit us does not 
reveal anything about our essence.
This perspective allows us to answer to the aporia mentioned at the 
beginning, such that our present action would be meaningless both if we 
are determined by our past and if we are absolutely free with regard to 
the very same past.
The first horn of the dilemma entailed the idea that the past, by de-
ciding what we are, takes away from us the possibility to bestow mean-
ing on our actions, since all meaning would be already included in the 
process that preceded and determined us. A model of this kind can be 
the one proposed by evolutionary adaptationism in natural history. This 
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perspective is saying to us that any quality, virtue or human potentiality 
is nothing but an accidental embodiment of the same and only sub-
stance: the principle of the survival of the fittest. Such a move empties 
qualities or virtues of their content and value. They are no longer judged 
for what they do and display, but in the light of their conjectural reduc-
tion to a causal history that – allegedly – produced them. However, as 
we have seen, the content of our dispositions, the essence of what we are 
and can, is not defined by natural selection. Therefore, the essence of 
what we are cannot be discovered by looking at our past causal history 
but by exploring the potentialities that we exhibit while acting. From 
this point of view it is precisely the present action, and the chain of 
future actions, that reveal the meaning of the agent (individual, society, 
species) to itself.
Now, if we take on the second horn, it seemed that the agent’s free-
dom would destroy the very identity of the agent and its relation to the 
past. If I am wholly free, I can recreate myself at pleasure, I am not 
bound to anything, I have no essence to which I can refer, and therefore 
I have no reason to prefer something to its opposite. This is a perspec-
tive to which Sartre seems to incline,4 a perspective where the absolute-
ness of freedom threatens the very possibility of grasping the meaning 
of one’s own acts, whose gratuity adumbrates their groundlessness.
In front of the absoluteness of freedom, taking care of any inher-
itance of the past might seem to be senseless prejudice. Yet, this stance 
is untenable. The inheritance that defines us for what we are has an 
intrinsic justification, which does not require any further argument to 
support its validity. The biological and cultural configurations that we 
inhabit have overcome obstacles and hurdles and have thus demonstrat-
ed to be able to preserve their functionality across generations. This is, 
at first sight, the highest possible authoritativeness that we can tap into, 
and it cannot be rejected in the wake of extemporaneous conjectures or 
ideal imaginations. In the face of customs, settled uses, collective hab-
4  «[…] my freedom is the unique foundation of values and […] nothing, absolutely 
nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular 
scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable. My freedom is 




its, tacit social norms, communitarian forms, educational practices, etc. 
we can usually say to ignore why they have been adopted, or why they 
are so and not otherwise. But this lack of theoretical reasons is no lack 
of justification: every cultural and institutional order that have come 
to us has always already at least something that speaks in its favour. If 
it came down to us (precisely like a phenotypic trait) we can say that 
it was enhancing, or at least allowing, social reproduction. This does 
not shield it from changes but circumscribes the sources legitimated to 
justify a change. From this point of view the agent is free, but it is also 
endowed with a ‘historical essence’, which defines it precisely as that 
kind of agent, and which depends on the previous possibilizing orders 
(biological, sociocultural, personal). Every agent is free, because its act 
is not univocally determined by the past, but it is also endowed with 
an essence, which is not justified by theoretical reasons but by its own 
existence as inheritor of its history. There exists, thus, an ultimate nor-
mative source provided by the biological, cultural and personal identity 
that each of us always already is. What such ‘essence’ is can be dis-
played by future actions, but that it exists, as inheritor of its past, is what 
gives a normative and foundational ground to our decisions.
Thus, the Sartrian aporia from which we started is about to disap-
pear. On the one hand, our action is always free in a radical way: it does 
not just realise previous possibilities, but it also originates further pos-
sibilities downstream. Action is free insofar as it is never conceivable as 
mere outcome of a chain of efficient causes. On the other hand, it is free 
but not arbitrary, since it inherits the possibilizing events that in the 
past opened up the possibilities that we presently inhabit. Our freedom 
is not mere libertas indifferentiae, no mere availability of indifferent 
options, and cannot be understood, not even in principle, as gratuitous 
sovereign autopoiesis. The form of action and its transformational po-
tential depend primarily on the acknowledgment of one’s own identity, 
which has normative value and cannot be bypassed – as if our identity 
were a burden to the aspirations nourished by our imagination. In uni-
versal history, as in the individual’s one, we find both the discontinuity 
of emergence, and the continuity of preceding possibilizations.
What we are (for ourselves) is not just a ‘fact’ but has normative 
character, that is, it defines the horizon of what we are able to desire 
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and how we can do it. Such normativity is never coaction, both be-
cause it provides options and addresses, no compulsions, and because 
we can always deny every inclination, renounce every desire, overcome 
every ambition. However, every choice that tries to be aware of itself 
must take in the normativity implicit in its actual identity and try to 
transform it along given lines. Even the reasons for trying a radical 
self-transformation must root in what the agent has access to, here and 
now, as collateral of its own identity. Every free and rational choice 
must therefore assume the identity, which we are bearers of and which 
we have never been in a position to choose, and only then we can pos-
sibly proceed to change it as variation of its spaces of possibility down-
stream. The identity of the existent is an unjustifiable and indubitable 
foundation, but its nature is not that of obligation but that of reasons for 
possibilizing actions.
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Abstract
Freedom and the meaningfulness of action are not just natural allies, as one might ex-
pect. They can be also incompatible instances, since radical absolute freedom threat-
ens any action with emptiness and groundlessness. In the present pages we try to 
tackle this ‘paradox of freedom’, where actions deprived of all freedom, and actions 
radically free, appear both to be threatened by meaninglessness. We do so by outlin-
ing a comprehensive conception of agents’ freedom as possibilization, which reveals 
itself in the forms of biological, cultural and personal history, and which is capable of 







FORM, FUNCTION AND VALUE  
IN THE EMERGING AND SELF-ORGANIZING 
PROCESSES OF THE NATURAL EVOLUTION
Table of Contents: 1. Agency and Autocatalysis; 2. Know-how, nat-
ural selection and self-organization; 3. Function, value and meaning; 
4. The preconditions of ethics; 5. Development of the moral sense and 
emergence of symbolic thought.
1. Agency and Autocatalysis
In the history of scientific thought many models have been conceived in order to attempt an explanation of the mysterious process of contin-
uous autopoiesis of every living system. Just as Kepler renewed the cog-
nitive ideal of astronomy, breaking the circle that had led from Tolomeo 
to Copernicus, Prigogine and other scholars, starting in the 1970s, have 
contributed to breaking the circle of sufficient reason by creating a new 
mathematical language capable of rendering intelligible the irreversible 
processes and events that traditional physics had itself saved through phe-
nomenological approximations. In recent decades, Prigogine’s insights, 
the pioneering work of the Dutch physicist Lorentz, the study of chaotic 
systems, and research in the field of biological complexity theory have 
gradually led to precise theoretical developments that now make clearer 
and more visible the intricate network of relationships between dynamics, 
non-equilibrium thermodynamics, systems biology and information theo-
ry [cf. Prigogine & Stengers 1979/1999; Nicolis & Prigogine 1989]. When 
we find ourselves, for example, in front of phenomena not of pure order 
or pure randomness, but phenomena pertaining to forms of high organi-
zation, we actually find ourselves in an intermediate situation between the 
complete absence of constraints and the maximum of redundancy.
The optimum organization should therefore be seen as a real com-
promise between maximum variability and maximum specificity [cf. 
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Kauffman 1993]. A compromise which can only be articulated accord-
ing to a dynamic dimension that transforms itself over time in the pres-
ence of a deep structure underlying the surface message [cf. Prigogine 
1996/2014].
In Investigations [Kauffman 2000] and other subsequent works [cf. 
Kauffman & Clayton 2006; Longo et al. 2012], Kauffman faces these 
intrepid questions and finally identifies the core of the current theory of 
biological complexity in the key concept of autonomous agent, i.e. the 
basic unit of a general biology independent of the support, defined as «a 
self-reproductive system capable of performing at least one thermody-
namic work cycle» [Kauffman 2000, 7].
An autonomous agent is a physical system that can act to its own 
advantage in an environment. A first intuition then is that an auton-
omous agent must be moved away from thermodynamic equilibrium 
because work cycles cannot occur at that state: the concept of agent is, 
in fact, itself a concept of non equilibrium.
In the beginning, it is also clear that the American scholar’s ob-
jective is to highlight how the definitional circle of this notion is virtu-
ous and therefore harbinger of a new understanding of the concept of 
“organization” in itself. In short, dissecting this definition will lead us 
into mysterious territory. Partly, the enigma concerns the answer to a 
precise question: what is the appropriate mathematical form to describe 
an autonomous agent? Is it a number, and therefore a scalar? Is it a list of 
numbers, and therefore a vector? A tensor? According to Kauffman, the 
answer is negative because the autonomous agent is a relational concept.
Living cells, in fact, inevitably appear as organized wholes. A cell 
is not a single type of molecule that replicates itself, but a rich web of 
molecular events through which that whole propagates «approximate 
reductions of itself» [Kauffman 2000, 43]. Then there is the metabo-
lism, there is the activity of understanding, translation and innovation 
of different languages that interact incessantly with each other such as, 
for example, that of DNA, that of the various RNAs and finally that of 
proteins where the code itself is mediated by activation enzymes (ami-
noacyltransferases) that load on the appropriate tRNA molecules the 
correct amino acids in order to translate the code, a code that is able to 
create the aminoacyltransferase enzymes themselves. Moreover, in the 
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cell there is the “rustling” of energy that flows simultaneously inside, 
and through, what we could define as main and secondary labyrinthine 
pathways that connect the degradation of high energy sources to the 
synthesis of products that require the addition of free energy. Living 
cells connect endoergonic and exoergonic reactions in order to produce 
high concentrations of many molecular species. The link between ex-
oergonic and endoergonic reactions is therefore essential in the defini-
tion of an autonomous agent, «that mysterious concentration of matter, 
energy, information, and that extra something we call life» [Kauffman 
2000, 64].
In summary, Kauffman argues that autocatalysis and molecular re-
production are necessary for life, but not yet sufficient [cf. Kauffman 
2003]. Life possesses deeper realities, and even more mysterious than 
the autocatalysis that Ghadiri and colleagues have been exploring [cf. 
Lee et al. 1997].
Well, keeping as theoretical reference the Carnot cycle and Boltz-
mann’s entropy, Kauffman and other scholars [cf. Hordijk & Steel 2017; 
Filisetti et al. 2012] in an attempt to probe the mysterious essence of life 
have recently successfully simulated the system of differential equa-
tions that correspond to the dynamics of the network of reactions of a 
virtual molecular agent [cf. Gillespie et al. 2014].
The main conclusion we draw from the simulation is that autono-
mous agents, by coupling one or more autocatalytic and work cycles, 
constitute a perfectly plausible form, although new, of an open, unbal-
anced chemical reaction network. Perhaps, behind the mysterious en-
tanglement of self-organization and natural selection there is not only 
an additional relationship between matter, energy and information, but, 
as Kauffman guess, a new conception of information is emerging, a 
conception within which information appears as a “quality” able to gen-
erate and regulate the entire system (coextensive relationship linked to a 
continuous dialectical game among parts), transforming it into a living 
system and therefore into a cognitive system [cf. Wallace 2014].
We are referring here to the fascinating opportunity to make pos-
sible the dialogue between the mystery of the complexity of the liv-
ing species and the notion of the genesis of meaning [cf. Carsetti 2012; 
Kauff man 2014]. The bios, in fact, in my opinion, going beyond the 
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merely quantitative measurement (syntactic level) of the information 
that is attacked through a binary logic (extensional logic), can be inter-
preted as an emerging phenomenon intrinsically connected to forms 
of cognition and intentionality (semantic level) [cf. Di Bernardo 2016], 
also allowing the review of some enlightening philosophical insights 
in modern times about the teleological principle of self-organization of 
living organisms.
2. Know-how, natural selection and self-organization
In the introductory part of The Metaphysics of Morals, masterpiece of 
1797, Kant gives a definition of what is meant of Life: «Life is called the 
faculty that a living being has to act in accordance with its representa-
tions» [Kant 1797/2006, 21, my translation].
At first it seems that this sentence refers only to subjects endowed 
with consciousness but if we revisit this definition in the light of Kauff-
man’s theory of autonomous agents, some original aspects certainly 
emerge. For example, more than two hundred years after the brilliant 
words of Kant, systemic biology can only recognize the great eight-
eenth-century philosopher as having merited one of the main charac-
teristics of life: cognition. But that is not all, it will soon become clear 
how in living organisms cognition is deeply linked to the fundamental 
notion of intentionality.
The autonomous agents fill the gap that separates the merely phys-
ical from that new realm of the merely physical where all living beings 
attribute themselves a purpose. Semantics comes into play with a pur-
pose; at the molecular level, in fact, according to Kauffman autonomous 
agents are able to distinguish and select external entities by virtue of 
a simple chemistry that hosts symbols and signs. To an external enti-
ty, therefore, will correspond a modification of the internal state of the 
agent itself, a modification, that is, that will allow the latter to act in one 
way rather than another.
Put in these terms and in agreement with the American biochemist, 
know-how is another way of seeing the catalytic closures that propagate 
itself, the work tasks, the perception, the recording and the actions that 
we today recognize as intrinsic to the activities of autonomous agents. 
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Know-how, in fact, is not outside the processes of self-organization: 
know-how is the propagating organization itself [Kant 1797/2006, 153-
154]. From this point of view, therefore, with autonomous agents also a 
glimmer of an ethical question arises because the facts are enunciated 
by the know-that, but the know-how as it preceded the know-that.
In fact, although aware of Hume’s injunction, Kauffman believes 
that in the perspective of the autonomous agent the disgusting-delicious 
dichotomy is primary, inevitable and, for that agent, of the utmost impor-
tance. Without attributing a consciousness to E. coli we cannot, therefore, 
fail to perceive that the rudiments of value are present once autonomous 
agents exist [Kant 1797/2006, 154-155]. Let us return for a moment to the 
definition formulated by Kant. Life, understood as the faculty of acting 
in accordance with its own representations, not only tells us that all liv-
ing beings are cognitive systems, but also tells us that these organisms 
act according to internal models creating always new meanings. A rep-
resentation, in fact, can be read, from a phenomenological point of view, 
as a re-presentation of something. In the term representation, therefore, 
the internal/external difference and thus the directionality towards the 
external reality perceived through modifications of the internal state to 
which it is possible to respond through simple actions is implicit. This 
tension towards exteriority, only intuited by Kant, in my opinion can be 
defined as intentionality not related to consciousness or internal purpose 
[cf. Kauffman 2008; 2016], that is to say as that process strictly connect-
ed with the gratuitousness of molecular interactions, whereby meanings1 
develop and, once embodied in actions, operate also allowing autono-
mous agents to modify to their own advantage the environment in which 
they live in order to reproduce themselves. Let us think for a moment of 
the humble E. coli swimming against the current in a glucose gradient. 
According to Kauffman, the bacterium is an autocatalytic system able to 
reproduce and therefore to act by carrying out one or more cycles of ther-
modynamic work, but it is also a cognitive system able to create always 
new meanings and, subsequently, to transmit them through unconscious 
actions [cf. Kauffman et al. 2008].
Bacteria and amoebas, in fact, as we well know, already manifest 
1  At this level we see that in a natural autopoietic system what is self-organizing is 
the function itself with its meaning [cf. Atlan & Louzoun 2007].
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a learning we could say Pavlovian to use Dennet’s words; these organ-
isms, in fact, are endowed with receptors that adapt themselves on a 
constant level of a certain ligand signal and that perceive a change from 
the present level: here, then, is the outline in biology of a primitive (nat-
urally unconscious) form of representation. Here, therefore, even if we 
cannot yet speak of the association between a more or less arbitrary 
conditioned stimulus and an unconditional stimulus, it is possible to 
infer that these organisms are in all respects endowed with that four bil-
lion year old faculty that Kauffman defines as know-how, intentionality 
not related to consciousness.
3. Function, value and meaning
Therefore, at this point the genius of Kant’s intuition appears clearly: 
life is called the faculty that a being has to act in accordance with his 
own representations [Kant 1797/2006]. In this definition, however, one 
aspect remains to be clarified. What is meant by the term “action”? Is it 
possible to distinguish between the actions of an autonomous agent and 
the mere events that take place within and around him? In an attempt to 
give an initial answer to this question, Kauffman [cf. Kauffman 2000] 
argues that the fundamental difference between what is living and what 
is not lies in the ability to act (agency), that is, in that process that al-
lows the meaning to manifest itself over time. In fact, according to the 
American biologist, “the meaning derives from the agency” and it can 
be studied in nature by referring first of all to the minimum autono-
mous molecular agents that perform at least one thermodynamic work 
cycle and that have a receptor for food and poison and are also able to 
approach the first and move away from the second. Going back to the 
example of the bacterium, we can infer, according to Kauffman, that a 
greater quantity of glucose molecules, revealed by a receptor while the 
bacterium swims or orients itself in the gradient, represents a sign of 
greater concentration of glucose along the gradient of this sugar. That is 
a sign “interpreted” by the bacterium through “its oriented movement” 
in the same gradient.
In the meaning of Peirce [cf. Peirce 1932/1969], then, we could say 
that glucose acquires a meaning for the bacterium thanks to the recep-
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tor of the sign for the bacterium, glucose, and by virtue of its actions: 
to go up the glucose gradient. The bacterium is the receiver. And in 
this case it was natural selection that built the molecular systems to 
achieve it. Without agency there can be no meaning. This is the the-
sis of Kauffman, interpreter of Peirce. Therefore, whatever the level of 
evolution in which we intend to recognize it, with the agency not only 
the meaning emerges in the universe, but also the values, behaviors and 
purposes. In fact, the evolution by natural selection acting on heritable 
variants contributes in a decisive way to the genealogical unfolding of 
the distinction between causal-functional and causal-collateral aspects 
of organisms2. Thus, in the ability of the bacterium to fulfill the biolog-
ical function of “obtaining food”, without attributing any consciousness 
to it, it is possible to discern from an external observer the evolutionary 
beginning of the choice and therefore of the behavior, value and purpose 
or semiosis, where a sign acquires a meaning a posteriori and in a given 
context of observation [cf. Kull 2009; Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2017].
The meaning has therefore appeared in the universe with life itself 
because, according to Kauffman, natural selection has assembled the 
propagating organization of structures and processes that have led to 
swim along the glucose gradient for valid selective reasons, glucose has 
a value for the bacterium. And since obtaining food is the function of 
this organized behavior, assembled by natural selection acting on the 
most suitable variants, obtaining food is the purpose of the activity and 
is the doing or the action of the bacterium [cf. Vattay et al. 2015].
In almost agreement with this perspective Freeman showed, among 
others, how human beings have evolved from simpler creatures and cer-
tain behaviors of these older forms are precursors of our intentional 
behavior which is rich and varied. According to Freeman, the evolution 
2  In biology, for example, the “heart pumping blood” function is distinguished from 
other non-functional causal consequences such as “heart noises” by the fact that the 
organization of processes and structures we call heart was born by virtue of natural 
selection for its ability to pump blood. Therefore, the heart is ontologically emerging 
because the very existence of its specific organization of structures and processes in 
the universe has been constructed by heritable variation and natural selection, which 
cannot be reduced to physics, where neither signs, nor interpretations, nor errors are 
logically possible because only events occur.
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has given us the ability to grasp intentionality in others without the 
need to define it. If we see a targeted behavior, we recognize it almost 
instantly. In zoological literature there are many examples of intelligent 
behaviour manifested by other vertebrates and also by invertebrates 
such as octopus, bee and lobster. Darwin, for example, discovered clear 
evidence of intentional behaviour in earthworms [cf. Freeman 2000].
Of course we can only assume all this by observing the autonomous 
agent in action. Unity, wholeness and purpose, therefore, constitute, at 
Freeman’s eyes, the basic conditions for the existence of a biological 
subject carrying meaning. Meanings, therefore, are transmitted through 
intentionality, that is, through that process by which living organisms 
change themselves by acting and learning from the consequences of 
their actions: when an autonomous agent grasps a meaning, in fact, it is 
pushed towards new behaviours [cf. Di Bernardo 2014].
Well, depending on the complexity of the autonomous agents, there 
will be different capacities of meaning processing, that is, different 
channels of communication [cf. Dougherty & Bittner 2010; Emmeche 
& Kull 2010]. This being so, therefore, according to the perspective 
outlined before, it is clear that autonomous agents constitute that mys-
terious place in physics where physics opens up to semantics; however, 
in my opinion, it is necessary to distinguish in the scale of living beings 
the actions of simple autonomous agents, such as amoebas and bacteria 
or more complex ones such as tigers and chimpanzees, from those of 
Homo Sapiens, that is, the only known species so far capable of good 
and evil.
4. The preconditions of ethics
With the Homo Sapiens, the most profoundly teleonomic nervous sys-
tem that has ever existed in the history of our biosphere makes its ap-
pearance on earth: only at this level, then, the nature becoming aware of 
itself actually able to transform actions, that carry meaning, into freely 
desired acts. In order to fully understand the scope of these consider-
ations it seems appropriate to invoke again the help of Kant who, in 
The Metaphysics of Morals, distinguishes with great insight the term 
“action” (Handlung) from that of “act” (That). The action (Handlung) 
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constitutes a change brought about by the subject, that is, by any living 
being; the act (that), instead, is the material content of the action, that is, 
that of which the subject is the creator [Kant 1797/2006, 47].
According to Kant, therefore, only man performs acts because only 
man, as the only self-aware being, is able to responsibly recognize an 
action as an expression of his own subjectivity. At this point, then, we 
can return to Kantian definition of life. By virtue of the distinction now 
outlined, it is clear that, at the eyes of the great German philosopher, the 
faculty to act (handeln) in conformity with one’s own representations 
is not only human, but extends to all living systems, that is, to all those 
cognitive systems which, acting to one’s own advantage, are able to 
reproduce themselves. Well, this brilliant intuition of Kant allows us 
to reflect also on another relevant question raised by Kauffman. We are 
referring to the original idea that rudiments of semantics, intentionality, 
value and ethics are born with autonomous agents and therefore are 
intrinsically correlated to the notion of life. Such suggestions also allow 
us to revisit, in the ethical field, Hume’s classic criticism that it is not 
possible to deduce “having to be” from “being” [cf. Hume 1739/2008]. 
Criticism that laid the foundations of modern ethics, from Kant to util-
itarianism, to the present day. Was the English philosopher right? If, 
according to Kauffman, neither biology nor agency are reducible to 
physics and if it is true that with minimal molecular agents such as 
bacteria and amoebas the value enters the universe, then with them the 
meaning and “having to be” enter the universe. According to the Amer-
ican biochemist, this “having to be” fruit of the agency is not reducible 
to the language of naked facts, to what “is” of the physical world: the 
“having to be” is also emerging and not reducible to statements limited 
to “being” (a teleonomic language is needed to describe it). Although 
Hume was right in arguing that we cannot deduce “having to be” from 
“being”, at the same time he was also wrong because today we know 
that values, meaning, actions and “having to be” are real parts of the 
inventory of the universe: “having to be”, in fact, is central to much of 
man’s action and moral reasoning.
Therefore, this approach allows us to dig further into the agent the-
ory as divided by Kauffman. According to the perspective now brought 
to light, in fact, autonomous agents are surely constructing actors who 
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always create new meanings, through the realization of unpredictable 
actions (know-how), but as Freeman denotes all this is possible only 
because life is essentially assimilation and intentionality [cf. Freeman 
2008]: the bios, therefore, at the end of this review, appears as the result 
of a trans-finished series of adjustments that constitute and unpredict-
ably modify parts of the game itself. So, from these considerations, in 
my opinion, it is possible to infer that life is not only syntactic language 
(or a pure system of fixed programs on the edge) and cognition (and, 
in general, learning), but also appears as a co-evolutive phenomenon 
in which information is continuously transformed giving birth to a di-
alectical process of creation and assimilation of new meanings, too: 
therefore, in agreement with Kauffman and Freeman, the construction 
of a new semantics becomes more and more urgent, a kind of seman-
tics that is not only of an interpretative type but of a generative type 
[cf. Di Bernardo 2015].
5. Development of the moral sense and emergence of symbolic thought
According to this new interpretation which can also be found in other 
works [cf. Sanyal et al. 2012], life in general presents itself as an amal-
gam of the cooperative and simultaneous work carried out by molecules 
that can be considered as actual components of a dance; we are refer-
ring here to the highly orchestrated game in which DNA, RNA and pro-
teins come to play at the same time the roles of actors and interpreters 
of a mysterious plot [cf. Gerstein et al. 2012].
In fact, today we know that the membrane as a result of the calcu-
lations made at the level of the cell develops combinations of proteins 
able to modulate the expression of DNA at the surface level. In this way, 
it allows the emergence of potentialities never known before, giving the 
DNA the opportunity to outline new forms of expression at a functional 
level [cf. O’Nuallain 2008].
From this complex interweaving a new unity of function and mean-
ing emerges. In fact, there is no longer only a machine of inheritance 
on the one hand and on the other hand an external meaning enclosed, 
for example, in a simple selective procedure that is given at the environ-
mental level [cf. Jablonka & Lamb 2014].
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Now the eyes of the scientist find themselves in front of a complex 
interweaving within which the meaning comes to operate as an imma-
nent guide for what concerns the primary expression of life while the 
observer himself comes to be determined by the function in action [cf. 
Carsetti 2019]. Today we know that the high number of proteins pro-
duced in human cells, and the increased complexity that characterizes 
our systems, depend on the junk DNA that in the new systemic vision 
becomes fundamental [cf. Li et al. 2011].
Recently, in fact, the completion of the genomic sequences of other 
organisms (dog, chimpanzee, mouse) has allowed to compare them with 
the human one (comparative genomics) and it has been discovered that 
intron sequences contain important information for the functioning of 
our about 22000 genes. In fact, it is not so much the number of genes 
as the way in which their functioning is regulated to make man man, 
dog dog and chimpanzee chimpanzee. However, it should be pointed 
out that for the systemic vision, we are delineating here, is considered a 
form of reductionism or materialistic monism, even if of a refined kind, 
the idea that function is a linear process that emerges from the quanti-
tative complexity of interactions between the many components of the 
system. This is the position, for example, of Crick, and in part also that 
of Kandel, who, not distinguishing between surface information and 
depth information, actually reduce the formal causation due to efficient 
cause, thus inverting the effect (biomolecular syntax) with the cause 
(biological meaning) [cf. Crick 1958; Kandel 1976]. Moreover, for them 
the concept of information cannot be separated from that of material 
support also reducing “quality” to “quantity” and the temporality that 
brings new functions [cf. Prigogine 1996/2014] to mere linear spatiality 
[cf. Boniolo 2003].
However, it should be specified here that the concept of biological 
meaning adopted by Atlan, Carsetti and Freeman implies the notion 
of intentional causation, where the notion of “intentionality” [cf. Free-
man 1999] refers not only to consciousness, but to agency – the ability 
of every living system to act (by changing itself and the environment 
around it) for achieving a precise goal: self-preservation. The concept 
of meaning here is understood as forma formans, i.e. as a process of 
“production of forms” and is applied in several disciplinary fields. As 
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the meaning of words is connected with a universe of highly dynamic 
functions and functional processes that operate synthesis, cancellations, 
integrations (a universe that we can only describe in terms of symbolic 
dynamics), in the same way, at the level of systems biology, assimilated 
schemata are continuously revealed and constructed and made available 
for selection, through the coordinated information that penetrates from 
external reality (at the mathematical level the non-standard models that 
interpret these processes despite the different disciplinary fields are 
practically the same) [cf. Longo & Montévil 2014].
Finally, all this intertwines with the mechanisms of internal selec-
tion along a “journey” in the regions of intentionality. In other words 
and in the more general sense, meaning is a relational property of re-
ality by virtue of which an inanimate object changes its state and a 
living being feels at its level of sensitivity that the message received 
provides information that is important for its main purposes such as, 
for example, that of survival. In short, the meaning of a message is the 
information (in the sense of modification of properties and behaviour) 
that the message itself produces in the receiver. Therefore, it can be said 
that meaning becomes an essential aspect of the omnipresent activity in 
the universe, “emerges” when life appears [cf. Del Re 2006]. In fact, in 
the living the ability to attribute meaning to messages that come from 
outside is a condition for preserving identity. It is indeed a sufficient 
condition, if necessary physical conditions such as the availability of 
energy in the right form are met. Seen in this perspective, meaning had 
to emerge progressively in the history of life [cf. Del Re 1992].
For the primordial bacteria many events must have been indifferent 
and just few answers were enough to be themselves, i.e. to play their 
part in their environment. When man appeared, the complexification 
of the universe produced a being capable of constantly questioning the 
sense of things and events. Trying to understand the world around him, 
himself, and his own intuition of something that goes beyond the sensi-
tive is a characteristic of the individual of the species Homo Sapiens. At 
this level, complicated messages are transferred with conventional signs 
such as those used to represent words. When the signs used are single 
objects or signs that put a person with realities not directly accessible to 
the five senses they are symbols.
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In the world of men, symbols are everywhere, from the equations of 
physics to the pillars of cathedrals. Since human beings have appeared 
in the universe, therefore, the fundamental distinction between sense 
and meaning has taken on value. According to Frege, the “sense” (Sinn) 
of a word is its function in a context, while the “meaning” (Bedeutung) 
is what it “designates”. But there is more and we can see it considering 
the use of the word “sense” in a question that highlights its intensional 
aspect. The question is: is it the same to talk about the meaning of life 
instead of the sense of life? It is clear that we are alluding to what a 
man’s life represents in the context of his existential and spiritual life, 
and not to the definition of life, so the word “sense” seems more correct. 
On the other hand, when the context is man’s relationship with things 
(extensional or reference level) the concepts of sense and meaning be-
long to the same perspective. However, one thing is sure: from human 
biological information emerge unthinkable qualities for other living be-
ings known until now. Man performs “conscious” acts that imply an 
incalculable degree of complexity: here the biological meaning that at 
the microscopic level forms the deep processes of self-organization, at 
the mesoscopic level regulates the sophisticated and stratified informa-
tion flows that modulate the interaction between endless populations of 
neurons, thus laying the foundations for the emergence of the self-con-
sciousness [cf. Freeman 2008].
However, it must be stressed that at the level of biological life, 
thought is not only the result of simple abstraction. On the contrary, 
it appears to be linked to a precise linguistic mediation, to the interval 
of well-defined schematism operating on a symbolic level according to 
a dialectic that involves a multiplicity of factors inextricably linked to 
each other. To think is not to guess or even simply to order. On the con-
trary, it is to concretely realize the conditions for an embodiment, that 
is an incarnation on a primarily biological and neural level. An embodi-
ment that binds together, for example, thinking about the movement of 
a body in space and seeing the contours of a neurogeometry at the level 
of the visual cortex [cf. Petitot 2013]. The mind therefore presents itself 
as a real articulated distributed and stratified process of spontaneous 
self-organization, which has as reference the neural connections. To the 
extent that they are characterized by processes of self-organization, the 
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cognitive processes are based, therefore, on the gradual construction 
of an “I-subject” characterized by a progressive work of abstraction, 
unification and emergence that leads, on the one hand, to the partial 
creation and interpretation of external reality and, on the other, to the 
constitution of that same subject as a cognitive subject.3
Since the dawn of civilization the ability of the human being to 
give meaning to things has been one of the peculiarities that has dis-
tinguished our species as being able to produce symbols. Without unity 
the cognitive process would be impossible because the assimilation of 
information from the outside implies a unifying subject: transforming 
the flow of information into something endowed with meaning, in fact, 
requires the existence of a system of determinations and constraints at 
the neural level that determine its meaning. The living person is there-
fore an autopoietic system which organizes itself and at the same time 
“in-forms” the world: by giving meaning to the world itself, it endows 
itself with meaning. This explains how it is possible in evolutionary 
and genealogical terms the passage from consciousness to self-con-
sciousness: it is the cognitive process that, emerging as a process of 
self-organization, allows the construction of an “I-subject”. In order to 
explain, therefore, the development of protomnestic activity (the ba-
sis of autobiographical memory) the presence of this subject which is 
self-knowledge in the moment in which it self-constitutes itself is nec-
essary [cf. Cusinato 2018].
According to this vision, the holistic perspective becomes decisive: 
in the interpretation of consciousness as a dynamic operator capable of 
creating order, in fact, suddenly appears a purpose (an ordered totality) 
incompatible with any vitalistic theory but, at the same time, regulated 
by a mysterious coupled game of constraints (invariance) and possibil-
ities (the becoming of multiplicity). Therefore, the idea of hierarchical 
organization demands in itself a finality in so far as it is not possible to 
separate the structure from its meaning. In the dynamic system precisely 
3  Although in a minimal form some more complex animals manifest glimmers of 
consciousness proportional to their brain structure, only in the human being does 
consciousness take the form of awareness, i.e. it presents itself as self-consciousness 
+ moral consciousness (conscience) despite the fact that the preconditions of morality 
already appear with life itself and then develop through genealogy.
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within such a multi-level approach, it is possible to trace the preconscious 
unity of the self, that is, the responsible agent who continuously tries to 
catch up with the consciously performed actions. According to Freeman, 
for example, intentionality (deep informational level or semantic aspect 
of bios) is intrinsic to the dynamics of the process of self-organization of 
every living system and guarantees its unity, gratuitousness and original 
dimension, as well as independence from matter [cf. Freeman 2000].
From this point of view the very recent results related to this new 
frontier closely connected with the emergence of a real conceptual rev-
olution at the level of the analysis of that particular entanglement of 
information, biological self-organization, causality and teleonomy show 
the need to develop a new, non-reductionist naturalistic approach to the 
problem of the preconditions of ethics able to take into account keeping 
well distinct the reference planes, not only of the unfolding of the natu-
ral forms of human cognition, but also of the genesis of the intentional 
structures (not referred to consciousness) in autonomous non-human 
agents, understood as building actors capable of creating always new 
meanings through the realization of unpredictable actions (know-how) 
[cf. Kauffman 2016]. We are referring here, in agreement with Kauff-
man, to the idea that rudiments of semantics, intentionality and value 
arise with biological systems and are therefore intrinsically related to 
the same notion of life [cf. Kauffman, 2019]. In fact, the mind, as emer-
gence, intends to grasp in genealogical terms the paths and modalities 
that determine the selective and coupled action expressed by the mean-
ing, the modalities, in particular, related to the disclosure of the above 
mentioned semantic apparatus at surface level. It is not a question of 
discovering new “territories” [cf. Putnam 1975] but to become matrix 
and arc for their autonomous emergence according to increasing levels 
of complexity. There is not a random autonomous process already in 
place (“thing- in-itself”) and an activity of selection and synthesis by 
means of possible “cutting out”, through, in particular, the use of ref-
erence procedures understood as a mode of simple regimentation [cf. 
Carsetti 2014]. In fact, in agreement with Carsetti, such procedures are 
functional to the construction of new incompressibility: meaning, as 
forma formans, gives the possibility to realize a holistic anchorage; it is, 
exactly, what allows the categorial to emerge as “arborization”.
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Hence, the opportunity within the theory of complexity to rede-
fine a conception of nature as an evolutionary process of growth of 
information that allows us to lay the foundations of a meta-biology 
[cf. Di Bernardo 2019] capable of rethinking the boundaries and the 
relationship between “being” and “having to be” within a new vision 
of time no longer understood as repetition and rediscovery, but as the 
generation and creativity of new structures and new symbolic sche-
mata (or systems).
According to this systemic genealogical approach capable of going 
beyond the mere differentiation of specialist knowledge and, at the same 
time, of keeping together the procedures and principles, the specificity 
of the disciplines and the complex language of each area of study must 
be included in a work of analysis and translation that can finally lead 
to a synthesis based on the continuous dialogue between different and 
complementary souls’ knowledge. An example of this is the concept 
of “integration” which, placed alongside that of plasticity, manages to 
give account of a broad identity to the notion of intentionality, even if 
it not all carried out under the sign of conscious rationality. In fact, the 
idea of integration, proper to an adequate epistemology of complexity, 
makes it possible to contrast the chaotic image of the centerless mind, 
proposed by some neuroscientific theories, with the emergence of a 
unity in diversity compatible with the philosophical position that it is 
possible to naturalize consciousness and, at the same time, recognize it 
as a subjective pole as the cornerstone of our conceptions of the world, 
i.e. the expression of a unitary and continuous subject over time. In this 
systemic vision, therefore, the notion of plasticity confers uniqueness 
and irreducibility to the subject who thinks in a continuous circulari-
ty between what is invariant (genetic level) and what is constantly be-
coming (epigenetic level). From this point of view, it is possible to read 
Kauffman’s proposal to elaborate a precise notion of agency (theory of 
action) associated with a specific molecular semantics proper to each 
living being on which it is possible to build an emerging theory of val-
ue (beyond the subject-object dichotomy) based on a non-reductionist 
naturalistic approach. On this line of research, as I have shown recall-
ing the works of Del Re and Freeman, the analysis and development 
of a specific evolutionary conception of meaning (historical reality “in 
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itself” and “for me”) as “intentionality not referred to consciousness” 
and “selective response” that allows to explain in genealogical terms 
the emergence of ethics and moral sense in human beings has recently 
come to fruition. Therefore, the development of moral sense would re-
side in the same evolutionary process of unfolding conditions (molecu-
lar semantics) that allow life to emerge as an agency and as a functional 
closure [cf. Montévil & Mossio 2015] of integrated and self-organizing 
tasks (Kantian whole). Such conditions when are mediated by symbol-
ic language and thought, i.e. the emergence of a narrative identity as 
a meeting point between the descriptive and the prescriptive, between 
what can and must be done, between action and ethics are then trans-
lated into ethical attitudes at the human level: the story is exactly what 
weaves and brings together the fragments of life, emotion and experi-
ence that we accumulate as conscious intentional agents in search of the 
ultimate sense of existence.
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for the current debate on enactivism
1. Introduction
In this paper, I show that the philosophical discovery of Uexküll’s biological reflections must be traced back not to Heidegger’s 1929 
course, but to a series of Scheler’s writings dating back to the years 
1909-1916. I argue that Scheler relied on Uexküll’s biological notions 
to rethink Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and thus to develop a new 
ecological approach to the philosophy of perception. However, Scheler’s 
reception of Uexküll’s works was not straightforward. At first, Scheler 
read Uexküll against Kant and interpreted the theory of Bauplan in 
the sense of a merely selective activity (1909-1916). Subsequently, he 
used the notion of Bauplan to develop his own concept of body sche-
ma (Leibschema) as the center of perception. At this point, Scheler was 
forced to tackle the fundamental aporia at the core of Uexküll’s system: 
How do different living species communicate with each other if they 
belong to different environments (Umwelten)?
In order to find a way out of Uexküll’s aporia, Scheler posited the 
existence of a «primordial affectivity» (Gefühlsdrang). According to 
this thesis, every living organism is endowed with a «grammar of ele-
mentary expression», which lets it interact on a biosemiotic level with 
its surrounding environment and with the expressivity of other living 
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forms. The notion of an organism capable of “feeling” and endowed 
with a primordial grammar of expression radically transforms the tra-
ditional image of life and organisms. In fact, this is an organism that 
can actively orient itself in its environment. Thanks to these notions, 
Scheler could establish an enactive perspective of the organism without 
falling into Uexküll’s aporias of Kantian subjectivism, which instead 
recur even in several forms of contemporary enactivism.
In Scheler’s perspective, the environment (Umwelt) is not a neutral 
container of the organism, and perception becomes the embodied activ-
ity of an organism in interaction with its environment. This thesis an-
ticipates nothing less than the idea at the core of enactive theory today. 
Largely developed by Scheler in Formalismus (1913-1916), during the 
second half of the 20th century this perspective was dismissed also due 
to its opposition to cognitivism, only to re-emerge in the contemporary 
debate thanks to the enactive perspective [Varela et al. 1991]. Nonethe-
less, while the convergences between enactivism and Uexküll’s theory 
have already been explored, leading for instance to the development of 
a biosemiotic enactivism [De Jesus 2016], the common ground between 
enactivism and Scheler’s thought has remained completely unnoticed.
The aim of this paper is not to draw attention to these convergences, 
but rather to Scheler’s position, which sheds light on important aspects 
hitherto little examined in current enactive theory. In particular, four 
aspects of Scheler’s perception theory can acquire a central significance 
in today’s enactive perspective: 1) perception does not attempt to rep-
resent the world to the intellect but aims at the survival of the organ-
ism, which, by means of its drive structure (Triebstruktur), perceives 
only what is within the horizon of its vital relevance, which defines the 
boundaries of an organism’s Umwelt; 2) perception has an axiological 
character or, more precisely, the mapping of the Umwelt takes place 
thanks to a valueception (Wertnehmung) that precedes and founds per-
ception (Wahrnehmung) on a pre-representative level; 3) perception is 
rooted in the affective sphere; 4) in addition to the basic enactive logic 
regarding the correlation between Leib and Umwelt analyzed by Varela, 
it is also necessary to envisage an enactive logic that concerns the cor-
relation between person and world.
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2. The concepts of “environment” and body in Scheler
Understanding the problem of organisms entails redefining notions that 
in many cases are initially conceived either as “categories”, in the sense 
of the predicates of being, or in reference to inorganic matter. There is 
nothing new about the thesis that organisms and life require their own 
conceptual tools in order to be understood – concepts that are frequent-
ly inconsistent with the attempt of classical science to focus on what is 
general, repeatable, and reversible while excluding what is singular, un-
foreseeable, and irreversible. This idea was already present in Bergson 
and exerted a considerable influence upon Scheler.
It is little known that Scheler, between 1909 and 1928, developed a 
phenomenology of corporeality independently of Husserl, mainly draw-
ing on Uexküll and Bergson. In particular, in the notes for the biology 
lectures given in the academic year 1908/09 («Biologie Vorlesung»), 
Scheler uses several terms to indicate the concept of environment. He 
often uses the Gallicism “Milieu” [Scheler GW XIV, 270-271]. However, 
there is also a passage in which he uses the German term Umwelt in a 
very peculiar sense:
the environment [Milieu] of an amoeba or of a mole differs from 
that of a horse. [...] There is [therefore] no point in saying that a 
living being with a more complex organization is better adapted 
[angepaßt] to the environment [Umwelt], since it has a complete-
ly different environment [Umwelt] [Scheler GW XIV, 274].
This passage leaves no doubt that, already in 1909, Scheler took up one 
of the main theses set out by Uexküll in his work Umwelt und Innenwelt 
der Tiere [Cusinato 2018, 70-72]. After 1909, Scheler largely dealt with 
Uexküll in the 1914 review of his work Bausteine. Zu einer biologi-
schen Weltanschauung, whereby Uexküll was brought to the attention 
of the philosophical debate in Germany [Scheler GW XIV, 395-397]. 
Indeed, Scheler already discussed Uexküll’s positions extensively in the 
manuscript Die Lehre von den drei Tatsachen (1911-12). This shows that 
Scheler discovered and understood the outstanding philosophical im-
portance of Uexküll’s biological reflections already between 1909 and 
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1912, and therefore much earlier than Heidegger did in the late twenties.1 
In particular, Uexküll disputed two theses shared by Lamarckian and 
Darwinian evolutionism, which were dominant at the time. According 
to the first, there is only one milieu that anthropocentrically corresponds 
to the world of the human being which can be used for measuring the 
degree of adaptation of the different living species. Against it, Uex-
küll maintained that there are as many environments as there are living 
species, and it makes no sense to establish hierarchies of adaptation 
because each species is perfectly adapted to its own specific environ-
ment. The second thesis maintained by popular Darwinism held that all 
organisms passively adapt to this unique milieu. Uexküll, instead, as-
serted that each organic species interacts with its own specific Umwelt.
Scheler took up both of Uexküll’s assertions by rethinking them 
through Nietzsche’s philosophy. In his essay Ressentiment (1912), 
Scheler refers to Nietzsche’s criticism of civilization as the expression 
of a degenerate form of adaptation, which is typical of a biologically 
deficient being such as the human being. In Scheler’s view, civilization 
is an “unfair” form of adaptation that is achieved not through organ 
formation (Organbildung), as is the case of other animals, but by means 
of the artificial construction of instruments (Werkzeuge).
The mechanistic conception of nature, for Scheler, reflects this re-
sentful mentality, which would have led the human being to exalt the 
instrument (Werkzeug) and to understand and explain the organism as 
a set of mechanical parts [Cusinato 2008, 142-143]. Moreover, Scheler 
also maintains that there is more than one arena of struggle for exis-
tence designed after the human model [Scheler GW X, 312] and that 
each animal species thus has its tailor-made environment.
We can also find complete convergence between Scheler and Uex-
küll concerning the second assertion. By criticizing the idea of a pure-
ly passive adaptation, Scheler says that the variety and morphological 
richness of life proves that the very «formation of the organ is not an 
adaptation [Anpassung] to a natural environment [Umgebung] given as 
1  Heidegger’s analyses of Uexküll (in particular during the Winter Semester of 1929-
30) lack the depth that characterizes Scheler’s reflections on the same theme in For-
malismus (1913-1916). On Scheler and Uexküll, see Cusinato [2008, 179-182]; Bren-
tari [2015]; Guccinelli [2016]; Cusinato [2018, 70-79].
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dead, since the same process in which the organ is formed also deter-
mines the essence and structure of the milieu or nature» [Scheler GW 
III, 143].
Scheler tackles in greater depth Uexküll’s theses, which he reinter-
prets through Bergson’s thought, in the manuscript Lehre von den drei 
Tatsachen (1911-1912). Here Scheler describes the symbolic relationship 
between Umwelt and Leib in terms of selection in accordance with the 
thesis of the lived body (Leib) as analyzer (Analysator) [Scheler GW X, 
437-440, 478]. On this basis, Scheler establishes an ecological theory of 
perception in which stimuli are defined as aspects of the world (Welt) 
around (um) the organism whose variations lead to changes in its vital 
processes.
It is interesting to observe that Uexküll’s influence is also visible 
in Ordo amoris (1914-1916), albeit from an unexpected ethical perspec-
tive. The expression «moralische Umwelt» indicates the dynamic «mor-
al environment» as opposed to the rigid and immutable environment 
of destiny (Schicksal) [Scheler GW X, 348; 352-353, 374]. In this way, 
Scheler transfers Uexküll’s ecological thesis to the ethical sphere. Ethics 
is no longer conceived under the banner of a passive adaptation to what 
ought to be (Seinsollen), but as the result of a dynamic correlation be-
tween one’s ordo amoris and the ethos of the society in which one lives.
3. Leib and Umwelt
In explicit reference to the theory of Umwelt, as early as 1909 Sche-
ler distinguished between Lebewesen and Körper, which would be the 
starting point for the further distinction between Leib and Körper: The 
Lebewesen has an Umwelt while the Körper does not. A «living being 
is not a body [Körper]» [Scheler GW XIV, 314] since what corresponds 
to it is not the spatiotemporal world of the inorganic but an environment 
[Scheler GW XIV, 271] that has its own categories of time, space, and 
movement irreducible to those of a physical object [Scheler GW XIV, 
335]. Also in 1909, Scheler argued that these categories can be con-
ceived only in relation to the lived body so that one can maintain that 
«presence, past, and future do not have any significance independent of 
the vital world» [Scheler GW XIV, 335]. For Scheler, this means that a 
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Lebensphänomen, as opposed to a Körper, turns out to be irreducible to 
the Cartesian dualism of res cogitans and res extensa and consequently, 
from the point of view of its content, is a «psycho-physically indifferent 
phenomenon» [Scheler GW XIV, 325]. All of these attributes, includ-
ing the psycho-physic indifference, which would become crucial both 
in Plessner’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of corporeality, are 
thereafter ascribed to the Leib [Scheler GW II, 388].2
What still appeared as a sketched phenomenology of corporeality 
in the semester 1908/1909 took on a more distinct aspect in the follow-
ing years, especially through the manuscript Die Lehre von den drei 
Tatsachen (1911-12) and the essay Über Selbsttäuschungen (1912). In 
the first text, the Leib has the function of an analyzer (Analysator) of the 
stimuli coming from the Umwelt [Scheler GW X, 437]. Here, Bergson’s 
influence is evident: according to him, perception «consists in detach-
ing from the whole set of the objects my body’s possible action on them. 
Perception is nothing but a selection. It creates nothing» [Bergson, 1959, 
360]. Scheler further develops this perspective in his 1912 essay Über 
Selbsttäuschungen, where he states that the Leib is «a notion that should 
be clearly distinguished from that of Körper» [Scheler 1912, 105] since 
it is the premise for inner sense and outer sense.
It is in this passage that, for the first time, Leib and Körper are 
distinguished in a published text in the field of phenomenology.3 Inner 
sense and outer sense are selection organs, and each of them functions 
as an «analyzer of perception» (Analysator des Wahrnehmens) [Scheler 
1912, 108]. Perceiving, therefore, means selecting through inner and out-
er sense what proves relevant to the Leib. What is perceived in the first 
instance, on the pre-representative level, are the value units (Wertein-
heiten) and their qualities [Scheler 1912, 142]. According to Scheler, the 
Leib becomes the «material a priori» of perception. Perception, thus, is 
2  Later, in Formalismus, Scheler returns to the crucial importance of this point: «The 
lived body, or rather its immediate perception as totality, founds both the givenness 
of the psyche of the lived body and that of the physicality of the lived body. And it 
is precisely this original phenomenon, the phenomenon of a double foundation, that 
constitutes the lived body in the strictest sense of the term» [Scheler GW II, 399].
3  On the origin of the distinction between Leib and Körper in Scheler and Husserl, 
cf. Cusinato [2018, 81-86].
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no longer considered in reference to the categories of the intellect, as 
was the case in Kant, but to a relevance order determined by the Leib. 
Such a relevance order results from the Uexküllian perspective. Only 
what has the «meaning of a signal from the environment [Umwelt] for 
our practical steps» [Scheler 1912, 140-141] can be perceived. The value 
qualities, therefore, are not “subjective” but rather «understood as sig-
nals for certain actions, [they are] separated and translated into notions 
and words only insofar as they are signals for different actions united by 
certain ends» [Scheler 1912, 140].
4. Body schema
There are two different phases in Scheler’s reflection on the phenom-
enology of the Leib. In the first phase preceding Erkenntnis und Ar-
beit, the Leib carries out a pre-representative categorial function: «It 
functions as a form […], we can also say, as a category of perception» 
[Scheler GW II, 397]. We are dealing here with a categorial function, 
though, that is not productive but merely selective: The Leib «is only 
an analyzer» of givenness [Scheler GW VII, 248] that scours the sur-
rounding environment in order to select relevant elements [Scheler GW 
X, 437]. In this way, Scheler transforms Kant’s “schematism” into the 
“schematism of the Leib”. We can find more detailed analyses in this 
sense in the second part of Formalismus [Scheler GW II, 396-420].
In the second phase, from Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926) to Ide-
alismus-Realismus (1928), Scheler shifted more decisively towards an 
“enactive” perspective, which in any case can already be found in For-
malismus. At this stage, he took up again the question concerning the 
schematism of the Leib, which he viewed as no longer only selective but 
also “creative”. In doing so, he turned back to a more careful considera-
tion of Kant’s problem posed by Uexküll through the notion of Bauplan.
What marks the transition between these two phases is the con-
cept of «body schema» introduced in 1926.4 In developing this notion, 
Scheler was influenced by Paul Schilder’s analyses on Körperschema 
4  Cf. Scheler [GW VIII, 316, 355; GW IX, 34, 218].
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put forth a few years earlier [Scheler GW IX, 218].5 It is worth mention-
ing, however, that he did not use the term Körperschema but Leibsche-
ma, which is consistent with his distinction between Leib and Körper. 
In coining the term Körperschema Schilder, in his turn, was influenced 
by Scheler’s reflections on the notion of Leib in Formalismus [Schilder 
1950, 283].6 Schilder may be referring here to the circumstance that the 
idea of Leibschema is already implied in the theory of body schematism 
expounded in Formalismus, as the use of the expression «Schema un-
seres Leibes» [Scheler GW II, 409] eloquently shows.7
The notion of body schema profoundly changed Scheler’s perspec-
tive since it practically took up the problems of Kant’s schematism and 
applied them to the lived body. In the first phase, Scheler only conceived 
of the lived body as the «material apriori» that orients the selection of 
perception. After introducing the theory of body schema, however, he 
traced back to the lived body the enactive faculty to produce an image 
(Bild) as a schema that anticipates a sensorimotor activity or an ac-
tion. Therefore, the body schema envisages an «embodied phantasy» 
or imag ination referring not to the intellect but to the lived body itself 
[Cusinato 2008, 137-141; 2018, 227-230].
5  In 1926 Scheler also quoted Schilder’s concept of Körperschema in the Preface to 
the third edition of Formalismus [GW II, 24]. Previously, he had mentioned Schilder 
referring to his studies on hypnosis [see, e.g., GW VII, 31-34].
6  «We are here in better accord with philosophers, especially with Scheler […]. He 
uses for this inner body the German word ‘Leib’. In his opinion the ‘Leib’ is inde-
pendent of the sensation of the inner organs; it is different from single sensations and 
different from any other object. He emphasizes that our body (Leib) is always given 
to us as a unit with some more or less vague structure» [Schilder 1935/1950, 283].
7  A remarkable development of these themes can be found in Gallagher [1986]. On 




5. Uexküll’s and Scheler’s biosemiotics: Bauplan and Leibschema
As a matter of fact, Uexküll is a Kantian striving to conceive the body 
in such a way that it can work with a Kantian a priori.8 According to 
Uexküll, an organic species “phenomenologically” does not experience 
a part of reality, since the “real world” remains an inaccessible Ding an 
sich. Instead, it creates its own environment in a Kantian sense, namely 
as an “internal” environment (Innenwelt). The organism of a species 
relates to an environment that is produced and not passively received, 
just as the Kantian subject synthesizes the phenomenon out of the cha-
os of sensory manifold. From this stems the problem at the center of 
Uexküll’s thought: How is it possible that the environments of different 
living species can come into contact with each other?
At the core of Uexküll’s theory is the idea that the organism is en-
dowed with a creative construction plan (Bauplan) capable of producing 
“magical environments” and that, by means of the “intentionality” of 
these supra-individual natural plans, it produces the signification of its 
own surrounding environment understood as Innenwelt. The creativity 
and intentionality of the Bauplan replace instinct, which remains an 
ambiguous concept for Uexküll: The organism moves about in its envi-
ronment oriented not by instinct, but by its own Bauplan. This idea has 
several similarities with Scheler’s thesis. According to it, the organism 
is endowed with its own orientativeness that in the case of an animal 
organism is embedded in the drive structure (Triebstruktur) of the lived 
body [Cusinato 2008, 68-79].
Uexküll’s concept of construction plan has a Kantian “legislative” 
meaning. For Uexküll, the organism, first of all, does not passively adapt 
to the environment. Nor does it merely select pieces of real givenness 
already constituted in themselves, as Scheler maintains. This comes be-
cause according to Uexküll rule and plan have nothing to do with Ding 
an sich and rather they are just the form in which we can know the 
effects of the natural factor in question. In Uexküll the natural factor in 
itself remains completely unknown.
8  Scheler’s notion of a priori considerably differs from that of Kant. In the follow-
ing pages, therefore, I use the term «a priori» in reference to Kant and «apriori» to 
Scheler.
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In Uexküll’s view, the world is conceived as a Ding an sich and in 
the beginning there is only a chaotic set of impressions that in the Kan-
tian sense acquires a phenomenologically verifiable form only thanks 
to the intervention of the organism’s Bauplan. The Bauplan does not 
select phenomena from the surrounding world that are already consti-
tuted in themselves as Scheler asserts in his Formalismus. Instead, it 
synthesizes images of semiotic markings (Merkbilder) in an inner world 
(Innenwelt). Likewise, the organism does not perceive representations 
of real objects (which for Uexküll remain Dinge an sich), but only the 
signals (Merkmale) of the relevance that certain aspects of the environ-
ment have for the Bauplan of the organism. In this manner, Uexküll 
eventually paves the way to a semiotic interpretation of Kant [Schön-
rich 1981] as well as to an interpretation of Peirce’s semiotics in terms 
of a biosemiotics.
At this point, Uexküll faces the problem of the operative closure 
of the system, which also recurs in Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann. 
As we have seen, according to Uexküll, the organism does not reflect 
the reality of the surrounding world, but it re-elaborates the stimuli as 
signals of the environmental qualities that are relevant to the sensori-
motor functioning of the organism. Each living species has its own way 
of perceiving the world. The tick, for instance, focuses on the olfactory 
and thermostatic variations caused by the passage of mammals under 
the branch of the tree from which it is hanging: This corresponds to a 
specific environment, to an ecological niche that coincides with that 
very small part of the Merkmale (semiotic markings) useful to its vital 
relevance. In this way, its perceptual world coincides with the biose-
miotics of such markings. The set of these relevant Merkmale consti-
tutes its Merkwelt. The verb merken originally means «to provide with 
a mark (mit einem Zeichen versehen)» or «to mark / to make recogniza-
ble (kenntlich machen)». The term Merkwelt, thus, literally means «the 
world that is provided with a mark» or «the world that is made recog-
nizable» by the organism. In the following pages, I translate the term 
as «world of semiotic markings» instead of «perceptual world», as it is 
generally rendered. In my opinion, this common translation weakens the 
sense of the German term: The Merkwelt is not simply the «perceptual 
world», but a perceptual world in which a «functional circle» (Funktion-
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skreis) between the perception of semiotic markings that is of vital rele-
vance for the organism, on the one hand, and the acting of the organism, 
on the other, is brought into being. By so doing, the organism does not 
actually perceive objects, but only the biosemiotics of this «functional 
circle». Perception and semiotics coincide. The organism only perceives 
what is functional to its own sensorimotor operativeness and acts in 
accordance with the biological markings it perceives. Everything a sub-
ject perceives becomes its world of semiotic markings (Merkwelt) and 
everything it does constitutes its operative world (Wirkwelt). Thus, the 
world of semiotic markings and the operational world form the closed 
totality of the «functional circle», namely the environment. Here I will 
limit myself to observing that in nature the way of acting, the way of 
perceiving semiotic markings and the biological form are intertwined: 
The way of acting not only is guided by what the semiotic markings 
signal, but also by the way in which the sense organs perceive them. For 
instance, the perceptual horizon of a shark is dominated by its auditory 
and olfactory organs. Thanks to its highly developed olfactory lobes, it 
is able to grasp very small olfactory variations between the right and the 
left nostril (which for this reason, e.g., in the hammerhead shark are set 
wide apart), so that in order to locate its prey it moves forward sniffing 
the water with a typical zigzag movement.
From this biosemiotic perspective, the environment is never given 
once and for all, but rather it is the result of the dynamic interaction 
between Wirkwelt and Merkwelt: The action starting from the organism 
returns retroactively to the organism itself (in the sense of the Scheler-
ian Rückmeldung) and the action of the «marking sign» (Merkzeichen) 
finds its end in the action of the «operative sign» (Wirkzeichen) towards 
the environmental variables. Thereby, the «functional circle» deter-
mines an operative closure of the system itself with respect to the sur-
rounding environment.
The most important aspect here is that for Uexküll each organic 
species develops itself by creating its own environment according to 
a precise Bauplan, that is to say, a non-mechanistic and non-instinctu-
al program that restores that character of spontaneity of the body ex-
punged by previous philosophical theories. While for Uexküll the en-
vironment referring to a single species is something constructed in the 
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Kantian sense, in the middle period of Scheler’s work, which includes 
his Formalismus, it remains phenomenologically given, although in a 
different way for each species.
However, once Scheler pointed out the enactive perspective em-
bedded in his notion of Leibschema, it became clear that the solution 
of “perspectivism” provided in Formalismus was no longer sufficient. 
Scheler realized then that Uexküll’s approach to the Kantian mindset 
expressed in the concept of Bauplan brought to the surface the aporia 
underlying this position, of which Uexküll was never able to find a truly 
satisfactory way out: How can different species belonging to different 
Umwelten communicate with each other?
6. Primordial affectivity and expressive dimension
According to an opinion still widely held today, claiming that life is 
characterized by sensibility, affectivity, and the ability to interact with 
values and expressions does not mean thinking of life in terms of its 
own categories but rather projecting anthropocentric categories onto 
life. This therefore results in something similar to a “naturalistic fal-
lacy”. In this view, these categories belong properly and exclusively to 
the human being, so thinking that they are also valid for nature is noth-
ing but the product of an anthropocentric projection. Surprisingly, the 
problematic nature of this reasoning is often overlooked: Following this 
logic, all the most important characteristics of life become the exclusive 
monopoly of the human being. Isn’t this anthropocentrism at its purest?
This way of thinking has applied reductionism to the study of or-
ganisms and life, leaving out all those categories and notions that can-
not be quantified or be traced back to physical laws, such as purpose, 
value, subjectivity, expression, feeling, and affectivity. The goal of this 
view is to not take into account the internal point of view of an organic 
system, but only its basic constituent elements.
The difference between the processes concerning living matter and 
those involving inanimate matter has been at the center of biological 
research from the beginning of modern science. It has also given rise 
to the controversy known to science historians as the dispute of vital-
ism against mechanism. Around the mid-20th century, the arrival of 
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molecular genetics and the discovery of the genetic code undermined 
the thesis that, unlike the non-living, living beings had some peculiar 
“vital force”. Vitalism thus seemed to lose its most important founda-
tion, which allowed its supporters to defend the idea that the living are 
fundamentally irreducible to the physical laws of matter. The biological 
processes of genetic transmission, in fact, could now be interpreted in a 
highly unified manner through the discovery of the genetic code. Final-
ly everything could be understood by referring only to the principles of 
physics and chemistry.
As usual, though, the devil is in the details. In fact, a series of no-
tions extraneous to physics and chemistry entered into this framework 
and took part in describing fundamental life processes. These notions, 
such as information, message, transmission, or translation, also have a 
philosophical meaning. Nevertheless, they were considered – in a cer-
tain sense “tolerated” – as mere metaphors, only useful for popularizing 
phenomena that remained essentially chemical and physical in nature. 
However, even the keenest supporters of physicalism had to admit that 
these were “indispensable metaphors”.
The question of information was already present in cybernetics, ac-
cording to which it was possible to interpret not only life but also the 
genetic code itself following the model of a “computer”. However, this 
approach has been gradually challenged. In particular, feeling and affec-
tivity have been progressively regarded as irreducible to the “computer” 
model, at least as it was initially conceived. Moreover, since the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) was concluded in 2000, it has become increas-
ingly evident that knowing the sequences of the elementary “building 
blocks” of life is not sufficient to explain life processes [Lewontin 2000]. 
Instead, it is necessary to also study and analyze the dimension which 
20th-century genetics had gradually marginated, namely the dimension 
of biological individuality or, more precisely, the self-organization and 
complexity that makes an organism a biological individuality.
We can find a different approach to the question of information in 
biosemiotics. Since the 1960s and 1970s, this discipline has proposed 
to consider all biological processes as intrinsically semiotic, including 
those concerning the simplest life units, such as cells, and those relating 
to animal (and human) groups and societies. The main thesis of biose-
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miotics is that “life is semiosis” at every level. As a result, there is a 
“semiosphere” corresponding to the biosphere, that is to say, a kind of 
semiotic dimension common to all living beings as such, not only those 
endowed with language, abstract thinking, or representative capacity. 
From this point of view, even Gregory Bateson can be considered a 
forerunner of biosemiotics [Hoffmeyer, 2008].
Scheler, who connected his reflection to Uexküll’s ecological the-
ory very early on, also fully embraced this perspective. The novelty of 
Scheler’s position consisted in his attempt to reinterpret life through two 
strategic categories, namely «primordial affectivity» (Gefühlsdrang) 
and «grammar of expression» (Grammatik des Ausdrucks). Scheler ex-
tended a «primordial affectivity» (Gefühlsdrang)9 to all living organ-
isms, including plants. According to this thesis, every living organism 
is endowed with an elementary germ of a «grammar of expression» that 
lets it interact with the surrounding environment and with the expres-
sivity of other living forms [Scheler GW VII, 22; 92; 112; VIII, 274; XII, 
86; 143].
Certainly, Scheler also drew an essential distinction between plants 
and animals. In the former, in fact, there is still no feedback (Rückwen-
dung) to a center:
Therefore, in the case of plants, I speak of “ecstatic” primordi-
al affectivity [Gefühlsdrang] in order to describe this total lack 
of feedback [Rückmeldung] of organ states to a center, which is 
peculiar to animal life – this total lack of a turning back [Rück-
wendung] of life into itself, even of the most primitive re-flexio, 
even of the most faintly “conscious” inner state [Scheler GW IX, 
15].10
9  On the notion of «primordial affectivity» (Gefühlsdrang) in Scheler’s thought, cf. 
Scheler GW VIII, 337; IX, 13-16. This concept, which is at the core of Scheler’s phil-
osophical anthropology, has been recently used also by Colombetti [2013].
10  «Daher spreche ich bei der Pflanze von “ekstatischem” Gefühlsdrang, um dieses 
totale Fehlen einer dem tierischen Leben eigenen Rückmeldung von Organzuständen 
an ein Zentrum, dieses völlige Fehlen einer Rückwendung des Lebens in sich selbst, 
einer noch so primitiven re-flexio, eines noch so schwach “bewußten” Innenzustan-
des zu bezeichnen» [Scheler GW IX, 15].
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Thus, only in relation to the animal is it possible to speak of “sensation”. 
This difference, however, does not call into question a fundamental uni-
ty of all life in terms of the two categories of «expression» (Ausdruck) 
and «primordial affectivity». Expression (Ausdruck), for Scheler, is the 
«Urphänomen des Lebens» [Scheler GW IX, 15]. From this point of 
view, «already in plant existence [im pflanzlichen Dasein], one finds 
the primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen] of expression, a certain 
physiognomy of their inner states, [in other words,] of the conditions 
[Zuständlichkeiten] of primordial affectivity [understood] as the inner 
being of their life, such as weak, strong, luxuriant, or poor» [Scheler 
GW IX, 15].11
The thesis I argued for in several works is that living beings relate 
to the expressive dimension by means of primordial affectivity. This 
implies that the essential characteristic of life is to be found in its inter-
action with the expressive dimension: All that is capable of interacting 
with the expressive dimension through primordial affectivity is life. Un-
doubtedly, non-living matter, such as a burning piece of paper, also can 
be highly expressive, and a computer can recognize facial expressions. 
Nevertheless, only life is able to interact with expression through pri-
mordial affectivity [Cusinato 2008, 98; 2018, 101-104].
7. The relevance of Scheler’s theses for the current debate  
on enactivism
From the perspective of cognitivism, which was hegemonic until the 
end of the 20th century, sense-making is considered to be the result of 
an intellectual cognitive activity separate from the body. With Varela [et 
al. 1991] enactivism overturns this perspective and considers perception 
as an embodied activity of an organism in interaction with its environ-
ment. This is exactly the conclusion reached by Scheler in Formalismus 
under the influence of Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt.
11  «[…] bereits im pflanzlichen Dasein [findet sich] das Urphänomen des Ausdrucks, 
eine gewisse Physiognomik ihrer Innenzustände, der Zuständlichkeiten des Gefühls-
drangs als des Innenseins ihres Lebens, wie matt, kraftvoll, üppig, arm» [Scheler 
GW IX, 15].
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However, it is only from Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926) onward that 
Scheler’s enactive perspective becomes explicit. Scheler gradually takes 
up the theme, which Uexküll put forth through the concept of Bauplan, 
and connects it to a “legislative” of the “lived body”. In Erkenntnis und 
Arbeit Scheler realizes that the solution offered in Formalismus risks 
undermining the results achieved by the phenomenology of corpore-
ality. He is also compelled to deal with the theme at the core of Uex-
küll’s proposal, that of the legislative productivity of the organism. By 
posing the problem of a material legislation of the lived body, instead 
of obliterating Uexküll’s Kantian problem, Scheler rethinks it from an 
“enactive” perspective, ascribing to the lived body that very legislative 
capacity that Kant formerly assigned to the intellect. In Scheler’s last 
writings we can find the intuition of an enactive activity that lies at 
the basis of perception and has its driving force in the drive-phantasy 
(Triebphantasie), namely a fantasy which is conceived in relation not to 
the intellect but to the body schema [Cusinato 2018, 87-97; 230-236]. 
The Umwelt for Scheler is not an external container in which the living 
organisms grow and move. According to his Erkenntnis und Arbeit, the 
organism interacts with the Umwelt from its own specific “enactive” 
point of view, which is represented by the drive-phantasy (Triebphanta-
sie). Hence, the Umwelt is not a neutral place, but always means some-
thing in relation to the organism.
In this respect, there are four aspects of Scheler’s theory that are 
particularly significant for the current debate on enactivism: 1) percep-
tion does not attempt to represent the world to the intellect but aims at 
the survival of the organism, which, by means of its drive-phantasy 
(Triebphantasie), perceives only what is within the horizon of its vital 
relevance that defines the boundaries of an organism’s Umwelt; 2) per-
ception has an axiological character or, more precisely, the mapping of 
the Umwelt takes place thanks to a valueception (Wertnehmung) that 
precedes and founds perception (Wahrnehmung) on a pre-representative 
level; 3) perception is rooted in the affective sphere; 4) in the human 
being perception not only refers to the interaction between Leib and 
Umwelt, but also to that between person and world: thus, we must ad-
mit a form of “anthropogenetic enactivism” also for the personal center 
[Cusinato 2018, 242-244]. Only recently has a debate begun to emerge 
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over the axiological and affective dimension of an enactivism which 
distinguishes itself from the enactivism functional to the relationship 
between organism and environment and whose propulsive core instead 
lies in the activity of positioning the person in the world.12
Each of these themes at the center of Scheler’s phenomenology can 
offer an important contribution to the current enactive perspective. An 
organism capable of “feeling” and endowed with a primordial gram-
mar of expression radically transforms the traditional image of life and 
organisms. In this view, an organism perceives values (such as useful 
or harmful) on the pre-representative level (Wertnehmung) and can en-
actively orient itself in the environment. By developing this Scheleri-
an approach, we can establish an enactive perspective of the organism 
without falling into Uexküll’s aporias of Kantian subjectivism, which 
instead recur even in several forms of contemporary enactivism.
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Abstract
This paper is aimed to discuss and reconsider life categories starting from German 
phenomenologist Max Scheler’s analysis of the “lived body” (Leib), which he de-
veloped between 1909 and 1928 independently of Husserl. For the philosophy of 
biology, Scheler’s phenomenology of corporeality is of outstanding importance, be-
cause the categories it applies to the Leib are not taken from the inorganic world, as 
is ultimately still the case with Husserl, but from Jacob von Uexküll’s biology and 
Bergson’s philosophy. It therefore represents one of the most significant attempts to 
rethink life in accordance with the categories proper to life itself.
Scheler’s reception of Uexküll’s works was not straightforward. At first, Scheler 
read Uexküll against Kant and interpreted the theory of Bauplan in the sense of a 
merely selective activity (1909-1916). Subsequently, he used the notion of Bauplan to 
develop his own concept of body schema (Leibschema) as the enactive center of per-
ception. At this point, Scheler was compelled to tackle the fundamental aporia at the 
center of Uexküll’s system: How do different species communicate with each other if 
they belong to different environments (Umwelten)? In order to find a way out of Uex-
küll’s aporia, Scheler posited a basic unity of life on the unipathic level (Einsfühlung).
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Scheler’s solution was thus the following: Living beings in different environments 
(Umwelten) communicate with each other because every living organism is endowed 
with an elementary «grammar of expression», which on the level of primordial af-
fectivity enables a pre-representative communication of all living forms, including 
plants. The most significant aspect of this solution is that Scheler could develop an 
enactive perspective of the organism without falling into Uexküll’s aporias of Kan-







KANTIAN MONADS IN A PLATONIC WORLD.  
SOME REMARKS ON 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF 
JAKOB VON UEXKÜLL’S UMWELTLEHRE
Table of Contents: 1. The animal as Kantian subject; 2. The Uex-
küllian subject as a monad; 3. How to grant harmony to a multi-world 
nature: the Platonic way; 4. Concluding remarks.
1. The animal as Kantian subject
Chief aim of this paper is to investigate some philosophical assump-tions, as well as some consequences, of Jakob von Uexküll’s biolog-
ical Umweltlehre. I will focus on Uexküll’s philosophical background 
with particular regard to his intent to grasp and describe the percep-
tive and operative ways through which animal organisms shape and 
share their experienced reality. In other words, I will highlight some 
philosophical reference points of the yearlong process through which 
Uexküll develops his most famous contribute to philosophy of biolo-
gy: the idea of the Umwelt as a subjective, species-specific, and (at the 
same time) intersubjective and inter-specific sphere of perception and 
action. One of the aspects that most make Uexküll’s theoretical biology 
and behavior theory original is, indeed, the importance he gives to an-
imal subjectivity. Without going into a detailed analysis of the textual 
references [cf., in this regard, Brentari 2018], I would start my analy-
sis by underlining two key traits of Uexküll’s concept of subjectivity. 
The first is its anti-mechanistic function in biological and zoological 
research. Uexküll ascribes subjectivity to all animals endowed with an 
(even minimal) degree of physiological reactivity, even to amoebas and 
arthropods (such as the tick). Being often regular and predictable, the 
behavior of such lower animals gives the impression of being nothing 
more than a series of reactions to the stimuli from the external reality. 
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Uexküll, however, explicitly considers them as subjects [Uexküll 2010, 
45] and stresses their capability to “pick up” the stimuli in a selective 
way [Uexküll 2010, 81], elaborate them autonomously in the organisms’ 
Innenwelt, and give them meaning as parts of their Umwelt.
This approach is likely to appear uneconomic in the analysis of the 
behavior of lower animals (one could legitimately ask, why to resort to 
semiotics to explain the behaviour of a scallop or a tick, if this behav-
iour is otherwise describable?). Uexküll’s choice is, instead, extremely 
fruitful in the investigation of higher animals, in particular social ones 
(not surprisingly, the young Konrad Lorenz uses many Uexküllian con-
cepts to describe the social behavior of birds [cf. Lorenz 1970]). What 
matters most, if we consider the theoretical context of the long-term 
quarrel between mechanists and vitalists, Uexküll’s approach appears 
well grounded. The Estonian biologist prefers the risk of using con-
cepts that are apparently too complex for the low levels of the animal 
world to the opposite peril of simplifying the behavior of higher animals 
by using a mechanizing toolkit (such as reflexes, tropisms, instincts). 
Moreover, according to the vitalist Uexküll, to assign subjectivity also 
to lower animals is a necessary preliminary step in order to gain in-
sight into the complex net of inter-specific relationships. For Uexküll, 
organic nature is pervaded by teleological forces providing an over-
all agreement among the needs and actions of the different agencies 
(i.e., the different species). Uexküll often refers to these harmonizing 
forces with the term «natural factor [Naturfaktor]» [Uexküll 1909, 13; 
all the quotations from Uexküll 1909 are my translation]; and, if on the 
physiological, morphological, and anatomical level the expression of the 
Naturfaktor is the organism’s Bauplan (its species-specific construction 
plan [cf. Brentari 2015, 57-63]), on the behavioural level its direct ex-
pression is subjectivity, as organising kernel of perception and action. 
In this way, Uexküll’s anti-mechanistic stance acquires a decidedly tel-
eological dimension.
The second key trait of Uexküll’s concept of the subject is its Kan-
tian derivation. Uexküll reads at a young age the Critique of Pure Rea-
son, which has a permanent influence on his thought. From the begin-
ning of his activity as a researcher, he tries on the one side to give a 
physiological basis to the theoretical core of the Kantian transcendental 
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approach, and, on the other, to investigate the subjective world of ex-
perience even of animal species other than humans. «The task of biolo-
gy» – writes Uexküll programmatically – «is to expand the outcome of 
Kant’s research in two directions: 1) to take into account the role of our 
body too, in particular of our sense organs and central nervous system, 
and 2) to investigate the relationships with the objects of the other sub-
jects (animals)» [Uexküll 1928, 3; all the quotations from Uexküll 1928 
are my translation]. If one reads his texts against the background of this 
statement, it is evident that, for the Estonian biologist, both the research 
on the sensorimotor apparatus of the different species and the investiga-
tion of their cognitive performances are part of a unique investigation 
of the animals’ transcendental subjectivity.
In his biological reprise of the transcendental approach, Uexküll has 
made some (often very fruitful) changes to the Kantian theory. First, if, 
for Kant, only the logical forms of subjective experience can be a pri-
ori, in Uexküll’s approach even the material side of experience can be 
determined at a transcendental level. This research line is closely rem-
iniscent of Max Scheler’s enquiry on the immediate axiological quality 
of ethical experience [Scheler 1973, 47-48, 71-74; Gasché 2010] and of 
the phenomenological debate about the existence of a “material a priori” 
[see Schlick 1969; Husserl 1984]. Since he moves from the physiological 
structure of the different animal species, Uexküll considers as a priori 
elements not only space as the general form of sensitivity, but also the 
particular implementations of this form at the level of the species-spe-
cific Erlebnis. For example, he sees three-dimensionality as depending 
on the presence of semi-circular canals – a position wherein, ultimately, 
the organisms’ Bauplan is the key of the subjective experience of each 
species [Uexküll 2010, 56-57].
Second, Uexküll’s Umweltlehre rests on the semiotization of Kant’s 
transcendental approach. The connection between the external reality 
– doomed, as the Kantian noumenon, to remain unknowable in itself – 
and the species-specific coordinates of perception and action is thought 
of as a semiotic operation. «Stimuli from the external world» – writes 
Uexküll – «are globally translated as a nervous sign language [in eine 
nervöse Zeichensprache]» [Uexküll 1909, 192]; and, as stressed by 
Thomas Sebeok [Sebeok 2001, 33], even the perceptual and operative 
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marks that make up the species-specific Umwelt are often called percep-
tive and operative signs (Merkzeichen and Wirkzeichen) [Uexküll 2010, 
122]. What the animal unfolds as a Kantian subject is a peculiar form 
of semiosis which does not convey any information about the external 
world (which remains inaccessible in itself) but produces a mutually 
interconnected network of codes and meanings in correspondence with 
the external objects. The human being, whose experience is broader 
than that of other species, can produce a larger and more complex net-
work, but certainly not attain the ultimate reality beyond it.1
2. The Uexküllian subject as a monad
The peculiar ways of Uexküll’s renewal of the transcendental approach 
exacerbate a problem that was already present in Kant’s work: the risk 
of the solipsism. In Kant, the consistency among the experience worlds 
of different subjects bases, ultimately, only on the philosopher’s belief in 
the functional homogeneity of all rational beings. The insertion of con-
tent elements into the subject’s transcendental theory and, above all, its 
application to different biological species exacerbate the problem. The 
different Umwelten appear to be neatly separated from each other; they 
diverge as for life rhythm, spatial articulation, and assigned meanings. 
From the point of view of the subject that constitutes them, the subjec-
tive worlds of a mosquito and of the mammal on which the mosquito 
feeds seem to have very little in common.
Already the first philosophical readings of the Uexküllian Umwelt-
lehre embed the problem of the solipsism in Uexküll’s theory into a 
comparison with the Leibnizian conception of the subject as a mon-
ad. In 1939, Harald Lassen dedicates a significant contribution to the 
1  Uexküll’s modified transcendentalism has a long lasting influence on other schol-
ars. On the one side, Uexküll’s attention to the material elements of animal experi-
ence stimulates the research that the young Konrad Lorenz dedicates to the innate 
recognition mechanisms that trigger social birds’ instinctive behaviours [Lorenz 
1970]. On the other, the semiotization of Kant’s theory makes possible the fruitful 
insertion of the Uexküllian theory in contemporary biosemiotic (from Thure von 
Uexküll and Thomas Sebeok to Kalevi Kull and many other scholars; for an intro-
duction, cf. Favareau [2009]).
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connection between Uexküll’s thought and the Leibnizian theoretical 
coordinates. First, Lassen clarifies a legitimate doubt. Referring to a 
personal communication from Uexküll, he excludes that Uexküll had 
a direct knowledge of Leibniz’s thought [Lassen 1939, 47]. Second, it 
provides an accurate reconstruction of the theoretical correspondence 
between Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelten and Leibniz’ monadology:
Cardinal points of this correspondence are the following:  
1) There is a plurality of subjective worlds = “Umwelten” = 
“monads”. 2) They are completely isolated one from another.  
3) The subject builds up its reality in a quite autonomous way 
according to an ideal and specific law = plan = conception.  
4) The individual vital laws harmonize according to an optimal 
general plan. 5) The objective space is denied and regarded as 
the formalized system of living subjective centres = points of 
view. 6) Therefrom results the difficulty of explaining a causality 
of unconscious nature, which is independent from the subject.  
7) From this follows the necessity of speculatively amplifying 
the conception of “subject” or “monad” as well as finally displac-
ing the problem of reality into the metaphysical-religious sphere 
of a supreme (divine) monad or subject [Lassen 1939, 49].
It is easy to see how Lassen’s «cardinal points» belong to two different 
groups. On the one hand, there are factors determining the isolation of 
the subjects; on the other, elements that oppose and lessen such con-
dition. The plurality of the subjects and the autonomy of the Umwelt 
formation process, accompanied as they are by isolation and lack of 
direct communication, belong to the first group. The conformity of the 
Umwelten to a plan, their mutual harmonization, the replacement of the 
objective space with a prospective system made of subjective points of 
views and, finally, the need for a higher-order subject that regulates this 
system belong to the second group.2
2  It may not be clear, at a first glance, how perspectivism can oppose the isolation 
of the subjects. Both in Leibniz and Uexküll, however, this possibility arises from 
the resolute affirmation that the different points of view do not constitute numerical-
ly separate objects, but (although in their difference) converge on the same object. 
Thanks to this, writes Uexküll, «you will understand that the theory of the environ-
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For each mentioned common point between Uexküll and Leibniz 
there are precise textual references. I limit myself to three examples. 
As for the subject’s isolation, Leibniz’ claim that «monads just have no 
windows through which something can enter into or depart from them» 
[Leibniz 1991, 17] finds a correspondence in Uexküll’s metaphor of the 
Umwelt as a «solid dividing wall, which surrounds the animal like the 
walls of a house it built itself and keeps away the whole world and its 
extraneousness» [Uexküll 1909, 212]. As for perspectivism, both au-
thors think of the relationship between the subjective worlds in terms 
of a coexistence of different points of view on the same thing. So writes 
Leibniz:
And as one and the same town viewed from different sides 
looks altogether different, and is, as it were, perspectivally 
multiplied, it similarly happens that, through the infinite mul-
titude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many 
different universes, which however are only the perspectives of 
a single one according to the different points of view of each 
monad [Leibniz 1991, 24].
In a very similar way, Uexküll compares the variety of the species-spe-
cific Umwelten to the multitude of images of a field that are reflected in 
the drops of dew hanging on the grass stalks: «Each of these myriads 
of drops mirrors all the world with the sun, the mountains, the forests 
and the shrubs, a magical world within itself. […] [E]ach one of these 
innumerable drops does not only shine in the diversity of the shim-
mering colours, but also possesses its own subjective tone, the one that 
distinguishes all living beings» [Uexküll 1938, 47-48; all the quotations 
from Uexküll 1938 are my translation; on this point, cf. also Langthaler 
1992, 162-163, and Guidetti 2013, 77-78].
The third common point I want to highlight between Leibniz and 
Uexküll is the need for a subject of higher order. This need arises both 
on the epistemic level and on the ontological one. On the epistemic lev-
ment has nothing to do with the silly solipsism» [Uexküll 1938, 48]. The opposite 




el, the understanding of perspectivism as a general condition of ani-
mal life can happen only if the human observer succeeds in taking a 
superordinate position from which (s)he can see the different points of 
view converging, as it has been said, on the same object. This kind of 
superordinate position is a relative one, as in the case of an ethologist 
observing the species-specific Umwelten that different animals build up 
based on the same oak [Uexküll 2010, 130]. On the ontological level, 
instead, the higher order subject can be an absolute one. For both Leib-
niz and Uexküll, the recourse to an absolute higher-order subject aims 
at explaining the ultimate origin of the harmony between the different 
lower-level subjective worlds, even in the absence of a direct commu-
nication or interaction between them. In Leibniz, it is the super-monad 
God who plays this role towards the lower-level monads [Leibniz 1991, 
23]. Uexküll, who rejects the existence of a personal God, entrusts the 
coordinative function between the different species-specific Umwelten 
to a non-self-conscious teleological instance (the already mentioned 
Naturfaktor), or, simply, to Nature. Very clear in this regard is the final 
passage of A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: «all these 
different environments are fostered and borne along by the One that is 
inaccessible to all environments forever. Forever unknowable behind all 
of the worlds it produces, the subject – Nature – conceals itself» [Uex-
küll 2010, 135].
3. How to grant harmony to a multi-world nature: the Platonic way
On several occasions, Uexküll affirms the radical unknowability of the 
Naturfaktor. The latter, therefore, risks moving so far away from the 
single organisms that Uexküll frequently turns to other intermediate 
instances, which can account more satisfactorily for the regularities ob-
servable in animal life. In some cases, Uexküll’s choice is to use the 
Platonic ideas as mediators between the Naturfaktor and the individual 
life forms – a choice that, as Esposito states, recalls Schopenhauer’s 
strategy to rely on ideas as mediator between the noumenic will and 
its individual concretizations at the level of representation [cf. Esposito 
2020, 39].
In Uexküll’s view of animal life, to be qualified as Platonic ideas 
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are four key spheres of the animal activity towards the elements of the 
Umwelt – in Uexküll’s terminology, four key functional circles (Funk-
tionskreise):
The ideas are the meanings of the objects that we see in front of 
us as colored silhouettes as long as we are tied up in the Platonic 
sensory cave. The meaning of an object is crucial for the role that 
the object plays in the drama of life. The meanings are fixed in 
nature, while the objects change. Every living being needs food, 
but the objects that for the different living beings serve as food 
are extremely different [Uexküll 1950, 157; all the quotations 
from Uexküll 1950 are my translation].
Besides food, the other «primal meanings [Urbedeutungen]» [Uexküll 
1950, 157] or «basis ideas [Grundideen]» [Uexküll 1950, 158] in animal 
life are the enemy, the reproductive partner and the medium in which 
the movement of the animal takes place. Uexküll thinks of the relation-
ship between the Grundideen and the reference objects in the Umwelt as 
a process of expression («the enemy’s idea finds expression in the par-
asites and in the predators») [Uexküll 1950, 158] or embodiment («the 
idea of the medium is embodied sometimes in water, sometimes in the 
air, sometimes in the ground» [Uexküll 1950, 158].
On the behavioural level, which includes the relations to the inor-
ganic elements and the intra- and interspecific relationships, Uexküll 
presents the four Urbedeutungen of animal lives as the fixed roles they 
have to perform. Through the metaphor of the theatre, which can be 
found both in Der unsterbliche Geist in der Natur [Uexküll 1938] and in 
Das allmächtige Leben [Uexküll 1950], the life of an organism is seen 
as a series of theatrical scenes which come together to make up a whole. 
To be more precise, Uexküll sees the constitution of the species-specific 
Umwelt as the realization of a peculiar theatrical setting which is irre-
ducible to that of the other subjects. Again, the autonomous spontaneity 
of the subject in configuring the world of experience leads to a high 
risk of incommunicability among the actors performing on the world 
stage. In a dialogue between a mechanistic-minded zoologist and a biol-
ogist who, instead, supports the subjective nature of space, time, and, in 
general, all coordinates of experience, Uexküll qualifies the conception 
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of the former as «mono-world [unimondal]» and that of the latter as 
«multi-world [multimundal]» [Uexküll 1938, 49] (behind the biologist’s 
perspective it is easy to recognize Uexküll’s own view of nature).
As mentioned above, Uexküll faces in various ways the danger of 
the lack of agreement among the different subjects and the species-spe-
cific worlds they shape. The main way is the “Leibnizian” use of a su-
pra-subjective instance operating in a teleological sense, i.e., predispos-
ing the Baupläne that determine the organisms’ anatomy, physiology, 
perception, and behaviour. This strategy is to be found also inside the 
theatre metaphor; Uexküll, in fact, qualifies the Baupläne as the ‘au-
thors’ of the drama of the individual lives: «according to the Umwelt-
lehre, there are thousands of different life plays on thousands of life 
stages, each with a different plan as author» [Uexküll 1938, 49].
Next to this main strategy, however, and as its integration, Uexküll 
adopts also in this context the Platonic strategy of limiting the expres-
sive possibilities of the animal subjects to a few ‘ideal’ life schemata: 
«The technique of living nature works with roles as with fixed unities. 
But roles, even if they reach out to body and space, are not material 
units, rather platonic ideas, whose spiritual tissue serves as foundation 
to nature» [Uexküll 1950, 156]. Here, Uexküll’s Platonism emerges in 
a particularly clear way: the four spiritual roles have a marked ontolog-
ical priority over the physical level of the animal’s body structure. This 
is reinforced by the idea of the ontological prominence of the Umwelt 
(as a subjective creation) over the physical component of the organism: 
«since any role in any life scenario requires its counterpointistic coun-
ter-role, the animal’s body is the reflection of its environment, which 
represents all the counter-roles» [Uexküll 1950, 69]. Thus, the life form 
of a species is a particular combination of the four Grundideen which 
objectivizes itself in the body structure of the animal and, further, in its 
Umwelt (as a peculiar constellation of Merkmale and Wirkmale). And 
this «tissue of vital scenes which are tied to each other through always 
renewed roles goes well over the borders of single subjective worlds» 
[Uexküll 1950, 156].
The recourse to Platonic ideas as an explanatory model for the 
species-specific regularities of animal life forms is a minor strategy in 
Uexküll’s work. Much more frequently, as we have seen, he resorts to 
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the postulate of a higher-order subject (Nature or the Naturfaktor); in 
other cases, he considers natural processes as regulated by lower-order 
teleological factors such as the Bauplan, or the «rules» that make up 
the organisms [Brentari 2015, 57-63; 121-123]. In these cases, Uexküll 
adopts, rather than a Platonic model, an Aristotelian kind of teleology: 
the idea of the construction plan is close to the concept of entelechy, 
which, in Uexküll’s times, is having a revival with the neovitalism of 
Hans Driesch [Driesch 1899; Uexküll 1928, 147]. From the explanatory 
point of view, Driesch’ concept of entelechy and, in general, Aristote-
lian teleology offer clear advantages over the Platonic model. Although 
super-material, entelechy is thought of as individual, as the species-spe-
cific form of a particular organism. Its greater adherence to the individ-
ual being allows neovitalist-minded biologists to use it not only to grasp 
the general basic form of the species but also, for example, to explain 
concretely the ontogenetic process of embryogenesis – thus assigning 
to the notion of entelechy the organizing role that, after the full discov-
ery of the functioning of the DNA, scientists will generally give to the 
genes.
4. Concluding remarks
Uexküll’s constant appeal to philosophy is directed to different purpos-
es. On the one hand, the adoption of the Kantian transcendental ap-
proach appears to be a founding choice, motivated by the belief that the 
investigation of the a priori forms and contents of the species-specific 
Umwelten is actually the most valid path for biology. The same can be 
said for the references to the Aristotelian teleological model, through 
the mediation of Driesch. As for the references to Plato, two distinct 
roots can be identified: on the one hand, as we have seen, there is the 
intent to limit the risky autonomy of the transcendental subject (which 
can lead to solipsism) through some basic settings of the life form in 
relation to its Umwelt (the above mentioned Grundideen). On the other 
hand, the occasional insertion of the Platonic view of reality in Uex-
küll’s theoretical biology plays the role of an additional weapon, along-
side vitalist teleology, against the Darwinism of the late nineteenth and 
early decades of the twentieth century.
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If it succeeds in opposing the materialistic determinism of the Dar-
winism of his time, the recourse to Platonism has, however, a side effect 
that clashes with Uexküll’s main goal. If, on the one hand, notions such 
as the fundamental ideas and the pre-established roles are powerful sta-
bilizing factors inside the species-specific biological anlage and etho-
logical repertoire, on the other hand they heavily limit the organisms’ 
freedom and spontaneity. One should not forget that Uexküll’s subjec-
tivism has a basilar anti-mechanistic character. It aims at acknowledg-
ing the transcendental and semiotic freedom of every animal action, 
even the seemingly mechanic feeding behaviour of a tick; moreover, for 
higher species Uexküll opens up the possibility of individual spaces of 
action [Uexküll 2010, 126]. In domesticated species, animals can even 
adapt their individual action to particular traits of the Umwelt of other 
species. In front of these cases, the Platonic model of the repetition of 
fundamental ideas (which determine which Funktionskreise are gener-
ally viable to the animal) turns out to be too narrow to account for the 
wealth of animal behaviour.
In conclusion, the composite philosophical toolkit through which 
Uexküll faces the problems arising from his ‘modified Kantism’ can 
give him only limited advantages. The programmatic inaccessibility to 
empirical research of Naturfaktor and entelechies reduces severely the 
favour such notions can enjoy among 20th and 21th century scientists. 
Moreover, Uexküll’s refusal of evolution by natural selection precludes 
him from adopting the most viable strategy to keep together the autono-
my of the animal Umwelten and their mutual interconnection on the life 
stage. This is not the place to provide a complete evaluation of the topic, 
but some elements should be mentioned. Contemporary evolutionism is 
far from the environmental mechanism that (in the form of the “struggle 
to survival”) characterized late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
Darwinism. It stresses, instead, the positive survival value of symbio-
sis, horizontal genomic transfer and other form of synergic interspe-
cific processes [Guerrero et al. 2013]. In addition, many scholars today 
re-evaluate the active and proactive role of the organism, which appears 
now very far from being mere «raw material» subjected to the joint ac-
tion of random variations and environmental external pressure [Gould 
2002, 1027-32]. Therefore, it is now possible to assign to evolution by 
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natural selection the role of coordinating and harmonizing the different 
species-specific Umwelten, without any need more to resort to (neo)
vitalistic notions, Leibnizian forms of pre-established harmony, or, fi-
nally, Platonic idealism.
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Abstract
This paper aims at investigating some philosophical assumptions of Jakob von Uex-
küll’s biological Umweltlehre. After a short exposition of Uexküll’s (Kantian) idea 
of the animal subjectivity, the contribution will focus on the correction strategies 
Uexküll puts into act, in different places of his works, to remedy the main limit of 
his subjectivism (i.e., the risk of solipsism). We will examine, in particular, three of 
these strategies, showing that they resume (explicitly or implicitly) some classical 
patterns of thought of Western philosophy: 1) Aristotelian (neo)vitalistic notions; 
2) “Leibnizian” forms of pre-established harmony; 3) Platonic idealism. In the con-
cluding remarks, the paper will highlight some limits of the philosophical toolkit 
through which Uexküll faces the problems arising from his ‘modified Kantism’. This 
criticism opens up the possibility to assign the role of coordinating and harmonizing 
the different species-specific Umwelten to evolution by natural selection (in the way 
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ORGANISMIC INDIVIDUALITY
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1. The return of the concept of organism
After the discovery of the DNA in the 1950’s, 20th century biology focused on the concept of the gene. In the 21st century, howev-
er, the concept of organism is regaining its primary role in biological 
thought. At present there is a rapidly growing literature verifying that 
living beings are able not only to deeply reorganize themselves but also 
to modify their genomes [Shapiro 2011; Sultan 2015; Jablonka 2017]. 
The emergence of a theory of organism requires, however, first the elab-
oration of a logic of organismic causality that proceeds from organismic 
phenomenality. In the following I will attempt to outline what I label 
“logic of organisms”. In order to achieve this aim I will first try to artic-
ulate a “logic of mechanisms” because it constitutes a sharp contrast to 
the “logic of organisms”.
2. Mechanisms as a form of explanation
For decades, Carl Hempel’s theory of explanation was the backbone of 
theorizing about explanation. In contemporary philosophy of biology 
there is broad consensus that the explanative relevance of biological 
modeling cannot be captured by Hempel’s account. As «life scientists 
commonly seek to uncover the mechanism responsible for the phenom-
enon of interest», in the life sciences phenomena are explained by mech-
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anisms [Bechtel et al. 2010, 322]. Leading advocates of what is often 
described as “New Mechanical Philosophy” or “New Mechanism” ar-
gue that in many fields of science what is considered a satisfactory ex-
planation requires providing a description of a mechanism. The gener-
ation of a phenomenon by a mechanism is demonstrated by a model. In 
systems biology it is always a computer simulation that shows how the 
Explanandum results from a mathematical model consisting typically 
of differential equations [Brigandt 2018, 985]. At the present computer 
simulations of both small and large systems of equations are considered 
mechanistic explanations. Complex mathematical models consisting of 
coupled differential equations have been introduced among other things 
for the computation of the cell cycle [e.g. Karr et al. 2012], genetic and 
metabolic oscillations, signal pathways within and between cells, and 
the prediction of the development of spatial patterns during embryonic 
morphogenesis [Murray 2002; Meinhardt & Gierer 2000]. Mathematics 
has become indispensable in contemporary biological explanations.
3. Logic of (biological) mechanisms
Systems biologists employ a variety of different methods depending 
on the problem to be solved. Systems biologists who model organis-
mic processes as systems of differential equations often focus on the 
modeling of the dynamics of genetic, metabolic and signal pathways.1 
They also study the behavior of larger network systems constituted by 
coupling these pathways, such as might occur in embryogenesis.2 From 
their perspective, the final-state-directedness of embryogenesis, cell cy-
cle, and other final-state-directed phenomena is thereby reduced to the 
dynamics of enormously complex systems of positively and negatively 
coupled biomolecular reactions, represented by positive and negative 
feedback loops in the corresponding diagrams.
In order to demonstrate how this approach works, I will introduce 
an exemplary case of the mathematical analysis of a biological system 
implemented with differential equations. Timothy Gardner, Charles 
1  Tyson et al. 2003; Murray 2002; Van Hoek 2008.




Cantor, and James Collins presented a model for the mutual regulation 
of the activity of two genes. This model is often considered a milestone 
of synthetic biology [Gardner et al. 2000]. Both genes transcribe a so-
called repressor protein which blocks the activity of the other gene, so 
that both genes inhibit each other. The dynamics of this system consists 
of two interwoven causal relationships that can be described by two 
quantities, U and V, which are associated with the concentrations of 
each repressor protein respectively. The variation of the concentrations 
of both proteins can be represented by two coupled differential equa-
tions [Gardner et al. 2000, 339].




The quantities U and V are variables because their values change with 
time. In modeling, the temporal behavior of variables represents the phe-
nomenon to be explained. In other words, the values of the variables are 
the Explanandum. The quantities α1, α2, β and γ are parameters. Their 
value is determined by the experimenters. It is important to keep in mind 
that the dynamics of the system is not merely the result of the time-de-
pendent variables U and V, but depends also on the value of the four pa-
rameters α1, α2, β and γ which cannot be varied by the system’s dynamics. 
Certain combinations of the four parameters lead to a specific behavior of 
the system, i.e. to specific dynamics of the variables U and V.
Parameters are either constants or entail many constants the val-
ue of which cannot be varied by the system’s dynamics. In most cases 
all parameters are preset by the model makers and are held constant 
in experiments with real organisms and corresponding computer sim-
ulations. In other words, parameters are externally fixed factors that 
cannot be varied by the system’s own dynamics. The reason for this is 
that those quantities canalize the development of the time-dependent 
variables so that they are logical presuppositions of the systems possible 
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dynamics. The parameters are an important part of the Explanans.
A few years ago, van Hoek suggested a metabolic pathway model 
for the behavior of the bacterium Escherichia coli. Following the same 
methodology as that of the authors introduced above, he employed ten 
coupled differential equations for the solution of which he used 58 pa-
rameters [Van Hoek 2008, 18-20, 45-47]. In the last decade, several re-
search groups performed computer simulations of whole cells. A model 
of the cell cycle of yeast operating with differential equations was pub-
lished a few years ago [Panning et al. 2007]. In this model the yeast cell 
is reduced to 36 state variables. For their computation the model makers 
use 143 parameters. So, on average for the computation of one variable 
they use four parameters.
Systems biological models share an essential feature: They operate 
on the same implicit assumption about the roles of different causal fac-
tors – variables, parameters, and equations – in dynamics of biological 
systems. For the purpose of this essay, this is the most important feature 
of those methods.
I use the term “causal factors” to refer to all factors that contribute 
to the determination of a dynamic system’s development. In what fol-
lows I will use the generic term “factors” to refer to causal factors. In 
formal models used in both physics and systems biology there are two 
clearly distinct kinds of factors at work: intrinsic and extrinsic ones.
Intrinsic factors of formal models include those factors which are 
generated by the system’s dynamics itself. They are the time-dependent 
values of the variables. In formulas 1 and 2 the changing values of U 
and V are the only intrinsic factors.
Extrinsic factors of formal models include all the factors that con-
tribute to the generation of intrinsic factors but are not influenced by 
any intrinsic dynamics, i.e., the respective state of the system. Parame-
ters, such as the quantities α1, α2, β, and γ are extrinsic factors.
In this essay, “intrinsic” means “dependent upon dynamics” and 
“extrinsic” means “independent of dynamics”.
In the formalisms of systems biology the most complex factors are 
described by the differential equations or the systems of coupled dif-
ferential equations (e.g. formulas 1 and 2) which determine the varia-




the less complex intrinsic and extrinsic factors, i.e. the variables and 
the parameters. In contemporary formalisms, the formal structures are 
not influenced by the system’s change of states. They are static, which 
clearly qualifies them as extrinsic factors. As relations between simpler 
factors, they can be characterized as second-order extrinsic factors. 
Analogously, variables can be understood as first-order intrinsic fac-
tors and parameters as first-order extrinsic factors. A system of coupled 
differential equations such as the system consisting of formulas 1 and 2, 
is a single indivisible second-order extrinsic factor.
There is an essential difference between first order intrinsic factors 
on the one hand and first- and second-order extrinsic factors on the 
other: Whereas new values of the variables are continuously generated, 
all extrinsic factors are usually held constant during an experiment or 
a computer simulation of a process. In other words, all extrinsic factors 
are static.
In the models of systems biology the number of first-order extrinsic 
factors are several times the number of the first order intrinsic ones.
4. Logic of organisms
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic factors can be applied to 
organisms as well if the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” are interpreted 
as “dependent upon dynamics” and “independent from dynamics” re-
spectively, as introduced above. First-order intrinsic organismic factors 
are all material and energetic quantities generated by an organism that 
have an effect on its dynamics, such as the concentration of regulato-
ry proteins, scleroproteins, hormones, ATP molecules etc. This cate-
gory includes also environmental factors that the organism influences 
in order to improve the conditions of its life. In this sense, regulated 
atmospheric humidity and room temperature are first-order intrinsic or-
ganismic factors as well. First-order extrinsic organismic factors are all 
factors that influence but are not affected by an organism’s dynamics. 
Those factors include initial conditions, such as the parental genetic 
constitution and the environment of a zygote at the time of its ferti-
lization, fundamental laws of nature that determine physicochemical 
processes, and environmental conditions that cannot be changed by or-
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ganismic activity, such as gravitation, radioactivity, geological process-
es, solar activity, and the forms and quantities of available energy and 
matter. However, one of the most essential characteristics of life is that 
the borderline between first-order intrinsic and extrinsic factors is flu-
ent. Especially during evolution of intelligence some of the extrinsic en-
vironmental factors just mentioned have been transformed to intrinsic 
ones. The idea of second-order factors applies also to organisms, as we 
will see shortly. However, real organisms do not obey the logic of mech-
anisms for two reasons: First, in sharp contrast to those mechanisms, 
organisms are able to change the value of most quantities that in sys-
tems biology models are represented by parameters. In contrast to these 
contemporary biological formalisms, in real organisms the number of 
extrinsic factors is only a tiny fraction of the number of all dynam-
ic quantities. In other words, in real organisms the number of first-or-
der intrinsic factors (variables) exceeds by many times the number of 
first-order extrinsic ones (parameters). Second, during growth, regener-
ation, and re-adaptation of unicellular and multi-cellular organisms and 
in the embryogenesis of the latter a vast array of new sorts of proteins 
is synthesized. This requires that the material constitution of each real 
organism is permanently subject to change. As a result, the structure 
of an organism is a sequence of permanently generated new relations 
between its own first-order intrinsic and extrinsic factors, which in cur-
rent systems biological formalisms are represented by systems of fixed 
differential equations (e.g. formulas 1 and 2). As noted above, in current 
biological formalisms those systems of equations are second-order ex-
trinsic factors. In contrast, even in primitive unicellular organisms, re-
lations between both kinds of first-order factors are themselves intrinsic 
factors. This is the case, since, on the one side, they are permanently 
varied by the organism’s dynamics, even though in some cases only 
slightly, and, on the other side, they canalize this dynamics. Embryonic 
processes display an even more radical dynamics. A system of differen-
tial equations representing the development of an embryo would have 
to undergo a transformation that is so radical that not only most of its 
parameters would have to be replaced by variables but also that formal 
system’s structure – i.e., form and number of the equations themselves 




rity is reached. To put it in a nutshell: In real organisms second-order 
factors are necessarily intrinsic factors or, in other words, there are no 
second-order extrinsic factors in real organisms [Koutroufinis 2017].
5. Individual self
The term “second-order intrinsic factor” refers to the dynamical and 
plastic self-perpetuating structure of the organism. In other words, it 
designates a living being’s most fundamental organizing principle. All 
aspects of its material and energetic constitution are organized around 
the maintenance and perpetuation of this form of organization. In a 
paper published with Terrence W. Deacon I suggest that «a dynamical 
process organized in such a way that it minimizes the probability that 
its organization will be lost» may be labeled a self [Deacon et al. 2014, 
417]. Based on this processual understanding of selfhood, a second-or-
der intrinsic factor can be characterized as a “self”. A self is a process 
that reinforces the synergistic relationship between its elements.3 The 
organismic self is «a form of individuality» [Deacon 2012, 309] be-
cause in any second-order intrinsic factor the related first-order intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors become inextricably interwoven so that the whole 
self-determining process cannot be physically divided into more ele-
mentary processes.4 The individuality of the second-order intrinsic pro-
cess is due to the inextricable causal interweavement of its permanently 
occurring first-order processes.
A very widespread position in the writings of contemporary bio-
scientists and philosophers of biology who subscribe to a form of ma-
terialism that could be described as “scientific materialism” is that 
organismic dynamics is canalized by constraints. Deacon thinks that 
«self is defined by constraints» [Deacon 2012, 473] and ascribes what 
he labels the «reflective individuation» of the organism to a «special 
form of closure» [Deacon 2012, 468]. In his highly sophisticated book 
Incomplete Nature, he claims that organismic order and individuality 
3  According to Deacon a self is a synergy of parts that reinforces their synergistic 
relationship [Deacon 2012, 469].
4  See also Deacon 2012, 469.
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emerge from the canalizing causal action that interwoven dynamical 
constraints mutually exert on each other. Maël Montévil, Matteo Mos-
sio, and Alvaro Moreno define constraints as «contingent causes, ex-
erted by specific structures or dynamics, which reduce the degrees of 
freedom of the system on which they act» [Montévil & Mossio 2015, 
181], so that «they simplify its description, and contribute to provide an 
adequate explanation of its behaviour, which would otherwise remain 
underdetermined» [Mossio & Moreno 2010, 271]. Mossio and Moreno 
argue that organisms «maintain themselves […] through a self-main-
taining organization of constraints» [Mossio & Moreno 2010, 276] each 
of which exerts a causal influence on the generation of other constraints 
while its own generation is reciprocally influenced by some of them so 
that the whole system of constraints achieves «organizational closure» 
[Mossio & Moreno 2010, 277, 275-280; Montévil & Mossio 2015, 186f.]. 
While these authors do not reduce organisms to organizational closure, 
they claim that the latter «can be taken as an essential mark of living 
organisms» [Mossio & Moreno 2010, 285].
Although I do not doubt the importance of constraints, I think that 
there are good reasons for not attributing an essential role to constraints 
within our understanding of organisms. My skepticism is due to the 
fact that any scientific explanation of organisms articulated by a formal 
model that allows a quantitative description of the organismic dynam-
ics (e.g. prediction of variables) cannot forgo mechanisms. This is true 
regardless of whether the model is based on organizational closure or 
any other possible form of constraint-based organization. This means, 
however, that as soon as constraint-based organization is translated into 
a formal language, it must be described in mechanistic terms and is thus 
necessarily subject to the logic of mechanisms. Even if a future model 
of organizational closure that goes far beyond what is imaginable today 
succeeds in computing all constraints, the computation will necessarily 
employ parameters and thus first order extrinsic factors that it cannot 
generate autonomously. Obviously, insofar as these extrinsic factors act 
as constraints on the computation of variables, this model of organismic 
dynamics is not organizationally closed. In other words, organization-
ally-closed systems of constraints are nothing but attractive narrations 




lapse as soon as they are articulated in formal languages that operate 
with mechanisms. For this reason, I think that an alternative under-
standing of organismic selfhood must be developed which is based on 
metaphysical assumptions that are alien to contemporarily established 
scientific materialism.
Before undertaking such an attempt it is important to consider that 
there is a «critical but contingent relationship between selves and phys-
ical boundaries» that complicates the identification of biological selves 
[Deacon 2012, 471]. Since any living being maintains itself through a 
selective exchange with its environment, we must bear in mind that 
«[t]he organism is not a solitary, self-creating artist» [Wolfe 2010, 206]. 
Hence, any adequate theory of organismic selfhood and individuality 
must necessarily be an organism-environment theory.
6. Umwelt
An organism incorporates within its organization information about 
those aspects of its environment that are relevant to its self-perpetuation 
and reproduction. This information is embodied in the specific organi-
zation of the set of processes that maintain organismic integrity with re-
spect to potentially beneficial or harmful aspects of its environment. In 
1909, Jakob von Uexküll introduced the term Umwelt referring to those 
features of a living being’s environment to which it is sensitive [Uex-
küll 1909]. In other words, Umwelt refers to those features of a living 
being’s surroundings that are meaningful to it. Therefore Umwelt may 
be translated as “meaningful environment”. The creation of a self-other 
boundary by the organism incorporates a representation of its Umwelt 
[Deacon et al. 2014, 417]. Umwelt and self are two sides of the same 
coin. This is characterized by biosemiotician Kalevi Kull’s translation 
of Umwelt as «self-centered world» [Kull 2010, 348-349].
Uexküll’s work deserves particular attention because he not only 
created an organism-environment theory but anchored it in the philoso-
phy of Immanuel Kant which clearly does not subscribe to a metaphys-
ics of scientific materialism. Of course, this applies also to the theories 
of other seminal thinkers of the last century, such as Bergson, White-
head, and Jonas. However, Uexküll succeeded more than anybody else 
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in the elaboration of an organism-environment theory that is grounded 
both philosophically and biologically.
Uexküll considers animals subjects, which in virtue of their struc-
ture select stimuli within their surroundings and respond to each in a 
specific way. The stimuli build «certain indications [Merkmale], which 
enable the animal to guide its movements, much as the signs at sea 
enable the sailor to steer his ship» [Uexküll 1926, 126]. Many indica-
tions are merged together into coherent units that occupy a moment 
and a place or a direction in space [Uexküll 1926, 78, 97-99]. Uex-
küll calls them “things” (Dinge). Those units are instantaneous data of 
experience. “Things” are events rather than persistent entities. Animal 
and human subjects synthesize them unconsciously [Uexküll 1926, 93]. 
The unconscious creative process also creates more complex cognitive 
entities – “objects” (Objekte). An object is an enduring thing, a thing 
extended in time. It is an enduring sequence of data of experience that 
occupies a particular spatiotemporal region in the subject’s perceptual 
field. Objects constitute higher units of experience than things [Uexküll 
1926, 98] and can be involved in lawful causal relations. Uexküll calls 
objects that possess a framework merging their parts into an organ-
ized whole “implements” (Gegenstände). Implements occupy the high-
est level of complexity. They are objects in which «the parts stand in 
the same relation to the whole as the individual sounds to the melody» 
[Uexküll 1926, 103]. Implements are organized wholes of data of expe-
rience. The perceptual environment of both humans and most animals 
is constituted by these three kinds of cognitive entities: things, objects, 
and implements.
According to Uexküll, all three are differently complex products of 
one and the same unifying process, the so-called apperception process 
[Uexküll 1926, 78]. The apperception process lies at the root of all per-
ception [Uexküll 1926, 15]:
Whatever the perception, the activity is of the same kind; dif-
ferent qualities are constantly being associated into unities. The 
power of the subject [Gemüt] that exercises this apperceptive ac-
tivity is for ever creating new structures; in its very nature, it is a 




An important fundament of Uexküll’s epistemologically-founded biolo-
gy of subjects is the assumption that the apperception process, although 
lawful, cannot be mathematically described [Uexküll 1926, 45]. For 
this and other reasons, biology cannot be reduced to physics [Uexküll 
1926, 33, 46, 70, 71, 91, 103] and biological explanation cannot be re-
duced to mechanisms. Uexküll’s conviction about the non-reducibility 
of biology to physics is supported by Kant’s concept of pure or original 
or transcendental apperception, which is the underpinning philosophy 
of Uexküllian apperception process. In his Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant introduces pure apperception as a spontaneous a priori activity of 
the subject. It synthesizes the manifold of its representations to a unity 
without being determined by the nature of the synthesized elements (the 
representations) [Kant 1998, B 129-132].
Combination does not lie in the objects […] but is rather only an 
operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further 
than the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the mani-
fold of given representations under unity of apperception, which 
principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition 
[Kant 1998, B 134-5].
According to Kant, the unity of perceived data in all our representations 
«can be executed only by the subject itself» [Kant 1998, B 130] that is 
by a transcendental factor that can never be an empirical content of 
human perceptions. Kant’s conviction that the unity of experience is 
executed only by the subject goes against the objectivism and anti-tran-
scendentalism which characterizes physics and biology at present and 
in Uexküll’s time.
Kant’s transcendental philosophy was framed uniquely for human 
subjects. Uexküll extended Kant’s theory of subjectivity to a general 
biological theory that he applied to both human and animal subjects. 
He considers human and animal subjects to be transcendental, spatio-
temporally non-localizable unities of apperception. The apperception 
process unfolds lawfully and determines the synthetic process of per-
ception. For that reason, the apperception process can be considered 
the central category of subjectivity. All three kinds of cognitive entities 
– things, objects, and implements – are products of synthetic activi-
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ties that constitute different manifestations of the apperception process 
which is a spontaneous act of synthesis. Due to its spontaneity, the syn-
thesis of cognitive elements to a more complex unit is a creative mental 
act that is neither determined by the nature of the synthesized elements 
nor by the relations between them.
Despite the fact that Uexküll aimed «to extend Kant’s transcenden-
tal philosophy to the entire living realm» – an attempt that Kant would 
likely reject – «both shared the same solution: subjective spontaneity» 
– and considered «the subject as the center of initiatives and not as a 
recording black box» [Esposito 2020, 38f.].
Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt can be extended to a theory of the or-
ganism’s internal organization. In contemporary biosemiotics the cells 
of a multicellular organism are considered subjects that communicate 
through the intensive exchange of molecules serving as signs. In other 
words, the cells of an organism interact with each other through contin-
ual processes of mutual interpretation. From an Uexküllian perspective, 
a multicellular organism is the Umwelt of its own cells or, in the words 
of Claude Bernard and George Canguilhem, a «milieu interieur»:
From the biological point of view, one must understand that the 
relationship between the organism and the environment is the 
same as that between the parts and the whole of an organism. 
The cell is a milieu for intracellular elements; it itself lives in an 
interior milieu, which is sometimes on the scale of the organ and 
sometimes of the organism; the organism itself lives in a milieu 
that, in a certain fashion, is to the organism what the organism is 
to its components [Canguilhem 2008, 111].
7. Conclusion
The second-order intrinsic causal factor is the plastic self-determin-
ing material-energetic structure of the organism. It is the organismic 
self that determines both the relation between the internal parts of the 
organism and the relation between the organism and its Umwelt. Its 




tions. From the anti-mechanistic perspective that I have defended in this 
essay, the self is the manifestation of a creative subject that transcends 
the logic of mechanisms for principal reasons. The organismic subject, 
which is the cause of the self, may be approached from the perspectives 
of various philosophers, such as Whitehead, Bergson, Jonas, and Uex-
küll. In this essay, I have focused on Uexküll because he considered 
more thoroughly than any other thinker the causal and logical inter-
weavement of subject, organism, and environment.
From an Uexküllian perspective, if the organism is understood as 
the Umwelt of its own components, the generation and transformation 
of the second-order intrinsic factor – which is the organism’s plastic 
structure – must be conceived of as the product of a creative spon-
taneous subject, the activity of which transcends any known form of 
mechanism.
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Abstract
Organisms exhibit a specific form of biological individuality. In contemporary bio-
sciences, explanations of organismic dynamics are often reduced to mechanistic de-
scriptions. It is taken for granted that complex biological processes of different kinds 
are reducible to molecular and other “mechanisms”. In this paper, I show (1) that 
organisms express a form of individuality that is realized by a particular kind of 
causality and (2) that organismic causality transcends the logic of mechanisms used 
in contemporary biosciences. Based on new insights about organismic dynamics as 
well as Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of “Umwelt” (meaningful environment), I ana-
lyze organismic causality and show that the latter constitutes a form of selfhood alien 
to both inorganic nature and mechanisms.
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